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Abstract
Essays in Macroeconomic Policy
by
Meng-Ting Chen

Adviser: Professor Sangeeta Pratap

This dissertation consists of three chapters that cover topics on macroeconomic policies.
Chapter 1 - Markups, Labor Share, and Wage Dispersion. Increasing market power has
an impact on labor market behavior. This paper argues that the decline in the aggregate
wage after 1980 comes from both increasing aggregate product markup and decreasing
aggregate labor markdown. Most of the decline is driven by the sharp decline in lower
wage percentiles, which also contributes to the increasing wage dispersion. Further, both
firms’ monopoly and monopsony power play important roles in explaining the decline in
the aggregate labor share. I build a heterogeneous firm model that features endogenous
variable markup and wage dispersion, which shows that firms’ market power in both
product and labor markets are equally important in explaining the decline in the labor
share. The most important channel of the decline in the aggregate wage is the decline
in the wage at the lower percentiles and the increase in wage dispersion through firm
monopsony power.
Chapter 2 - Do Direct-administered municipalities work? Evidence from Chongqing
municipality in China (with Jiakai Zhang). It has been widely observed that China has
experienced a high growth rate. The central government has tried to implement several
policies to promote local economic development after the 1978 economic reform. This

v
paper draws upon a quasi-experiment in China’s regional administrative hierarchy to
investigate the effect of a city-upgrading policy. This policy upgrades prefecture-level
cities to municipalities with the same administrative level as the provinces. Chongqing is
the only city recently designated as the municipality in 1997. Due to a small number of
treated and control units, this paper adopts the synthetic control method. We find that the
city-upgrading policy increased Chongqing’s GDP by more than 40% on average in the
following four years after 1996. Additionally, we also find the positive spillover effects of
the municipalities on economic growth using the spatial panel model. Finally, we examine
the direct and spillover effects of the municipalities on various aspects, including foreign
direct investment, urbanization, local government revenue, and total factor productivity.
Chapter 3 - On the Effectiveness of Capital Controls: A Synthetic Control Method
Approach (with Richard J Nugent III). We evaluate financial stability and capital flows
management objectives of capital controls in the context of four capital control events:
removing or imposing controls on capital inflows and removing or imposing controls on
capital outflows. Using the synthetic control method, we solve the endogeneity problem
between the decision the use capital controls and the outcomes of interest. We find new
evidence that capital controls are not consistently effective in reaching financial stability
outcomes but are consistent in reaching capital flows management outcomes. We compare
our results to estimates using difference-in-difference and carry out placebo analysis.
Finally, we use synthetic difference-in-difference to correct for the parallel trend bias and
show that the results still hold.

Acknowledgments
First, I’m deeply indebted to my advisor, Professor Sangeeta Pratap, who help me to
achieve the impossible. She inspired me on the research topics and always encouraged me
to think thoroughly about the research questions. She provided enormous help throughout
the process and supported me on any obstacles that I encountered along the way. I cannot
even possibly describe how privileged I am to have her as my advisor.
I especially want to thank Professor Zadia Feliciano for her guidance in teaching at
Queens College and for collaborating with me on a research project. She leads me toward
a successful Ph.D. career. I thank Professor Matthew Baker for his valuable comments
on improving my dissertation. I am very grateful to my co-authors and friends, Richard
Nugent III and Jiakai Zhang. Dr. Nugent brings me into his research project and provides
endless helps in writing a decent dissertation. To me, he is a mentor who shares the
knowledge for succeeding in Ph.D. life. Dr. Zhang, who is my cohort, accompanies me
from the first day of my Ph.D. to the end. He constantly encourages me to focus on research
and relentlessly reminds me of every detail. My appreciations for Prof. Feliciano, Prof.
Baker, Dr. Nugent, and Dr. Zhang are beyond words.
I am thankful for my cohorts, especially Rubaiyat Tasnim. She always brings a positive
attitude to me and supports me in every difficulty. I am also thankful to my two master’s
program professors in Taiwan, Professor Jhy-yuan Shieh, and Professor Yu-sia Chen, for
their encouragement and supports in pursuing a Ph.D. in Economics.
vi

vii
Last but not least, I want to thank and dedicate my dissertation to my girlfriend and
her family. She always believes in me and supports me in my dream without any hesitation.
Also, her family gives me the security blanket that helps me to be focused and successfully
finish my dissertation.

Contents
Contents

viii

List of Tables

x

List of Figures

xii

1 Markups, Labor Share, and Wage Dispersion

1

1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.2 Motivating Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

1.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

1.4 Quantitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

1.5 The Consequences of Market Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47

1.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

1.7.1

Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

1.7.2

Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

1.7.3

Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

2 Do Direct-administered municipalities work? Evidence from Chongqing municipality in China

62
viii

CONTENTS

ix

2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

2.2 Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

2.3 The Effect of City-Upgrading Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

2.4 Further Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

86

2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.6.1

Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

2.6.2

Synthetic Control Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

2.6.3

Production Function Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

3 On the Effectiveness of Capital Controls: A Synthetic Control Method Approach116
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.2 Empirical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
3.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
3.6.1

Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

3.6.2

Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

3.6.3

Synthetic Difference-in-Difference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

Bibliography

174

List of Tables
1.1 The effects of firm-level markups and markdowns on firm-level labor shares 11
1.2 The effects of firm-level markups and markdowns on firm-level wages . . .

12

1.3 Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

1.4 Labor Share Decomposition of 10-year Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

1.5 Wage Dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

1.6 Counterfactual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

1.7 Data v.s. Model: The effects of markups and markdowns on labor shares . .

46

1.8 Data v.s. Model: The effects of markups and markdowns on wages . . . . .

47

1.9 Markup comparison: Full-sample v.s. Sub-sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

1.10 Targeted Moment and Untargeted Moment

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

1.11 Counterfactual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

1.12 Counterfactual Labor Share Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

2.1 Baseline model: Economic growth and development . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

2.2 Synthetic weights for Chongqing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

2.3 GDP predictor means before Chongqing upgrading . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

2.4 The direct and spillover effects of municipalities on economic growth . . .

85

2.5 The direct and spillover effects of Municipalities on FDI . . . . . . . . . . .

88

2.6 The direct and spillover effects of Municipalities on urbanization

89

x

. . . . .

LIST OF TABLES

xi

2.7 The direct and spillover effects on fiscal revenue of local government . . . .

93

2.8 Municipality and firm’s TFP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

96

2.9 The direct and spillover effects of Municipality on aggregate TFP . . . . . .

97

2.10 TFP Dispersion Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98

2.11 Municipality and TFP Dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.12 Variable Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.2 Results Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
3.3 Difference in Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3.4 Identifying Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
3.5 Country List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
3.6 Variable Definitions and Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
3.7 Donor Pool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
3.8 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
3.9 Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
3.10 Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
3.11 Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

List of Figures
1.1 The Evolution of Markup, Wage, Labor Share, and Markdown . . . . . . . .

9

1.2 Wage Distribution and Employment-Weighted Percentile Wage . . . . . . .

9

1.3 Effects of Markup and Markdown on Labor Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

1.4 Product Market Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

1.5 Labor Share and Wage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

1.6 The Evolution of Markup, Wage, Labor Share, and Markdown (Model) . . .

29

1.7 Untarget Moment Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

1.8 Labor Share Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

1.9 Wage Dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

1.10 Aggregate Demand Elasticity and Aggregate Markup . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

1.11 Labor Market Competitiveness and Markdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

1.12 Market Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

1.13 Counterfactual Labor Share, Wage, and Wage Standard Deviation

. . . . .

39

1.14 Counterfactual Wage Percentile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

2.1 Structure of Chinese Government (End of 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

68

2.2 Number of prefectures and municipalities since 1949

70

. . . . . . . . . . . .

2.3 The proportions of Transfer Payments in Four municipalities and Prefectural
Cities on average . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
xii

71

LIST OF FIGURES

xiii

2.4 City-Level TFP v.s. Transfer Payments Per Capita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72

2.5 City-Level TFP v.s. Spatial Lag Transfer Payments Per Capita . . . . . . . .

73

2.6 Trends in GDP: Chongqing versus Synthetic Chongqing . . . . . . . . . . .

78

2.7 GDP between Chongqing and Synthetic Chongqing

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

2.8 GDP gaps in Chongqing and placebo gaps in all 36 control cities . . . . . .

80

2.9 Ratio of postintervention RMSPE to preintervention RMSPE: Chongqing
and Control Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

82

2.10 GDP gaps between Chongqing and Sparse Synthetic Controls . . . . . . . .

83

2.11 TFP dispersion: Municipality vs Prefectural city . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

2.12 Geographical distribution of municipalities and donor pool cities

. . . . . 104

2.13 GDP gaps between Chongqing and Sparse Synthetic Controls . . . . . . . . 105
2.14 Placebo Graph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.15 TFP: Municipality and prefectural city over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
2.16 TFP dispersion: Municipality and prefectural city over time . . . . . . . . . 107
2.17 TFP dispersion: Municipality, Second-tier city and others . . . . . . . . . . 108
2.18 TFP dispersion: Chongqing, big three, second-tier city and others . . . . . 109
3.1 Economic Conditions in Russia 1995-2015

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

3.2 Financial Stability for Russia & the Synthetic Control 1995-2010 . . . . . . 131
3.3 Capital Flows Management for Russia & the Synthetic Control 1995-2010 . 132
3.4 Economic Conditions in Egypt 1995-2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.5 Financial Stability for Egypt & the Synthetic Control 1995-2011 . . . . . . 135
3.6 Capital Flows Management for Egypt & the Synthetic Control 1995-2011 . 135
3.7 Economic Conditions in Kenya 1995-2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.8 Financial Stability for Kenya & the Synthetic Control 1995-2010 . . . . . . 137
3.9 Capital Flows Management for Kenya & the Synthetic Control 1995-2010 . 138

LIST OF FIGURES

xiv

3.10 Economic Conditions in Nigeria 1995-2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
3.11 Financial Stability for Nigeria & the Synthetic Control 1995-2009 . . . . . . 140
3.12 Capital Flows Management for Nigeria & the Synthetic Control 1995-2009 142
3.13 Placebo Simulations for Russia 1995-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
3.14 Placebo Simulations for Egypt 1995-2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.15 Placebo Simulations for Kenya 1995-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
3.16 Placebo Simulations for Nigeria 1995-2009

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

3.17 Russia: SDID vs. SCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
3.18 Egypt: SDID vs. SCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
3.19 Kenya: SDID vs. SCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
3.20 Nigeria: SDID vs. SCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Chapter 1
Markups, Labor Share, and Wage
Dispersion
1.1

Introduction

What are the reasons for the decline in the aggregate labor share? What are the sources
of the rising wage dispersion? Recent research provides different explanations for the
decline in the aggregate labor share such as a fall in the relative price of investment goods,
technology change, rising product markups, and productivity dispersion.1 This paper
provides another mechanism that explains this fact: increasing monopsony power in the
labor market. Many works focus on the firm’s performance in product markets and the
implications of product market power (Decker et al., 2016; Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2017;
Akcigit and Ates, 2019). However, I show that the firm’s decisions in the labor market
also plays an important role in explaining the decline in the labor share. Moreover, the
rising monopsony power of firms provides another explanation for the increase in wage
dispersion.
1 See

Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013), Elsby et al. (2013), Autor et al. (2017a), Kehrig and Vincent
(2017), De Loecker et al. (2020), and Gouin-Bonenfant et al. (2018).
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This paper studies the role of firms’ market power in both the product market and
the labor market as drivers of the decline in the aggregate labor share and the aggregate
wage after 1980. Markup is the firm’s ability to charge a higher price over its marginal
cost. A rise in markup shows a firm’s ability to claim more market power in product
markets. Similarly, a wage markdown is defined as the firm’s ability to pay a lower
wage relative to its marginal revenue product of labor; it shows the worker’s ability to
bargain over their wages. In a competitive labor market, markdowns would be equal
to unity, that is, workers get paid their marginal product of labor. A markdown below
unity indicates that the worker has less bargaining power, and, therefore, the firm has
monopsony power. This paper argues that the rising aggregate product markup and falling
aggregate wage markdown over the past three decades both play an important role in the
declining aggregate labor share and aggregate wage. Also, the residual wage dispersion
among workers with identical characteristics accounts for a substantial proportion of
wage inequality. This wage differentials can be rationalized by the effect from firms
heterogeneity of markups and markdowns.
I first follow the methodology by De Loecker et al. (2020) to show the evolution of
markups based on firm-level Compustat data for the U.S. economy. The aggregate markup
increased from 18% in 1980 to 33% in 2018. I further consider factor market distortions
in this paper. I use the methodology by Hall (1988) to compute the firm-level labor
markdown. The aggregate markdown has declined from 0.99 to 0.85, indicating a rise in
firms’ monopsony power from 1% to 18%. I then show that the aggregate log wage has
fallen 7.5%, the aggregate labor share has declined 23%, and the standard deviation of
the wage has risen 77% since 1980. Lastly, I document that the higher markup and lower
markdown are associated with a lower labor share. I also show that the 10th percentile of
wages has fallen since 1980, especially after 2000; whereas, the 90th percentile of wages
increased slightly over time; both the markup and markdown have a larger impact on the
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low percentiles of wages than on the high percentiles of wages. Specifically, wages on the
left tail of the wage distribution pull down the aggregate wage and drive up the wage
dispersion.
I then build a model using the Kimball (1995) aggregator, featuring heterogeneous
monopolistically competitive firms facing non-CES demand and workers on-the-job search
in the labor market. High-productivity firms face lower demand elasticity and charge
higher markups than low-productivity firms. When the product market is perfectly
competitive, the high-productivity firms also face less elastic labor supply and have larger
firm monopsony power relative to the low-productivity firms. Once the product market
becomes noncompetitive, firms operate at lower marginal revenue level and decrease
the wages they pay. Moreover, low-productivity firms find it more profitable to claim
higher firm monopsony power and reduce wages more than high-productivity firms. As a
consequence, low-productivity firms contribute the most to the decline in the aggregate
wage and the rise in wage dispersion. Both markup and markdown create a wedge between
firms’ revenue and cost. As a result, both increasing markup and decreasing markdown
cause the decline in the labor share.
To assess the model’s performance, I calibrate the model to match the aggregate
moments related to product market power: the aggregate markup, markup dispersion,
and sales dispersion; and two labor market moments: the aggregate markdown and the
replacement rate. The model correctly predict the trend and the level of the aggregate wage
and aggregate labor share as well as the trend of wage standard deviation. Moreover, the
model capture that, within 6-digit NAICS industry, 80% of the decline in the aggregate
labor share stems from the within firm component, firms adjust their labor share internally,
and the remaining 20% is explained by the between firm component, sales are reallocated
to the firms with low labor share. Most studies of the labor share have only investigated the
impact from between sectors reallocation effect, which this paper provides another source
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of the decline in labor share. Finally, the model can also reproduce the sharp decline in
the low percentile wage and the stable trend in the high percentile wage.
How does market power affect the labor share and wage dispersion? I answer this
question by simulating three counterfactual analyses one by one: decreasing demand
elasticity, falling labor market competitiveness, and increasing productivity dispersion. I
first find that, following decreasing demand elasticity, the markup channel explains 25% of
the decline in the labor share. Secondly, the markdown channel contributes 35% to this fall
after allowing for falling labor market competitiveness. Finally, the productivity channel,
by increasing productivity dispersion, causes the most of the decrease—up to 40%.
Most part of the rising markup is the result of the decline in demand elasticity parameters. The fall in demand elasticity allows firms to claim more markup and reduce
the wage they pay; hence, the higher the markup a firm has, the more it drops the wage.
The counterfactual result shows the markup channel causes the wage level and wage
dispersion to decline. On the other hand, I show that both workers’ job finding rate and
unemployment benefits fell over time, and these represent a lower labor market competitiveness. The decline in labor market competitiveness can explain the fall in the aggregate
markdown. A reduction in the labor market competitiveness allows a small firm to reduce
wages more and increase its firm monopsony power; therefore, the aggregate wage would
drop but wage dispersion would rise. I find that the markdown channel contributes to
the sharp decline in the aggregate wage and, in particular, to the low percentile wage the
most, especially after 2000. As a result, increasing wage dispersion is mainly driven by
the sharp drop in the low percentile wage. Finally, increasing productivity dispersion has
a positive effect on wages but the effect is almost offset by the effect from the markup.
Higher productivity dispersion allows high-productivity firms to increase their size and
pay higher wage; therefore, both the aggregate wage and wage dispersion would rise. I
find that an increase in productivity dispersion results in a rise in the aggregate wage
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and high percentile wages as well as an increase in the wage differential due to increasing
high percentile wages. All three groups of parameters contribute differently to the decline
in wages and the rise in wage dispersion. However, all these parameters would cause a
decline in the labor share.
Literature. This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it is related to
recent literature that studies the increasing market power of a few firms. De Loecker
et al. (2020) show that the sale-weighted average markup has increased substantially
since 1980 in the U.S., especially for a small portion of firms.2 Autor et al. (2017a) argue
that the rise in profits is an efficient outcome, reflecting the increasing importance of
”superstar” firms. However, the cost of markup could be substantially distorted. Edmond
et al. (2018) find that the aggregate markup accounts for about two-thirds of welfare costs,
and misallocation accounts for about one-third of welfare costs. Edmond et al. (2015)
argue that opening up to international trade strongly increases competition and reduces
markup distortions. In contrast to this literature, I focus on the consequences of product
markup on the labor market, especially wage dispersion.
Second, my paper is related to an emerging literature on the decline in the labor share.
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) show that the decline in the relative price of investment
goods induces firms to shift away from labor and toward capital which causes a decline
in the labor share. Alternately, Elsby et al. (2013) advocate for the role of offshoring
as an important driver of the labor share decline. Autor et al. (2017a) and Kehrig and
Vincent (2017) focus on reallocation in product market from firms with relatively high
measured labor shares to firms with low labor shares. Gouin-Bonenfant et al. (2018)
build a model to match Canadian data and show that the main driver of the labor share
decline is an increase in firm productivity dispersion. Unlike previous work, in my paper
2 The

phenomenon is widespread in all the developed countries (De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2018). The
firms’ granular effect can shape the aggregate phenomena (Gabaix, 2011).

CHAPTER 1. MARKUPS, LABOR SHARE, AND WAGE DISPERSION

6

the mechanism is reallocation in both in the product and labor markets. These resource
reallocations from low-productivity firms to high-productivity firms have a significant
effect on labor share distribution and wage dispersion.
My paper is also related to the literature on wage inequality. Antitrust regulators pay
little attention to labor market power despite the labor literature on firms’ market power
in the labor market (Staiger et al. (2010); Falch (2010); Ransom and Sims (2010)). This
monopsony in the labor market implies that firms have the ability to pay workers less
than their marginal product.3 Berger et al. (2019) develop a tractable quantitative general
equilibrium oligopsony model of the labor market and show welfare losses from labor
market power that range from 2.9 to 8.0% of lifetime consumption. Unlike Berger et al.
(2019), this paper deals with market competition that firms face and labor market search
friction.4 The model in this paper features heterogeneous firms engaging in monopolistic
competition with non-CES demand.5 On the other hand, workers are paid their marginal
product and are indifferent to where they work in a competitive labor market. Job search
and recruiting, however, are not frictionless processes that are required in a case of perfect
competition.6
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the motivating facts to guide the
model choice. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 discusses the model performance.
Section 5 provides simulation results for the counterfactuals and explains the effects of
3 Helpman et al. (2017) build the heterogeneous-firm model of trade and inequality and examine employer-

employee data for Brazil’s aftermath of trade. Coşar et al. (2016) use establishment-level data from Colombia
to estimate an open economy dynamic model that links trade to job flows and wages.
4 Coşar et al. (2016) connect the product market with the labor market in an open economy framework
but with CES demand.
5 I follow the Edmond et al. (2018) setup to build the firm competition in product markets in which more
productive firms are larger and face less elastic demand, and, so, they charge higher markups than less
productive firms. More importantly, firms can gain markups by increasing firms’ size and claiming more
market share; therefore, resource reallocates toward more productive and large firms. Due to economies of
scale, larger firms have lower costs, and, therefore, they can increase their market share.
6 Brown and Medoff (1989) suggest employer size as a measure of the job ladder rung for workers to
evaluate which firms they want to hire.
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markups and markdowns on the labor share and wages. Section 6 concludes.

1.2

Motivating Facts

In this section, I start by presenting the empirical evidence regarding the patterns of
aggregate markup, markdown, labor share, and wages in the U.S. economy. I establish
the key stylized facts about the relationship between market power, the labor share, and
wages that guide the theoretical model developed in Section 3.
Data. I use microdata data from Compustat, which contains information on firm-level
financial statements in the U.S. covering from 1980 to 2018. Compustat includes every
sector, details up to the 6-digit NAICS level, and provides information on firm-level
financial statements that include sales, input expenditures, and capital stock information
over a substantial period. Markup is defined as price over marginal cost. I follow the
methodology in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) to estimate firm-level markup, and the
information of firms in Compustat allows me to measure markups, as in De Loecker et al.
(2020).78 On the other hand, markdown is defined as firm wage over its marginal revenue
product of labor. I use the methodology in Hall (1988) to obtain industry-wide labor cost
shares to measure the firm-level markdown.
7 Firms

listed in Compustat are publicly-traded firms, and they account for only 29% of private US
employment (Davis et al., 2006). De Loecker et al. (2020) deals with the selection of the publicly-traded
firms in two ways. First, they use the U.S. Censuses to compute markups. The results from the U.S. Censuses
are consistent with the results from Compustat. However, except for the manufacturing sector, which
contains establishment-level data on sales in addition to very comprehensive data on inputs (the total labor
wage bill, capital, materials, and so on), most of the other sector censuses (retail, wholesale, etc.) only
contain data on establishment-level sales, the wage bill, and not other nonlabor inputs. Second, they use the
population weights of each sector to adjust the weights in the Compustat sample and account for any bias
due to the sectoral composition.
8 Although Compustat does not have comprehensive data for the wage bill, the evolution of markups
for those reported companies is consistent with the evolution of markups for the entire sample. It is still
worth glancing at the markup’s effect on labor share and wages, but with caution. Whether the distribution
of the markup would affect wage dispersion is still unclear in the literature. To my knowledge, this is the
first paper to try to understand the effect of the markup distribution on wage inequality. Appendix 1.7.1
documents a more detailed comparison between the two samples.
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To compute the labor share, I follow Keller and Yeaple (2009) and use firms’ sales
minus staff expenses and operating income to construct material expense. I then compute
the value-added labor share as staff expense divided by sales minus material expense.9 The
value-added share used in the calculations below is the denominator of the relevant labor
share measure. Thus, I consider the payroll-to-value-added ratio as the firm’s sales weight.
In the following context, I refer to value-added as firm-level sales to avoid confusion.
Lastly, the firm-level wage is computed by the logarithm of the firm-level wage bills
divided by the number of employees.10
Empirics. I define the aggregate level of markup, wage, labor share, and markdown using
following weighting scheme.

Mt =

X
i

CW it µit ,

Wt =

X
i

EW it wit ,

LSt =

X
i

SW it lsit ,

Mdt =

X

SW it µdit

i

where the aggregate markup Mt is defined as the cost-weighted (CW it ) firm-level markup
µit in a given year. Similarly, the aggregate wage Wt is the employment-weighted (EW it )
firm-level wage wit , the aggregate labor share LSt is the sales-weighted (SW it ) firm-level
labor share lsit , and the aggregate markdown Mdt is the sale-weighted firm-level markdown
µdit .
Figure 1.1 panel (a) shows the evolution of the aggregate markup, wage, labor share,
and markdown, and panel (b) shows the evolution of the standard deviation of the markup
and wage from 1980 to 2018. I normalized all the variables to one in 1980. The aggregate
markup has increased from 1.18 in 1980 to 1.33 in 2018, which is around a 12.5% increase,
and the standard deviation of the markup increased around 70% through this period. The
aggregate wage slightly increased from 3.96 log points in 1980 to 4.01 log points in 1998
9 This income approach is the same methodology as in the System of National Accounts and is also used
in Gouin-Bonenfant et al. (2018).
10 Appendix 1.7.1 documents a more detail estimation procedure.
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Figure 1.1: The Evolution of Markup, Wage, Labor Share, and Markdown
(a) Average

(b) Standard Deviation

and then dropped to 3.67 log points in 2018, which is a 25% decline. Meanwhile, the
standard deviation of the wage has nearly doubled. Lastly, the aggregate labor share fell by
23%, and the aggregate labor markdown dropped by 15% from 1980 to 2018. Therefore,
as both product market power and labor market power grew over 40 years, the aggregate
labor share and the aggregate wage declined over time, and the wage dispersion rose
through out the period.
Figure 1.2: Wage Distribution and Employment-Weighted Percentile Wage
(a) Unweighted Wage Distribution

(b) Employment-Weighted Percentile Wage
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Figure 1.2 depicts the unweighted wage distribution before and after 2000, and the
weighted wage percentile over the time. The decline in the aggregate wage, especially
after 2000, came from the low percentile of wages. Specifically, the 10th percentile
declined substantially since 2000 from 3.5 log points to 2.5 log points; whereas, the 90th
percentile of wages increased slightly between 1980 and 2018. The wage distribution
expanded on both the left and right tail of the distribution after 2000. Most importantly,
the distribution features a thicker left tail, indicating that most firms pay lower wages
than average. Although only a small fraction of firms pay higher wages than before 2000,
the unweighted aggregate wage still declined.
Facts. I now show the empirical evidence that guides the theoretical model developed
below. Figure 1.3 shows the scatter plots of the correlation of the firm-level markup and
markdown with its value-added labor share. A higher markup and a lower markdown
are associated with a lower labor share. In Table 1.1, I report the regression coefficients
of the log of the labor share on the log of the firm’s markup and markdown; all columns
are clustering at the firm level. The first three specifications replicate the results in
De Loecker et al. (2020), without considering the markdown effect. Failing to control for
the markdown effect leads to the coefficients of markup being downward biased. The
fourth to sixth columns include the markdown effect. The effects of a markup on the labor
share are larger than the first three specifications, which are not controlling the markdown
effects. The results consistently indicate a negative coefficient of around -0.85 to -0.9 in
markup and a positive coefficient of around 0.37 to 0.4 in markdown. Therefore, as a
firm’s markup increases by 10%, its labor share decreases by around 9%; whereas, as a
firm’s markdown decrease by 10%, its labor share decreases by around 4%. It can thus
be suggested that both increasing the aggregate markup and decreasing the aggregate
markdown could be a reason for the decline in the aggregate labor share.
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Figure 1.3: Effects of Markup and Markdown on Labor Share
(a) Markup

(b) Markdown

Table 1.1: The effects of firm-level markups and markdowns on firm-level labor shares

Markup (log)

(1)
-0.719∗∗∗
(0.0647)

(2)
-0.656∗∗∗
(0.0650)

Labor Share (log)
(3)
(4)
∗∗∗
-0.570
-0.877∗∗∗
(0.0751) (0.0602)

(5)
-0.847∗∗∗
(0.0609)

(6)
-0.906∗∗∗
(0.0692)

0.399∗∗∗
(0.0247)

0.387∗∗∗
(0.0246)

0.375∗∗∗
(0.0207)

X

X

23282
0.155

X
23282
0.570

Markdown (log)
Year F.E.
Industry F.E.
Observations
R2

23282
0.053

X

X

23282
0.070

X
23282
0.513

23282
0.148

Notes: Columns (1) and (4) start the estimation without controlling for year fixed effects and industry
fixed effects. Columns (2) and (5) add control for year fixed effects. Columns (3) and (6) add control for
both year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level for all
regressions in parentheses. Levels of significance: ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.

To assess the effect of market power on wages, I test the prediction that heterogeneous
effects of markups and markdowns lead to a decline in the aggregate wage. I estimate the
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following specifications
log(wi ) = ηs + γt + log(µi ) + log(µdi ) + log(li ) + log(yi )
where µi and µdi denote the firm-level markup and markdown, respectively, wi is the
firm-level log wage, γt is year fixed effects, and ηs is industry fixed effects. I also run two
separate regressions for firm wages below the 25 percentile and above the 75 percentile.
Table 1.2: The effects of firm-level markups and markdowns on firm-level wages

Markup (log)

(1)
W
-0.855∗∗∗
(0.0402)

Wage (log)
(2)
(3)
< W25
> W75
∗∗∗
-0.885
-0.456∗∗∗
(0.0665) (0.0517)

Markdown (log)

0.875∗∗∗
(0.0122)

0.828∗∗∗
(0.0191)

0.505∗∗∗
(0.0304)

Employment (log)

-0.871∗∗∗
(0.0116)

-0.786∗∗∗
(0.0184)

-0.551∗∗∗
(0.0293)

Sales (log)

0.854∗∗∗
(0.0112)

0.772∗∗∗
(0.0176)

0.525∗∗∗
(0.0287)

X

X

X

X
23368
0.871

X
5858
0.867

X
5772
0.825

Year F.E.
Industry F.E.
Observations
R2

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the firm level for all regressions in parentheses. Levels of
significance: ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.

The results are shown in Table 1.2. The first column reports the effects of markup and
markdown on the overall firm-level wage. They are roughly the same; an increase of 10%
in markup or a decrease of 10% in markdown results in a 8.5% decline in wage. Most
importantly, these effects on the wage are mostly driven by the lower-wage percentile.
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As we move up to the higher percentile, both markup and markdown effects are half of
the general effects. According to these data, I can infer that the effect of markup and
markdown on the decline in the aggregate wage mainly comes through the channel of a
decline in the low-percentile wage.

1.3

Model

This section lays out the model to connect the firms’ product market decisions with its
labor market decisions. Heterogeneous monopolistically competitive firms face non-CES
demand as described by Edmond et al. (2018). Firms hire workers who can search while
employed or unemployed in the spirit of Burdett and Mortensen (1998). The model serves
two purposes. First, it allows me to see the effect of different market powers on wages
and the labor share. Second, it provides intuition for how a firm’s markup alters a firm’s
behavior in the labor market.
The Economy. In the model, the economy consists of a measure L of homogeneous, infinitely lived worker-consumers with preferences over final consumption. The final good
is produced by perfectly competitive firms using a bundle of differentiated intermediate
inputs. The differentiated intermediate inputs are produced by monopolistically competitive firms using labor. There is no aggregate uncertainty. I focus on characterizing the
steady-state equilibrium.
Preferences. Each period t, agents derive utility from the consumption of a composite
good, Ct and they do not save. The representative worker-consumer maximizes the
expected present value of their utility stream
∞
X
t=0

β t log Ct

(1.1)
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subject to the budget constraint
Ct = Wt Lt + Πt
where Wt denotes the aggregate real wage, Lt denotes the aggregate labor supply, and Πt
denotes the aggregate firm profits, net of the cost of creating new firms. Because firms are
owned by the representative worker-consumer they use the one-period discount factor
βCt /Ct+1 to discount future profit flows. In the steady state, I assume the real interest rate,
r = 1 − β1 .
Labor Market. Assume each worker-consumer consumes either wage wt when employed
or unemployment benefits bt when unemployed. The homogeneous worker-consumers
are receiving wage offers at the Poisson rate λut when unemployed and with the rate λet
when employed. Wage offers are random draws from a cumulative wage offer distribution
F(w) with upper support wmax , in which wages are increasing with firm productivity.
Workers can accept or reject a wage offer. Worker-consumers discount the future at a real
interest rate r and follow a reservation wage strategy where the minimum accepted wage
is denoted wt∗ . The value of being employed J with the current wage wt is:
rJ(wt ) = wt + λet

wmax

Z

wt

[J(z) − J(wt )] dF(z)dz − δt (J(wt ) − U )

(1.2)

where U is the value of unemployment. The first term is the current wage, the second term
represents the possibility of receiving more lucrative on-the-job offers with probability λet ,
and the third term is the value of moving into unemployment with probability δt after
exogenous job (firm) destruction.
The value of unemployment is

rU

= bt + λut

Z

wmax

wt∗

[E(z) − U ] dF(z)dz

(1.3)
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An unemployed worker-consumer receives benefits b and job offers at a rate λut . The
reservation wage is characterized by:11
wt∗

= bt + (λut

− λet )

wmax

Z

wt∗

1 − F(z)
dz,
r + δt + λet [1 − F(wt )]

(1.4)

which is the sum of the flow benefits in unemployment and the value of continued search
in unemployment. Focusing on the effects of firms’ market power on wage decisions, I
assume that the job arrival rates are the same when workers are unemployed or employed,
i.e, λut = λet = λt 12 , which implies wt∗ = bt .
In the steady state, the unemployment rate u can be derived from the condition that
the outflow from unemployment equals the inflow into unemployment
λ[1 − F(w∗ )]u = δ(L − u)

Rearranging yields
u=

δ
δ + λ[1 − F(w∗ )]

(1.5)

The stationary distribution of employment over wages implies that we can pin down the
realized distribution of wage G(w) from the following equation:
(L − u)G(w)[δ + λ[1 − F(w)]] = uλ[F(w) − F(w∗ )]

The left-hand side of the equation represents the flow of workers with wages below w,
who either flow to unemployment or receive a better job offer. The right-hand side of the
11 See

Appendix 1.7.2 for the derivation.
a job ladder model, the latter is decreasing in the difference λu − λe , because worker-consumers are
giving up less in terms of search efficiency when moving out of unemployment. In other words, workerconsumers would be willing to accept lower-paying jobs since they can climb up the job ladder without a
throwback in unemployment. Similarly, r and w decrease the value of additional search because workers
become impatient, and high wage offers have a lower duration, respectively.
12 In
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equation represents the flow of workers moving into the job with wage w. Rearranging
yields13
G(w) =

F(w) − F(w∗ )
δ
1 − F(w∗ ) δ + λ [1 − F(w)]

(1.6)

The wage distribution is affected by exogenous job (firm) destruction that moves workerconsumers into unemployment, where they subsequently accept any offer above their
reservation wage w∗ , as well as by the number of job offers. The labor supply denotes the
measure of workers per firm earning a wage w and can be written as
G(w) − G(w − ϵ)
(L − u)
ϵ→∞ F(w) − F(w − ϵ)

l(w|w∗ , F(w)) = lim

I define F(w) = F(w− ) + v(w) where v(w) is the mass of firms offering w and w− is the
wage below but not including w. Denoting k = λ/δ, I can rewrite the labor supply to firms
that offer a wage w as
l(w|w∗ , F(w)) =

Lk
if w ≥ w∗
−
[1 + k[1 − F(w)]] / [1 + k[1 − F(w )]]

(1.7)

otherwise l(w|w∗ , F(w)) = 0 if w < w∗ . The expression in equation (1.7) can be written as
l(w|w∗ , F(w)) = Lk [1 + k[1 − F(w)]]−2

(1.8)

which is increasing in the wage offer distribution. Firms that offer higher wages can attract
more workers and an increase in the wages offered by all other firms decrease the labor
supply to that firm. The elasticity of labor supply η(w) to the firm and its labor monopsony
13 See

Appendix 1.7.2 for the derivation.
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power ν(w) can be written as

η(w) =

d log l
2kF ′ (w)
=
×w
d log w [1 + k(1 − F(w))]

(1.9)

1 + η(w)
η(w)

(1.10)

ν(w) =

ν(w) reflects firms’ monopsony power in labor market and above unity. Define labor
markdown µd (w) as the inverse of v(w), µd (w) =

1
,
v(w)

this reflects the extent to which

wages are marked down.14 As long as the wage offer distribution is decreasing in wage, the
firms offering higher wage would face less elastic labor supply and extract higher market
power in the labor market and mark down more on wage.
Final Good Producers. Let Yt denote the aggregate production of the final good. This can
only be used for consumption Ct , which implies

Yt = Ct

The final good Yt is produced by perfectly competitive firms using a bundle of differentiated intermediate inputs yt (n) for n ∈ [0, Nt ], where Nt denotes the mass of available
varieties. This bundle of inputs is assembled into final goods using the Kimball aggregator,
i.e.
Z

Nt
0

!
yt (n)
Υ
dn = 1
Yt

(1.11)

Normalizing the price of the final good to 1, final good producers choose yt (n) given pt (n)
14 In

wage-bargaining models, the wages in a match between a worker with reservation wage w∗ and a firm
with productivity z, and 1/v(w) is the bargaining power of the worker.
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to maximize profits subject to technology (1.11).
Z
Yt −

Nt
0

pt (n)yt (n)dn

The optimality condition for this problem gives rise to the demand curve facing each
intermediate producer
pt (n) = Υ
where
Z
Dt =

Nt

Υ′

0

!
yt (n)
Dt
Yt

′

(1.12)

!
!−1
yt (n) yt (n)
dn
Yt
Yt

(1.13)

is a demand index. Denote qt = yt (n)/Yt as relative output.
One set of preferences that has been used often in the variable markups literature
is the one first studied by Kimball (1995).15 Following the Klenow and Willis (2016)
specification
" 
!#
 

σ 1
1 σ −1
σ qε/σ
Γ
, −Γ
,
Υ (q) = 1 + (σ − 1) exp
εε
ε
ε ε
ε ε

(1.14)

with σ > 1 and ε ≥ 0 and where Γ (s, x) denotes the upper incomplete Gamma function:
Z

∞

t s−1 e−t dt

Γ (s, x) =
x

The Klenow-Willis specification in (1.14) gives
ε

1 − qσ
σ −1
exp
Υ ′ (q) =
σ
ε
15 The

σ −1

!
(1.15)

CES case is a special case, where Υ (qt ) = qt σ , the demand index is a constant Dt = σ /(σ − 1) and
−1
equation (1.12) reduces to the familiar constant elasticity demand curve pt (n) = (yt (n)/Yt ) σ .
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which implies the demand elasticity

σ (q) = −

Υ ′ (q)
− σε
=
σ
q
Υ ′′ (q)

(1.16)

which in turn implies the markup function

µ(q) =

σ (q)
σ (q) − 1

(1.17)

When ε = 0, this reduces to the familiar CES constant markup µ = σ /(σ − 1). When ε > 0,
larger firms find it optimal to choose higher markups. A firm’s markup increases with its
relative size and is determined by ε/σ , which is critical in determining how markups vary
with productivity and competition.
Intermediate Input Producers. Each variety n is produced by a single firm. Firms are
created by paying a sunk cost κ in units of labor. On entry, a new firm obtains a one-time
productivity draw z ∼ P (z), which is independently distributed and drawn from a Pareto
distribution P (z) = 1 − (zmin /z)ξ for z ≥ zmin > 0 and ξ > 1.16 Firms exit with exogenous
probability δt each period. I focus on a symmetric equilibrium where producers with the
same z will make the same decisions, so henceforth I will index firms by z. A firm with
productivity z hires labor lt to produce output according to
yt (z) = zltα

(1.18)

where α < 1, that is firms are subject to decreasing returns to scale.
16 The

Pareto distribution is not only tractable but, together with our other assumptions, implies a Pareto
firm-size distribution, which provides a reasonable approximation to observed data (Axtell (2001)).
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Firms’ Problem. In the steady state, each firm maximizes profits by taking as given the
production function (1.18), the demand curve (1.12), and the labor supply (1.8). I will
focus on size-invariant equilibria in which wages are increasing in firm productivity as in
Coles and Mortensen (2016) and Gouin-Bonenfant et al. (2018).17 I can write the static
profits of a firm of type z as

!
! α1 


y(z)
y(z)

π(z) = max Υ ′
Dy(z) − w(z)

y≥0
Y
z

(1.19)

Let y(z) denote the solution to the firm’s static problem and q(z) is the solution for its
relative output. The firm’s price p(z) can be written as a markup µ(q(z)) over marginal cost

p(z) = µ(q(z)) × mc(z)

where
1 y(z)
mc(z) = ν(z) ×
α z

! α1

(1.20)

1
× w(z)
y(z)

Since the firm has market power in the labor market, its marginal cost of labor accounts
for both the wage and the additional cost associated with increasing wages. Rewriting (1.20), the firm’s optimality condition is: marginal revenue product of labor equals
marginal expense of labor
y(z)
p(z)
w(z)
1
×α
= ν(z) × w(z) ⇒ µd (z) =
=
µ(z)
l(z) | {z }
ν(z) MRP L
|{z} |{z}
ME
MPL

MR

|

{z

}

MRPL

17 The

focus on size-invariant equilibria means that a firm with productivity z and size l offers a wage
w(z) that does not depend on its size l but depends on its productivity z. The focus on equilibria in which
wages are increasing in firm productivity means that the equilibrium policy function of the firm satisfies
w(z′ ) > w(z) whenever z′ > z.
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Figure 1.4: Product Market Competitiveness
(a) Firm Markup

(b) Labor Markdown

Markups and Markdowns. Figure 1.4 shows the firm markup and labor markdown for
different sizes of firms in perfect competition, monopolistic competition with CES, and
monopolistic competition with Kimball demand. When the product market is perfectly
competitive, all firms operate at the same marginal revenue level. Therefore, the gap
between the wage and the marginal product of labor reflects the labor markdown. Higher
productivity firms would pay higher wages to attract more workers, whereas their marginal
product of labor are disproportionately higher than the wages they pay. As a result, the gap
between the wage and the marginal product of labor increase in firm productivity and the
labor markdown decrease in firm productivity. Therefore, a high-productivity firm would
lower the wage it should pay more than a low-productivity firm would even if it pays a
higher wage. This is the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) mechanism that the elasticity of
the labor supply to a firm decreases as the wage increases. However, if the product market
is monopolistically competitive, all firms operate at lower marginal revenue levels, and
the marginal revenue is decreasing in productivity. Allowing firms to extract markup
would lower the wages they pay relative to the competitive market case, and the effects
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are heterogeneous in firm productivity. Low-productivity firms find it more profitable
to extract monopsony power and decrease the wages more than high-productivity firms.
Figure 1.4 (b) shows that low-productivity firms increase their monopsony power and
decrease labor markdown once the product market become noncompetitive. The gray dash
line indicates the cumulative distribution of productivity, and it shows that the majority
of firms are at the lower range of productivity. Therefore, a large fraction of firms extract
higher monopsony power in the labor market once they have market power in the product
market.
Labor Share and Wage. Using (1.20), the firm-level labor share can be written as
w(z)l(z)
α
=
p(z)y(z) θ(z)

(1.21)

where θ(z) = µ(z)/µd (z) is the firm-level wedge. In a perfectly competitive product market
and labor market, the firm-level wedge is unity. However, imperfect competition creates
a wedge between labor share and output elasticity. The wedge term acts like a tax that
reduces the output level compared to the competitive market level. Both increasing
markup and monopsony power would drive up the wedge and reduce the labor share.
As mentioned earlier, firms with different sizes have a different strategies to create
a wedge that extracts profit. Similarly, given that firms face the same labor supply and
operate at the same output level in the different competitive markets, the wage that the
firm pays is related to its price and wedge, w ∼ p/θ. Figure 1.5 shows the wedge term,
labor share, and wage-to-MPL ratio in different models for the product market. Including
product market power allows small firms to extract more product market power and labor
market power; whereas, large firms increase their product market power at the expense of
lower labor market power. The majority of firms are small, and this will translate to a large
fraction of low-productivity firms lowering their labor share, but only a small fraction of

CHAPTER 1. MARKUPS, LABOR SHARE, AND WAGE DISPERSION

23

high-productivity firms increasing their labor share.
Figure 1.5: Labor Share and Wage
(a) Wedge (θ)

(b) Labor Share

(c) Wage

(d) Wage-to-MPL ratio

The small firms claim higher monopsony power by reducing their wage-to-MPL ratio.
Under perfect competition, the least productive firm pays at its MPL. However, the least
productive firm only pays 80% of its MPL once the product market becomes noncompetitive. The ratio decreases when productivity increases, but the difference between
competitive and noncompetitive markets also reduces by the firm size. This indicates that
low-productivity firms play a vital role in wages when the product market is noncompetitive. In monopolistic competition, the wage that every firm pays drops, but wages in small
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firms drop more than wages in large firms. There is no difference between homogeneous
and heterogeneous markup in wages because Kimball demand allows firms to claim higher
markup by moving down along the demand curve; this will alters firms MRPL and its
wage offer distribution. Therefore, only the labor supply elasticity would change at a given
level of wage and labor supply.18
Free Entry. Let Mt denote the mass of entrants in period t. Free entry drives the expected
profits of potential entrants to zero. The sunk entry cost κWt is paid prior to the realization
of the productivity draw z. The free entry condition determining the equilibrium number
of active firms is given by:

!−1
Z  X
∞

C

t
κWt = β
(β(1 − δt ))i−1
π(z)t+i  dP (z)
Ct+1

(1.22)

i=1

where the aggregate real wage Wt is an employment-weighted arithmetic average of
firm-level wage
Z
Wt =

wt (z)

lt (z)
dn(z)
L̃

(1.23)

The expression in equation (1.22) can be written as


!−1 
Z  X
∞
d 


µ
C



t
(β(1 − δt ))i−1
κWt = β
1 − t+i  pt+i (z)yt+i (z) dP (z)
Ct+1
µt+i

(1.24)

i=1

A firm’s incentives to enter are determined by its operating profits; therefore, it is a
18 One

way to break the link is by introducing a demand shifter in Kimball demand. The main focus of this
paper is to understand the effect of market competition on the labor share and the wage; therefore, adding a
demand shifter allows the market to reallocate resources differently, which complicates the analysis. For
quantitative reasoning, using Kimball demand can produce a reasonable markdown and labor share since
both CES and perfect competition require a large aggregate markdown and a low labor share to match the
data.
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function of markups, markdowns, and the firm’s overall sales.
Aggregation. Let Zt denote the aggregate productivity of this economy, implicitly defined
by an aggregate production function that relates the total amount of final goods Yt to the
total amount of labor L̃t used in production:
Yt = Zt L̃αt

(1.25)

where the aggregate productivity Zt can be expressed in terms of firm-level productivities
z according to
Z

Zt = 

qt (z)
z

! α1

−α

dn(z)

(1.26)

Let M denote the aggregate markup of this economy, Md denote the aggregate markdown of this economy, and Θ denote the aggregate wedge; therefore, the aggregate labor
share is implicitly defined by
Md
Wt L̃t
α
=α t =
Yt
Mt Θt

(1.27)

The aggregate markup and markdown prevent firms from reaching full capacity and act
like a wedge between the labor share and labor productivity. The aggregate wedge Θt is a
cost-weighted arithmetic average of firm-level wedge θt = µt /µdt
Z
Θt =

θt (z)

wt (z)lt (z)
dn(z)
Wt L̃t

(1.28)

In turn, the aggregate markup is a cost-weighted arithmetic average of firm-level markups
Z
Mt =

µt (z)

wt (z)lt (z)
dn(z)
Wt L̃t

(1.29)

and the aggregate markdown is a sales-weighted arithmetic average of firm-level mark-
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downs
Mdt

Z

µdt (z)

=

pt (z)yt (z)
dn(z)
Y

(1.30)

The aggregate labor share in (1.27) can be rewritten as a sales-weighted arithmetic average
of the firm-level labor share
W L̃
LSt ≡ t t =
Yt

Equilibrium. Let Nt =

R

Z

w(z)l(z) pt (z)yt (z)
dn(z)
p(z)y(z)
Y

(1.31)

dnt (z) denote the overall mass of firms. An equilibrium is a

sequence of firm prices pt (z) and wage wt (z); and allocations yt (z) and lt (z); as well as a
mass of new entrants Mt , aggregate real wage Wt , aggregate output Yt , consumption Ct ,
and labor supply Lt , and a measure of firms Nt such that firms and consumers optimize
and the labor and goods markets are all clear.19
The total mass of firms evolve according to

Nt+1 = (1 − δt )Nt + Mt

(1.32)

Labor market clearing requires
Z
Lt =

l(wt )dn(z) + κMt

(1.33)

Similarly, goods market clearing requires

Yt = Ct
19 See

Appendix 1.7.2 for a detailed solution

(1.34)
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Quantitative Analysis

This section outlines the calibration strategy, the model performance, and its implications
for the labor share and wage. I start by discussing the calibration strategy. I then compare
the model results with empirical evidence and discuss the labor share and wage dispersion.
Calibration Strategy. I calibrate the model to match the aggregate markup, the aggregate
markdown, and the standard deviation of markup, which are represented by the solid
line in Figure 1.1. I leave the aggregate wage, the aggregate labor share, and the standard
deviation of the wage as untargeted moments, which are shown by the dash line. Therefore,
I can understand the effect of both product market power and labor market power on the
decline in the aggregate labor share, decline in the aggregate wage, and increase in wage
dispersion.
Table 1.3: Parameters

Parameter
Assigned
δ

Description

ρ

Average Weekly Benefit
Average Weekly Wage

Job destruction rate

Joint Calibration
ξ
Pareto tail
σ
Demand elasticity
ε/σ
Superelasticity
λ
Job arrival rate
b
Unemployment benefit

Source
Longitudinal Business Database
Department of Labor
1980
6.12
8.98
0.45
0.15
2.99

1990
5.11
7.11
0.34
0.16
2.98

2000
4.54
6.65
0.31
0.14
2.87

2010
4.15
5.72
0.27
0.06
2.67

2018
4.04
4.82
0.24
0.07
2.57

Notes: All parameters are time-variant.

The output elasticity of labor α is set at 2/3 and the discount factor β = 0.96. I assume
that the period is a year and treat every year as a steady-state to match the moments
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every given year from 1980 to 2018. I normalize the entry cost κ to achieve a steady-state
mass of firms N = 1. Since the level of the wage is uniquely pinned down by the lowest
productivity zmin , I then calibrate zmin to match the aggregate wage in 1980 and leave it
unchanged throughout the period. The firm exit rate δ is taken from the Longitudinal
Business Database.
The remaining key parameters Θ = {ξ, σ , ε, λ, b} are calibrated jointly by the model. The
Pareto tail ξ pins down the distribution of relative sales of firms, and is chosen to match
the standard deviation of relative sales in each 6-digit industry. In order to eliminate
industry variation, I define relative sales as the sales of a firm in an industry relative to the
average sales of all firms in that industry. The aggregate markup is pinned down by the
average elasticity of demand σ , which I calibrate to match the Compustat cost-weighted
average markup. The key parameter that affects the markup dispersion is ε/σ . I use the
standard deviation of markup to determine this parameter. Two remaining labor market
parameters λ and b pin down the sales-weighted markdown and replacement rate. The
replacement rate is defined as average weekly benefits over average weekly wage, which is
made available taken from the Department of Labor. I drop some firms with estimated
markups below one, which the model cannot generate. Here, I only report parameter
choices in Table 1.3 for 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2018.
Model Performance. Figure 1.6 reports the model results that correspond to the empirical
results in Figure 1.1. All the values are shown relative to the 1980 values. The solid lines
represent the targeted moments that I match year by year, including the cost-weighted
aggregate markup, markup standard deviation, and sales-weighted aggregate markdown.
The dashed line represents the untargeted moments, including the employment-weighted
aggregate wage, wage standard deviation, and the sales-weighted aggregate labor share.
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Figure 1.6: The Evolution of Markup, Wage, Labor Share, and Markdown (Model)
(a) Average

(b) Standard Deviation

The model perfectly matches the targeted moments.20 The aggregate markup increased
from 1.18 to 1.33; whereas, the aggregate markdown decreased from 0.99 to 0.85 between
1980 and 2018. As mentioned in Section 1.3, both increasing the aggregate markup and
decreasing the aggregate markdown indicate that firms extract higher market power in
both the product and labor markets. The dispersion in markup rose as in De Loecker
et al. (2020) and a similar trend is observed for the standard deviation of relative sales.
Hornstein et al. (2011) report the ratio of the mean to the minimum wage (Mm-ratio) as a
summary statistic to compare wage dispersion across different classes of search models.
This ratio is calibrated to match the replacement rate. I use the Department of Labor data
to compute the ratio between average weekly benefit and average weekly wage and match
the moment. Shimer (2005) and Tjaden and Wellschmied (2014) set the replacement rate
at 40%; the replacement rate from the Department of Labor is 0.38 in 1980, and then it
falls to 0.33 in 2018.
Figure 1.7 shows the comparison between model moments and empirical counterparts
for the aggregate wage, labor share, and wage standard deviation. The model can produce
20 I

list 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2018 values in Table 1.10
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Figure 1.7: Untarget Moment Comparison
(a) Wage

(b) Labor Share

(c) Wage Standard Deviation

the phenomenon that the aggregate wage increases slightly before 2000 and then decreases
sharply after 2000. Similarly, the wage standard deviation increased throughout the time
period, both in the model and the data, especially from 1990 to 2010. Finally, as the figures
show, the decline in the aggregate wage is associated with a decline in the labor share;
thus, the model can generally reproduce the trends that show the decline in the aggregate
wage, the decline in the labor share, and rising wage dispersion.
Labor Share. The aggregate labor share dropped roughly 23% in both the model and
the data from 1980 to 2018. In the model, the decline in the aggregate labor share was
mainly due to the increase in market powers in both the product and labor markets over
time. There are other contributions to the decline in labor share21 ; however, the model is
focused on the effects of the market powers on the labor shares only. Following Autor et al.
(2017b), I can rewrite the aggregate labor share as

LSt
|{z}

=

X
i

SW it × lsit =

¯
LS
|{z}

+ cov (lsit , SW it )
|
{z
}

aggregate

within

between

labor share

component

component

The aggregate labor share can be expressed as the sum of the average (unweighted) firm21 See

(2017)

Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013), Elsby et al. (2013), Autor et al. (2017a) and Kehrig and Vincent
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level labor share (within-firm component) and the covariance between the labor share
and the value-added share (between-firm component), which is the reallocation effect on
the aggregate labor share. I compute both the within-firm component and between-firm
component in the data and in the model. In the data, I compute each term separately in
each 6-digit NAICS industry and then take a value-added weighted average.
Figure 1.8: Labor Share Decomposition
(a) Data

(b) Model

Table 1.4: Labor Share Decomposition of 10-year Change

LS

aggregate labor share

∆LS

change in labor share

¯
∆LS

change in within

∆cov(ls, SW )

change in between

Data
Model

80-90 90-00
00-10
10-18
0.56
0.51
0.44
0.43
0.55
0.51
0.46
0.42
average cumulative change (%)
-0.4
-6.3
-12.7
-13.4
-0.6
-4.4
-10.4
-13.5
+0.8
-4.2
-10.5
-11.5
-1.1
-3.9
-7.6
-10.7
-1.2
-2.1
-2.3
-1.8
+0.5
-0.4
-2.8
-2.8

Notes: Row (1) and (2) show the average labor share from data and model in 10 years, e.g. 1980s, 1990s,
2000s, and 2010s. Row (3) to (8) show the average cumulative change for change in total, change in
within, and change in between from 1980 to 1990, 2000, and 2018.
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Figure 1.8 shows the computed results both in the data and the model. Within 6-digit
industries, the within-firm component contributes the most to the decline in labor share.22
Table 1.4 considers the cumulative change in the labor share over 10-year periods. The
decomposition results show that 80% of the change in the labor share comes from the
change in the within-firm component. The remaining 20% comes from the between-firm
component, which is relatively small.
Wage and Dispersion. Although the model does not capture the exact point when the
wage started to drop as shown in the data, the general trends of the aggregate wage
are roughly the same. Both the data and model results show that the aggregate wage
falls by 7.5% in 2018 relative to the 1980 level. On the other hand, the model fails to
match the exact level of wage standard deviation and the magnitude of the increase in the
wage standard deviation. The model shows that the wage standard deviation is 0.31 in
1980 and would increase by 33% to 0.41. However, the increase in the wage standard
deviation is roughly 78% in data—from 0.35 to 0.67. The model can explain half of the
wage dispersion. The contribution of increasing wage standard deviation in the model is
mainly through the decline in the aggregate markdown and replacement rate. Various
sources can contribute to wage dispersion. There is a difference between the model and
the data because the model treats workers as homogeneous. An increasing number of
studies have documented that the skilled-based technology is one of the main drivers of
wage differential (Trottner, 2019). However, this paper is focused on the contributions of
market power to wage dispersion and gives the different aspects of its dynamics.
Another way to examine wage dispersion is through the 90-to-10 ratio, that is, the
22 Although

some literature finds that the between-firm component is the important source of the decline
in the aggregate labor share (Autor et al., 2017b; Kehrig and Vincent, 2017), the results here are not
contradicting previous works. Most resource reallocation occurs at the sector level, e.g., 2-digit NAICS
industry; however, I compute the components within the industry level. The purpose of this paper is to
understand the effect of firm-level market power on a firm’s behavior to adjust its labor share and wage. It
provides another point of view to understand the salient decline in the aggregate labor share.
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Figure 1.9: Wage Dispersion
(a) Interdecile Range of Log Wage

(b) 90 and 10 Percentile Log Wage

Table 1.5: Wage Dispersion

W90 − W10
W90
W10

employment-weighted
interdecile range of log wage
employment-weighted
90 percentile log wage
employment-weighted
10 percentile log wage

Data
Model

1980
0.61
0.32
4.25
4.12
3.64
3.79

1990
0.80
0.29
4.41
4.13
3.61
3.84

2000
1.39
0.56
4.38
4.16
2.99
3.60

2010
1.56
1.07
4.52
4.21
2.95
3.13

2018
1.94
0.96
4.37
4.07
2.43
3.12

Notes: All values list in corresponding years.

interdecile range of wages. Moreover, comparing the trends in the 90 percentile of wages
and the 10 percentile of wages allows me to investigate the source of the wage dispersion.
Figure 1.9 plots the trends in interdecile range of employment-weighted wages, the 90
percentile of employment-weighted wages, and the 10 percentile of employment-weighted
wages. The corresponding values are shown in Table 1.5. The interdecile range of wages
has increased sharply, from 0.6 in 1980 to nearly triple that in 2018. The sharp increase
mainly occurred between 1990 and 2010. Similar to the standard deviation of wage,
the model underpredicts the interdecile range of wage; however, the trend matches.
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Similarly, the sharp rise in wage dispersion takes place between 1990 and 2010. Most
importantly, the rising wage dispersion primarily stems from the decline in low-percentile
wage. Throughout the time period, the 10 percentile of wages has dropped 33% in the data
and 18% in the model, whereas the change in the 90 percentile of wages was negligible.
Thus, the model can capture the fact that it is the low percentile of the wage distribution
that pulls down the aggregate wage and it occurs around 2000.

1.5

The Consequences of Market Power

In this section, I start with my primary analysis: How does market power affect the labor
share and wage dispersion? I will discuss the three main group of parameters, that is,
demand elasticity, labor market competitiveness, and productivity dispersion, all of which
affect firm-level markup and markdown and their contributions to the labor share and
wage dispersion. Next, I use the calibrated model to simulate the effects of each group of
parameters. Finally, I use the model simulation to run the regression analysis to test the
effects of firm-level markup and markdown on the labor share and wage dispersion.
Counterfactual. In the model, three main sources affect the labor share, aggregate wage,
and wage dispersion. Sizable prior literature has already shown the implication of the
rising markup on the decline in the labor share.23 Nevertheless, few studies directly explore the link between product market power and wage.24 The parameters that govern the
aggregate markup and markup dispersion are the demand elasticity, σ , and superelasticity,
ϵ/σ . Therefore, I first consider only changing these parameters to analyze the effect of
markups on the labor share and wages. Berger et al. (2019) show that the labor market
concentration makes an important contribution to the decline in the labor share. Several
23 See

De Loecker et al. (2020), Baqaee and Farhi (2017), and Edmond et al. (2018)

24 Coşar et al. (2016) inspects the effect of trade integration with global product markets on wage inequality
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papers have documented the impact of labor market power on wages and its dispersion.25
The parameters that govern the aggregate markdown are labor market competitiveness,
k = λ/δ, and unemployment benefit, b. I change these parameters to understand how
markdowns change the aggregate labor share and wages. Lastly, Gouin-Bonenfant et al.
(2018) find that a rise in the dispersion of firm productivity causes the aggregate labor
share to decline as productivity dispersion effectively shields high-productivity firms from
wage competition.26 Therefore, I change the productivity dispersion parameter, ξ, to
observe its contribution to the labor share and wages.
Role of Demand Elasticity. Estimating demand elasticity requires detailed price and
physical quantity data as in Foster et al. (2008). Although Compustat does not contain
such detailed information, I can still compute the aggregate demand elasticity by using the
implications of profit maximization. The optimal price-setting behavior implies that the
markup over marginal cost is equal to

σ
σ −1 .

Therefore, I can back up the aggregate demand

elasticity by the inverse of the aggregate markup, which decreased from 5.56 in 1980 to
3.03 in 2018. The calibrated demand elasticity from the model (shown in Figure 1.10 (a))
decreased from 8.98 to 4.82, which is above the simple inverse markup approach.27 In fact,
the model calibrates higher demand elasticity because the model features variable markup.
Traditional macro literature assumes the demand elasticity is 10, but the trade literature
assumes it to be around 4. There is still no clear way to estimate the aggregate demand
elasticity, but I view the calibration result as close to that found in the literature. Most of
25 See

Lentz and Mortensen (2010), Alan (2011), and Song et al. (2019).
link between productivity and wage dispersion is also documented in Dunne et al. (2004), Faggio
et al. (2010), and Barth et al. (2016). On the other hand, Kehrig and Vincent (2021) documents that the
reallocation of value-added to the lower labor share distribution is the cause of the decline in the aggregate
labor share.
27 Oberfield and Raval (2014) use detail plant-level data, the U.S. Census of Manufactures and Annual
Survey of Manufactures (ASM), to estimate industry-wide demand elasticities using a similar inverse markup
approach and obtain the range 3 to 8.
26 The
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the increasing markup is a result of the decline in the aggregate demand elasticity.28 Figure
1.10 (b) shown the markup trend when I allow only the demand elasticity parameters to
change over time. If only the demand elasticity parameters decline, the aggregate markup
rises from 1.18 to 1.30, which is not much different from the calibrated moment that rose
from 1.18 to 1.33. Therefore, the demand elasticity parameters are the main channel that
leads to an increase in the aggregate markup; it allows me to undertake a counterfactual
analysis to understand the consequences of product market power on the labor share and
wages.
Figure 1.10: Aggregate Demand Elasticity and Aggregate Markup
(a) Aggregate Demand Elasticity

(b) Markup

Role of Labor Market Competitiveness. The calibrated job arrival rates (job-finding rates)
are lower than 35-40% of that found in the literature. The model calibrates low job arrival
rates simply because the job destruction rate I obtain from the Longitudinal Business
Database (LBD) is lower than the traditional value of 15%. There are two measurements
for job destruction rate in the LBD. One only considers that jobs are destroyed by the
death of the establishment, which the exiting firm creates. The other one includes jobs
28 One

of the implications of the decline in aggregate demand elasticity is household spending concentration or consumer inertia, as in Gourio and Rudanko (2014), Neiman et al. (2018), and Bornstein et al.
(2018)
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destruction by existing firms. The average job destruction rate from the exiting firms is
5%, whereas from both the exiting and the existing firms is 15%. When I use the average
job destruction rate from both the exiting and the existing firms to calibrate the model,
the job arrival rates would be three times the values shown in Table 1.1. Thus, the relevant
parameter governing labor market competitiveness is the ratio of the job arrival rate and
job destruction rate, k = λ/δ. A higher value of k indicates more competition among firms
for workers, which is expected to raise wages. Therefore, a higher value of k represents the
labor market being closer to a competitive market; whereas, a lower value of k indicates a
noncompetitive labor market.
Figure 1.11: Labor Market Competitiveness and Markdown
(a) Competitiveness & Unemployment Benefit

(b) Markdown

Figure 1.11 (a) plots model calibrated value k and the reservation wage (unemployment
benefit) b. Labor market competitiveness has dropped dramatically between 1990 and
2010—the same period when the aggregate markdown also declined. The unemployment
benefit gradually declines over time since the replacement rate dropped from 0.38 to 0.33.
The effect of imperfect competition in the labor market is the main driver of decreasing
the aggregate markdown. As shown in Figure 1.11 (b), there is a clear downward trend in
the aggregate markdown between 1990 and 2010 once I further allow the labor market
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parameters to change over time. The graph also shows the markdown trend if I only
change the demand elasticity parameters. Apparently, most of the decline in the aggregate
markdown results from the decline in labor market competitiveness, specifically as the
labor market became less competitive. Therefore, I analyze the effect of markdowns on the
labor share and wages by changing the labor market competitiveness parameters.
Role of Productivity Dispersion. The calibration shown in Table 1.1 indicates that the
Pareto tail decreased from 6.12 in 1980 to 4.04 in 2018, which is close to Arkolakis et al.
(2019), while the calibrated Pareto tail is 5 using French firm-level data. The decline in
the Pareto tail means the productivity dispersion has increased throughout time. The
dispersion in productivity plays an important role in increasing markup and decreasing
markdown in the model as well. There are several empirical works that explore changes in
productivity dispersion and its implications, such as Syverson (2004) and Aghion et al.
(2009). The calibration results in this paper are also in line with the finding that the
productivity dispersion has increased over time.
Figure 1.12: Market Power
(a) Markup

(b) Markdown

Figure 1.12 show both markup and markdown trends after I allow productivity disper-
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sion to increase over time. Productivity dispersion can also explain part of the rise in the
aggregate markup and the decline in the aggregate markdown. Increasing productivity
dispersion has reallocation effects on firm-level sales; therefore, resource are reallocated to
high-productivity firms, which feature a higher markup and a lower markdown. Hence,
the rise in markup and the fall in markdown are affected by productivity dispersion
through the channel of resource reallocation.29 Therefore, I can also understand the
impact of productivity dispersion on the labor share and wages.
Counterfactual Results. Figure 1.13 plots the counterfactual cases for the moments
that I am interested in: the aggregate wage, aggregate labor share, and wage standard
deviation. Each group of parameters play a different role in affecting each outcome
variable. The purpose of the counterfactual analysis is to isolate the contributions of
each different factor to the aggregate labor share, aggregate wage, and wage dispersion.
Table 1.6 lists the percentage change from 1980 to 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2018 in each
different counterfactual case for five variables of interest, respectively. The values in each
line represent the percentage change from 1980 to the specific year. Case in point, the
aggregate wage rose 0.5% from 1980 to 1990, 0.04% to 2000, and fell 5.53% to 2010 and
7.36% to 2018. Therefore, I can see the aggregate wage fell the most after 2000.
Figure 1.13: Counterfactual Labor Share, Wage, and Wage Standard Deviation
(a) Wage

29 De

(b) Labor Share

Loecker et al. (2020) documents the same reallocation effect.

(c) Wage Standard Deviation
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The lines for markup, markdown, and productivity indicate the effect of that particular
channel on the variables. The markup lines show the counterfactual case when I allow
only the demand elasticity parameters to change over time. I then add the change in labor
market parameters in the markdown lines. Lastly, the effects of change in productivity
dispersion are shown in the productivity lines. The values of markup, markdown, and
productivity shown below each specific variable in a given year represent the effect of the
specific channel on the variable of interest. For instance, in 2018, the markup channel
caused the aggregate wage to fall by 8.67%, the markdown channel added a further decline
of 4.09%, and the productivity channel increased aggregate wages by around 5.39%. Therefore, aggregating all the channels, I obtain the aggregate wage decline of 7.36% from 1980
to 2018.
Counterfactual Wage. The aggregate wage started to increase from 1980 to 1990 then
gradually declined. Until 2018, the aggregate wage dropped 7.36%. In Figure 1.13 (a),
it can be seen that, had only demand elasticity parameters declined, the aggregate wage
would have dropped to around 3.6 in 2018, which is more than the actual aggregate wage
drop. Furthermore, the aggregate wage would have declined to less than 3.5 in 2018 if
I further allowed the labor market parameters to change. Most importantly, the further
decline in wages started in 2000. These two counterfactual analyses indicate that product
market power causes the aggregate wage to decline over time and labor market power
exacerbates it after 2000. Increasing productivity dispersion brings the aggregate wage
to a higher level since high-productivity firms became more productive, and a higher
marginal product of labor would raise the wages they pay. As a result, the aggregate wage
was stable before 2000 due to the effect of productivity dispersion offsetting the markup
effect; whereas, the aggregate wage started to fall after 2000 since the markdown effect
became another source of decline in the aggregate wage.
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Table 1.6: Counterfactual

1990

W

sd(W )

LS

W90

W10

2000
2010
2018
percentage change (%)

employment-weighted
aggregate wage

+0.51

+0.04

-5.53

-7.36

markup
markdown
productivity

-2.64
+0.27
+2.88

-3.52
-1.01
+4.57

-5.72
-4.34
+4.53

-8.67
-4.09
+5.39

wage standard deviation

+2.09

+16.23

+38.52

+33.06

markup
markdown
productivity

-10.77
+3.95
+8.92

-14.28
+8.50
+22.01

-22.99
+27.78
+33.74

-34.19
+31.69
+35.56

sales-weighted
aggregate labor share

-4.22

-12.02

-24.62

-23.93

markup
markdown
productivity

-2.01
+2.03
-4.24

-2.70
-1.87
-7.44

-4.11
-11.64
-8.86

-6.06
-8.85
-9.02

employment-weighted
90 percentile wage

+0.25

+1.17

+2.19

-1.07

markup
markdown
productivity

-2.63
+1.36
+1.53

-3.50
-1.41
+6.07

-5.66
-1.85
+9.70

-8.51
-3.72
+11.16

employment-weighted
10 percentile wage

+1.27

-5.05

-17.33

-17.81

markup
markdown
productivity

-1.71
+1.04
+1.95

-2.28
-3.24
+0.47

-3.71
-13.92
+0.29

-6.64
-11.59
+0.42

Notes: All values shows the percentage change from 1980 to 1990, 2000, and 2018.
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Table 1.11 also shows the other aggregate variables that might help explain the effects
from each channel. Both the markup channel and the markdown channel cause the aggregate output to decline and the markdown channel becomes more prominent after 2000.
Similar trends can be found in aggregate labor income. The large drop in the markdown
effect mostly came from the decline in production labor. As shown in equation (1.25), aggregate output is associated with aggregate productivity and production labor. The effect
from of the markup channel on wages works through mainly by reducing the aggregate
productivity; however, the markdown channel slightly increased the aggregate productivity
but significantly reduced production labors. Therefore, the effect from the markdown
channel not only directly reduced the aggregate wage but also indirectly brought down the
number of workers and decreased the aggregate output. This labor resource reallocation is
mainly the result of the drop in labor market competitiveness. To be more specific, the
effect of the markup on wages comes from firms reducing the wage they pay, but the effect
from the markdown on wages results from reducing the size of employment and shielding
away from wage competition. In summary, the markup itself has a significant impact on
the decline in the aggregate wage, and the markdown also contributes to it after 2000.
Counterfactual Labor Share. Before 1990, there was a slight drop in the labor share—
around 4%. The rapid decline in the labor share took place between 1990 and 2010,
then leveled off afterward. In Figure 1.13 (b), both demand elasticity parameters and
productivity dispersion explain the decline in the labor share throughout the time period.
The markup channel contributes roughly to one-fourth of the drop and productivity explains
around 40% of the decline in the labor share. From equation (1.27), the aggregate labor
share is associated with labor income (W L) and aggregate output (Y ). As mentioned earlier,
the markup channel affects the labor share mostly via a fall in wages, with a slight reduction
in aggregate output. However, productivity dispersion increases the aggregate output
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the most; hence, it reduces the aggregate labor share. Although productivity dispersion
also increases labor income, the effect on labor income is disproportional to the effect on
aggregate output, the increase in labor income is only about one-third of the aggregate
output increase. Therefore, a rise in productivity dispersion would result in a decline in
the aggregate labor share.
Furthermore, the markdown channel reduces the aggregate labor share the most after
2000. Again, most of the effect came from a sharp decline in labor income. Therefore, the
markdown effect can explain 35% of the drop in the aggregate labor share between 1980
and 2018. Table 1.12 also shows the cumulative change in the labor share decomposition
over 10-year periods. Each of the three channels can explain the within-firm component of
the decline in the labor share and the markdown and productivity channels can explain most
of the between-firm component since both channels relate to the resource reallocation
in the product market and labor market. This section has provided a brief summary of
the literature relating to the decline in the aggregate labor share. The evidence reviewed
here suggests that each channel plays an important role in explaining the decline in the
aggregate labor share.
Counterfactual Wage Dispersion. The standard deviation of wages rapidly increased
between 1990 and 2010. Based on Figure 1.13 (c), almost half of the increase in wage
dispersion can be explained by the decline in the aggregate markdown. Both labor market
competitiveness and unemployment benefits parameters help explain both the decline in
the aggregate markdown and the rise in wage dispersion,30 especially after 2000. On the
other hand, allowing firms to exploit markup would decrease the wage dispersion because
every firm pays a lower wage. Similar to the literature, increasing productivity dispersion
30 Hornstein et al. (2011) discussed, for a large class of search models, that wage dispersion can be explained

by the mean-min wage ratio, which is the concept of the replacement rate in the model, and I calibrated the
unemployment benefits to match the replacement rate.
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by itself has a significant impact on wage dispersion. A large dispersion in productivity
means a large dispersion in the marginal product of labor; therefore, the wage differential
becomes more dispersed. The productivity channel helps improve market competition
by increasing the number of firms and new entrants; in turn, it increases the aggregate
output and aggregate productivity. Higher productivity dispersion allows larger firms to
reach higher productivity levels and pay higher wages. Therefore, the productivity channel
explains the other half of wage dispersions.
Figure 1.14: Counterfactual Wage Percentile
(a) 90 Percentile Wage

(b) 10 Percentile Wage

Another way to examine wage dispersion is through the employment-weighted interdecile range of wages. Figure 1.14 (a) and (b) show the 90 and 10 percentile of wages
with three counterfactual analyses over the sample period. The employment-weighted 90
percentile wage has increased around 2% until 2010, and then declined to -1%; whereas
the employment-weighted 10 percentile wage has dropped dramatically between 2000 and
2010 (around 17%). Both the 90 and 10 percentile wages would have dropped significantly
if only the demand elasticity parameters changed over time. This shows that the markup
channel causes both the high and low percentile of wages to decline, but the decline is
larger in high percentile of wages than in low percentile of wages. As a result, it slightly
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closed the gap between the 90 and 10 percentile wages, and, in turn, the wage dispersion
decreased. Hence, it could be hypothesized that the markup, or product market power,
caused the decline in both wages and wage dispersion.
Both the effects of the productivity and the markdown channels on wages contribute
to the rise in wage dispersion, although they work through different mechanisms. As
mentioned earlier, the low-productivity firm finds it more profitable to extract monopsony
power and lower the wage it pays. Consequently, around two-third of the decline in 10
percentile wages come from the markdown effect. On the other hand, large productivity
dispersion allows large firms to increase their productivity the most and pay a large wage
premium. Because of this, the productivity channel improves the high-percentile wage,
which almost offsets the effects of markups and markdowns; hence, the 90 percentile wage
slightly increased in the past four decades.
In sum, the markup channel has significant impact on the decline in wage for both high
and low percentiles and in wage dispersion. Both markdown and productivity channels
explain the rise in wage dispersion caused by a reduction in the low percentile wage from
markdown effect and an increase in the high percentile wage from productivity dispersion
effect.
Regression Analysis. To test the model validity to the effect of market power on labor
share and wage dispersion, I run the same regression analysis as shown in section 1.2. In
Table 1.7, I report the regression coefficients of the log of the labor share on the log of the
firm’s markup and markdown; all columns are clustered at the firm level. The first three
specifications are reported in 1.1 (columns four to six). The last two specifications show
the regression results from the model simulation. Although the coefficients of markdown
are larger in the model than in the data, the effect of the markup is quite similar—around
-0.87 to -0.91. The difference in the markdown coefficient between the model and the
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data mostly results from the mismatch in the wage distribution. The model does not
consider any other source that can affect the wage firms pay, and firms pay different wages
because they face different labor supply elasticities and charge different markdowns. If
the skill-premium is also an important determinant in wage payment decisions, the effect
from the markdown would be smaller, and this is the exact mechanism that Trottner (2019)
proposed. This paper plays a complementary role to the vast literature on the labor share
and wage dispersion, and it provides one reason for the salient fact of the decline in the
labor share. In summary, the model can accurately predict the casual effect of the markup
and markdown to the labor share.
Table 1.7: Data v.s. Model: The effects of markups and markdowns on labor shares

Markup (log)
Markdown (log)

(1)
Data
-0.877∗∗∗
(0.0602)

Labor Share (log)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Data
Data
Model
-0.847∗∗∗ -0.906∗∗∗ -0.915∗∗∗
(0.0609) (0.0692) (0.0622)

(5)
Model
-0.874∗∗∗
(0.0506)

0.399∗∗∗
(0.0247)

0.387∗∗∗
(0.0246)

0.375∗∗∗
(0.0207)

1.065∗∗∗
(0.0100)

X

X

23282
0.155

X
23282
0.570

Year F.E.
Industry F.E.
Observations
R2

23282
0.148

1.073∗∗∗
(0.0096)

X

0.431

0.432

Lastly, I test the prediction that the heterogeneous effects of markup and markdown
lead to a decline of the aggregate wage in the model. In Table 1.8, the first-three columns
report the results in Table 1.2. Similar heterogeneous effects can be found in the model
simulation (columns four to six in Table 1.8); the effects of markups or markdowns from
upper-wage percentile firms are smaller than the effects from lower-wage percentile firms.
Although the magnitude of the effect is smaller than in the data, the model can produce
quite well the heterogeneous effects on the upper and lower-wage percentiles.
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Table 1.8: Data v.s. Model: The effects of markups and markdowns on wages

(1)
Data
W
-0.855∗∗∗
(0.0402)

(2)
Data
< W25
-0.885∗∗∗
(0.0665)

Wage (log)
(3)
(4)
Data
Model
> W75
W
-0.456∗∗∗ -0.990∗∗∗
(0.0517) (0.0124)

(5)
Model
< W25
-0.448∗∗∗
(0.0316)

(6)
Model
> W75
-0.288∗∗∗
(0.0151)

Markdown (log)

0.875∗∗∗
(0.0122)

0.828∗∗∗
(0.0191)

0.505∗∗∗
(0.0304)

1.005∗∗∗
(0.0095)

0.479∗∗∗
(0.0159)

0.227∗∗∗
(0.0135)

Employment (log)

-0.871∗∗∗
(0.0116)

-0.786∗∗∗
(0.0184)

-0.551∗∗∗
(0.0293)

-0.993∗∗∗
(0.0116)

-0.481∗∗∗
(0.0280)

-0.275∗∗∗
(0.0140)

Sales (log)

0.854∗∗∗
(0.0112)

0.772∗∗∗
(0.0176)

0.525∗∗∗
(0.0287)

0.990∗∗∗
(0.0119)

0.464∗∗∗
(0.0325)

0.290∗∗∗
(0.0143)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
23368
0.871

X
5858
0.867

X
5772
0.825

0.581

0.427

0.267

Markup (log)

Year F.E.
Industry F.E.
Observations
R2

1.6

Conclusion

In this paper, I study the role of firms’ market power in both the product market and labor
market as drivers of the decline in the aggregate labor share and the aggregate wage after
1980. I argue that the prevalence of the rising aggregate markup and the falling aggregate
markdown play important roles in these two salient facts. Specifically, the decline in the
aggregate wage can be attributed mostly to the lower percentile of the wage distribution.
As a result, wages in the left tail of the distribution pull down aggregate wages and drive
up wage dispersion.
Firms’ market power rose not just in the product market but also in the labor market
over the past four decades. I document that the aggregate markup rose around 12.5% and
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the aggregate markdown fell around 15% between 1980 and 2018. I then build a model
that features heterogeneous firms engaged in monopolistic competition with non-CES
demand with the Kimball (1995) aggregator and on-the-job search in the labor market
to calibrate the rising market power in both markets. The model can reproduce both
the decline in the aggregate labor share and the aggregate wage. Moreover, the model
can predict the rise in wage dispersion that stems from a sharp decline in the lower
wage percentiles after 2000. The increasing aggregate markup has a direct impact on the
decline in the aggregate wage. In addition, there is a heterogeneous effect of markups
on firms’ monopsony power and wages. Although low-productivity firms claim less
markup than high-productivity firms, low-productivity firms lower the wage more than
high-productivity firms. I find that the sharp decline in the lower wage percentiles is
caused by both the larger decline in the labor markdown from low-productivity firms and
the decreasing replacement rate in the labor market. These two facts indicate that labor
market competitiveness is an important channel for both the decline in the aggregate wage
and the rise in wage dispersion.
In the counterfactual analysis, I consider three important channels for both increasing
markup and decreasing markdown. The productivity dispersion channel can explain a
rise in wage dispersion, which is caused by a rise in the higher wage percentiles; whereas,
the markdown channel can rationalize the sharp decline in the lower wage percentiles.
The markup channel has a negative impact on all wage levels. Therefore, the effects from
markups and productivity dispersion offset each other at the higher wage percentiles but
both markup and markdown contribute to the decline in the lower wage percentiles. As a
consequence, the sharp decline in the aggregate wage after 2000 is the result of increasing
firm monopoly power and monopsony power. Finally, the productivity dispersion explains
the most of the decline in the labor share—up to 40%. The markup and markdown
channels explain 25% and 35%, respectively. Increasing productivity dispersion would
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reallocate the resources to large firms. This resource allocation also contributes to the
rise in markup and the fall in markdown. In sum, both product market power and labor
market power are equally important in explaining the decline in the aggregate labor share.
The future research agenda could include, firstly, computing misallocation caused
by variable markups and wage dispersion. Secondly, most of the increasing markup is a
result of the decline in the aggregate demand elasticity in the model, future work could
factor in the the demand-side driven factor. Detailed modeling of consumer behavior can
rationalize the evolution of markups and its consequences for the labor share and wages.
Lastly, adding heterogeneous firms’ international trade specification ((Melitz, 2003; Melitz
and Ottaviano, 2008)) to gauge how trade affects both variable markups and wages is also
a promising research avenue because of globalization especially after 2000.
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Data. Following the definition in De Loecker et al. (2020) closely, I can observe firm
sales, and I use ”Cost of Goods Sold” (COGS) as the variable inputs costs, both variables
are deflated by GDP deflator. I use ”Property, Plant and Equipment” (PPEGT) as Gross
Capital, which is adjusted for the industry-level input price deflator. I use variable XLR
divided by ”Employees” (emp) to compute firm-level wages. I further remove year and
(6-digit NAICS) industry fixed effects to firm-level log wage. To compute labor share, I
follow Keller and Yeaple (2009) use firm’s sale minus staff expense and operating income
(OIBDP) to construct material expense. I then compute the value-added labor share as
staff expense divided by sales minus material expense. I keep unique records for each
firm and assign a firm to a unique 2-digit industry. When a firm reports both an Industry
Format and a Financial Format, I keep the Industry Format; and I exclude firms that do
not report an industry code. I eliminate firms with reported cost-of-goods to sales, staff
expense to sales ratio, and value-added labor share in the top and bottom 1 percent, where
the percentiles are computed for each year separately. The above variables are essential
ingredients to measure markups and, also, measure the effect of markup on labor share
and wage.
Estimation. De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) proposed a useful way to estimate markups
using information from the firm’s financial statements. The method does not require any
assumptions on market structure or the functional form of the demand that firms face.
Instead, this production function approach requires a detailed treatment of the production
function to estimate markups by the cost-minimization structure approach.
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Following closely De Loecker et al. (2020) setup, consider an economy with N firms,
indexed by i = 1, ..., N . Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity, Zit . Each firm
i uses Kit units of capital and bundle of variable inputs (including labor,intermediate
inputs, materials,...), V = (V 1 , ..., V J ), to produce Qit . Given the production function, firm i
minimizes the contemporaneous cost of production in the period t:

Qit = Qit (Zit , Vit , Kit )

(1.35)

The key assumption is that within each period, variable inputs adjust freely, whereas
capital is subject to adjustment costs and other frictions. The Lagrangian objective function
associated with the firm’s cost minimization:
L(Vit , Kit , λit ) = PitV Vit + (rit + δ)Kit + Fit − λit (Qit (·) − Q)

(1.36)

where PitV is the price of the variable input, rit + δ is the user cost of capital. Fit is the fixed
cost, Q(·) is the technology specified in equation (1), Q is a scalar and λ is the Lagrange
multiplier. I assume that these input prices are given to the firm. The output elasticity of
variable input is given by equation:
θitV

1 PitV Vit
=
λit Qit

(1.37)

The estimation procedure is so-called production approach, as in De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker et al. (2020). I estimate an approximation of the production function in Equation (1.35) using a sector-year-specific Cobb-Douglas production
function, with a variable input bundle and capital as inputs. For a given sector-year st, I
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consider the production function:
V
K
qit = θst
vit + θst
kit + zit + εit

(1.38)

where the lower case letters stand for the log form of the variable represented by the corresponding capital letter. To control for unobserved productivity shocks, which cause simultaneity and selection bias 31 , I follow De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker
et al. (2020) to use control function approach. The unobserved productivity zit is given
by a function of the firm’s inputs and a control variable, dit , such that zit = hst (dit , kit ).
Following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg et al. (2015), I use variable input
as static control variables to proxy for productivity and assume that the demand for
variable input is strictly monotone in zit . Also, as discussed in De Loecker et al. (2020),
under constant returns to scale assumption, I can identify output elasticities using data
on sales and expenditures as long as one can control for markups. I use 4-digit industry
market share and productivity as determinants of markups. Therefore, the control variable
dit = (vit , msit ).
The production function estimation relies on a two-stage approach. In the first stage,
the measurement error and unanticipated shocks to output are purged using a nonparametric projection of output on the inputs and the control variable:

qit = φt (vit , kit , dit ) + εit

(1.39)

V
K
where φt = θst
vit +θst
kit +hst (dit , kit ). The productivity process is given with law of motion,
V
V
K
zit = g(zit ) + ξit , given θst
, I can obtain productivity from φit − θst
vit − θst
kit .
31 Observed inputs (e.g., labor, capital) may be correlated with unobserved inputs or productivity shocks
(e.g., managerial ability, quality of land, materials, capacity utilization). This correlation introduces simultaneity biases. On the other hand, firms exit from the sample is not exogenous and it is correlated with firm
size. Smaller firms are more likely to exit than larger firms. Endogenous exit introduces selection-biases.
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In the second stage, I estimate the production function parameters using GMM moment
conditions of the following form to obtain the industry-year-specific output elasticity:
V
E(ξit (θst
)vit−1 ) = 0

(1.40)

This approach identifies the output elasticity of a variable input under the assumption
that the variable input will immediately respond to productivity shocks, but capital is
subjected to adjustment cost. The persistence in productivity assumption allows variable
inputs to be serially correlated.
Wooldridge (2009) proposes to address the unidentified problems in first stage by
replacing the two-step estimation procedure with a generalized method of moments
(GMM) setup. It suggests estimating both first stage and second stage simultaneously. The
estimation procedure is following: 1) Estimate the two-stage production approach with
Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction to extract initial values for second step, 2) Estimate the
system GMM as proposed in Wooldridge (2009). Furthermore, through out the estimation
process, I impose constant return to scale so that it gives the identification of output
elasticities using data on sales and expenditure and the estimation setup is line with my
model setup. The Wooldridge (2009) methodology regains the efficiency and computes
the standard error, which it is hard to achieve in traditional two-stage approach. On the
other hand, Flynn et al. (2019) points out that applying constant returns to scale reduces
the skewness in the markup distribution.
Following De Loecker et al. (2020), firm-level markup is defined as output elasticity
over its sales to variable cost ratio:
µit = θsV

Pit Qit
PitV Vit

(1.41)
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,
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the empirical

challenge is to recover the output elasticities. Bond et al. (2020) points out that using the
revenue to estimate the production function does not identify the markup. However, the
concern can be addressed by imposing constant returns to scale. Flynn et al. (2019) also
points out that the markup estimated by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) approach does
not identify it and generate huge variation in markup. Therefore, to obtain the output
elasticity of variable input, I impose constant returns to scale because it identifies output
elasticities using data on sales and expenditure.
The estimated markup is computed as the output elasticity of variable input. The
key assumption is that firms can freely adjust variable input within one period. With
detailed data that includes material input and employment, the traditional approach is to
assume material expenses are frictionless, as in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). However,
lack of information in material expense pose a critical challenge when using Compustat
to estimate production function. To address the issue, I follow the assumption that
De Loecker et al. (2020) impose on the freely adjusted variable input but further assume
that variable input is comprised of constant returns to scale combination of material and
labor as follows
M

L

Vit = Mitθ Lθit , θM + θL = 1

(1.42)

Departing from frictionless material input, I allow both input markets, material, and
labor, to be noncompetitive. I compute labor-variable input share and material-variable
input share by Hall (1988) methodology to obtain industry-wide labor cost-share and
material cost share. I assume that the shares vary across 4-digit industry and year. I then
construct the firm-level material markup and labor markup by the first-order condition
µM = θ M θ V

µit
Pit Qit
=
PitM Mit µdM

µL = θ L θ V

Pit Qit µit
=
wit Lit µdL

(1.43)
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are the markdowns in the material market and labor

market respectively. θ M and θ L represents the share of material and labor in variable
inputs given industry and year. Assuming µdM θ M + µdL θ L = 1, I can get
µdM =

1 PitM Mit
θ M PitV Vit

µdL =

1 wit Lit
θ L PitV Vit

(1.44)

In the competitive input market, the input share of variable input should equal the
elasticity of variable input and results in µdM = µdL = 1. Therefore, the markup estimations
are identical no matter which variable input is used to construct markup, µ = µM = µL . If
input shares deviate from elasticity, the firms would have friction in input markets. I will
focus on labor markdown, µdL , only to understand the effects of product and labor market
power on labor share and wage.
Table 1.9: Markup comparison: Full-sample v.s. Sub-sample

Full-sample
cost-weighted aggregate markup
employment-weighted 10-percentile markup
employment-weighted 90-percentile markup
Sub-sample
employment-weighted aggregate markup
employment-weighted 10-percentile markup
employment-weighted 90-percentile markup

1980

1990

1.20
1.05
1.39

1.23
1.06
1.44

1.18
1.02
1.32

1.23
1.05
1.44

2000 2010 2018
N=243,325
1.26 1.28 1.32
1.04 1.04 1.07
1.47 1.54 1.60
N=23,545
1.24 1.26 1.33
1.05 1.02 1.08
1.45 1.53 1.67

1980-2018
1.27
1.05
1.51
1.26
1.04
1.50

Results. One concern of the main context in section 1.2 is that the firms in sub-sample
have different evolution of aggregate markup. It potentially contaminants the conclusions
in section 1.2. Table 1.9 lists the cost-weighted aggregate markup both in full data set and
the sub-sample with only the firms who report the wagebills. The average markup rise
from 1.20 to 1.32 between 1980 and 2018 in the full-sample. The markup in 10-percentile
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only rise from 1.05 in 1980 to 1.07 in 2018; on the other hand, the markup in 90-percentile
sharply increase from 1.39 to 1.60 between 1980 and 2018. Therefore, the results shown
in section 1.2 can be viewed as lower-bound. Overall, the markups of firms in sub-sample
perform almost identical to the one in full-sample.

1.7.2

Derivation

Wage Distribution. Recall the worker problem:

rE(w) = w + λ

e

Z

wmax

[E(z) − E(w)] dF(z) − δ(E(w) − U )

(1.45)

w

rU = b + λ

u

wmax

Z

[E(z) − U ] dF(z)

(1.46)

w∗

Evaluating the asset value of employment at w∗ and setting it equal to the asset value of
unemployment yields:
u

∗

Z

e

wmax

w = b + (λ − λ )

[E(z) − E(w)]dF(z)

(1.47)

w∗

u

e

Z

wmax

= b + (λ − λ )
w∗

1 − F(z)
dz
r + δ + λe [1 − F(w)]

We now derive an implicit solution for the wage distribution G(w). A stationary distribution of employment over wages implies:
(1 − u)G(w)[δ + λ[1 − F(w)]] = uλu [F(w) − F(w∗ )]

Evaluating (1.48) at wmax yields
u
δ
=
1 − u λu [1 − F(w∗ )]

(1.48)
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Substituting into (1.48) gives the solution for G(w):

G(w) =

F(w) − F(w∗ )
δ
1 − F(w∗ ) δ + λ[1 − F(w)]

(1.49)

Finally, we can derive a solution for the mean wage:
Z

wmax

w̄ =

wdG(z)

(1.50)

w∗

Integration by parts yields
Z
w̄ = wmax −

wmax

G(z)dz
Z wmax
∗
∗
= [wmax − w ] + w −
G(z)dz
w∗
Z wmax
∗
=w +
[1 − G(z)]dz
w∗
∗ Z wmax
1 − F(z)
∗ δ + λ[1 − F(w )]
=w +
dz
∗
1 − F(w )
δ + λ[1 − F(z)]
w∗
w∗

Solution. I now outline how I solve the model. Since the production technology is constantreturns-to-scale, I can solve the individual firm problem and evaluate the aggregation
results. In particular, first, given a distribution N (z) of the number of firms, I solve for the
firm wage w(z) that maximize firm profits. Second, given these choices, we solve for all
aggregate quantities and normalize aggregate price P = 1 without lose of generality. The
profit function in (1.19) can be rewritten as

π(z) = max [p(z)z − w(z)] l(w)
w≥0

(1.51)

subject to labor supply (1.8) and demand curve (1.12). The firms choose wage w to post to
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maximize their profit by solving the first order condition
p(z)z
dw
=l
+w
µ(z)
dl

(1.52)

The assumption that all workers face the same job arrival rate λu = λe = λ implies that
w∗ = b from equation (1.4). Using the elasticity of labor supply from equation (1.9) and
replacing it to the first term of right-hand side of equation (1.51), I obtain
"

p(z)z
−w
µ(z)

#"

#
2kF ′ (w)
=1
1 + k(1 − F(w))

Focusing on size-invariant equilibria in which wages are increasing in firm productivity,
F(w(z)) = P (z). This implies F ′ (w(z))w′ (z) = P ′ (z) and it follows that the optimal wage
relationship between wage and productivity, w(z), solves the ordinary differential equation
"

p(z)z
w (z) =
−w
µ(z)
′

#"

2kP ′ (w)
1 + k(1 − P (w))

#
(1.53)
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Tables
Table 1.10: Targeted Moment and Untargeted Moment

1980

1990

2000

2010

2018

1.18
1.18
0.23
0.23

1.23
1.23
0.26
0.26

1.24
1.24
0.30
0.30

1.26
1.26
0.33
0.33

1.33
1.33
0.39
0.39

0.87
0.87

1.07
1.07

1.16
1.16

1.06
1.06

1.02
1.02

0.99
0.99
0.38
0.38

0.99
0.99
0.37
0.37

0.91
0.91
0.33
0.33

0.79
0.79
0.34
0.34

0.85
0.85
0.33
0.33

3.96
3.96
0.35
0.31
0.57
0.56

4.01
3.98
0.40
0.32
0.56
0.53

3.85
3.96
0.64
0.36
0.45
0.49

3.87
3.74
0.63
0.43
0.42
0.42

3.67
3.67
0.63
0.41
0.44
0.42

Targeted Moment
M
std(M)
py

std( Y )
Md
ρ

cost-weighted
aggregate markup
markup
standard deviation
relative sales
standard deviation
(6-digits NAICS)
sales-weighted
aggregate markdown
replacement rate

Data
Model

Untargeted Moment
W
sd(W )
LS

employment-weighted
aggregate log wage
log wage
standard deviation
sales-weighted
aggregate labor share
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Table 1.11: Counterfactual

1990

Y

L̃

WL

Z

N

M

aggregate output

2000
2010
2018
percentage change (%)
+8.79 +11.54 +2.96
+8.65

markup
markdown
productivity

-0.65
+1.84
+7.60

production labor

+3.68

-1.91

-17.84

-10.79

markup
markdown
productivity

0
+3.68
0

0
-1.91
0

0
-17.84
0

0
-10.79
0

aggregate labor income

+4.20

-1.87

-22.39

-17.35

markup
markdown
productivity

-2.64
+3.86
+2.99

-3.52
-2.83
+4.48

-5.72
-20.39
+3.73

-8.67
-13.50
+4.81

aggregate productivity

+6.21

+12.98

+17.37

+17.24

markup
markdown
productivity

-0.65
-0.56
+7.42

-0.84
+0.25
+13.57

-1.68
+1.66
+17.39

-2.77
+1.48
+18.53

number of firm

+13.81

-28.45

+41.74

+51.31

markup
markdown
productivity

+4.63
-1.15
+10.33

+6.26
+2.55
+19.64

+9.68 +14.56
+6.38
+8.92
+25.69 +27.83

entry

+7.37

+33.30

+6.97

+5.63

markup
markdown
productivity

+4.63
-7.00
+9.74

+6.26
+6.66
+20.38

+9.68
-22.09
+19.39

+14.56
-28.35
+19.43

-0.84
-1.68
-1.02
-10.62
+13.40 +15.25

-2.77
-5.75
+17.17
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Table 1.12: Counterfactual Labor Share Decomposition

∆LS

¯
∆LS

∆cov(ls, SW )

change in labor share

80-90 90-00 00-10 10-18
average cumulative change (%)
-0.64 -4.36 -10.44 -13.49

markup
markdown
productivity

-0.49
+0.78
-0.94

-1.34
+0.41
-3.43

-1.95
-3.55
-4.94

-2.99
-5.24
-5.26

change in within

-1.11

-3.94

-7.60

-10.72

markup
markdown
productivity

-0.45
+0.06
-0.72

-1.27
-0.10
-2.58

-1.94
-1.86
-3.79

-3.15
-3.40
-4.16

change in between

+0.46

-0.42

-2.85

-2.78

markup
markdown
productivity

-0.04
+0.72
-0.22

-0.07
+0.51
-0.86

+0
-1.69
-1.16

+0.16
-1.84
-1.10

Chapter 2
Do Direct-administered municipalities
work? Evidence from Chongqing
municipality in China
with Jiakai Zhang
2.1

Introduction

The design of an organization’s hierarchies deeply affects the information flow, the efficiency of the governance, and the local government’s incentive. Large organizations often
face a significant tradeoff between the vertical layers and the horizontal spans of control
(Williamson, 1967; Mookherjee, 2006). The optimal hierarchy of governance structure
is an essential question for the country’s political institution’s reform. The flattening
governmental hierarchies is a population trend in developing countries. Some studies
have examined how the flattening administrative structure affects the fiscal performance
and efficiency of public funds uses for local governments (Bo et al., 2020). However, few
62
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studies directly investigate the causal effect of the flattening government hierarchies on
the local economic development and the impacts of the relevant administrative hierarchy
policies.
This paper provides quantitative evidence to demonstrate how administrative governance structure affects regional development. Local government plays an important
role in different aspects, including accelerating regional growth, reducing inequality, and
providing public services (Weber, 2009). However, it is hard to identify the impact of the
administrative hierarchies on regional development because there was no exogenous policy
variation to change the hierarchies of local governments. Therefore, we examine a quasiexperiment in China that upgrades a prefectural city to a municipality directly governed by
the central government (hereafter city-upgrading policy). The Chinese central government
implemented the city-upgrading policy for Chongqing in 1997. Chongqing city is the only
one upgraded to the direct-administered municipality after the 1978 economic reform
and is the only inland city among the current four municipalities. The city-upgrading
policy implementation in Chongqing aimed not only to speed up Chongqing’s economic
growth and urbanization but also to promote Western China’s development through more
powerful local governments. To the best knowledge, this is among the first pieces of empirical studies to examine how the higher administrative hierarchy of the city influences
economic performance.
This paper mainly asks several research questions: How does the city-upgrading affect
regional development? Whether the establishment of municipalities drives the economic
growth of surrounding regions? What are the spillover effects of the municipality on
the surrounding areas in the different aspects? The key challenge in identifying the
effect of the city-upgrading policy is to select an appropriate method to make the causal
inference. There are a small number of treated and control units (Abadie, 2019), so we
adopt the synthetic control method (SCM) in this paper to identify the effect of the city-
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upgrading policy on the economic development in Chongqing. Secondly, we use the spatial
panel model to identify the spillover effects of the municipality on the neighboring cities’
economic growth. Finally, we discuss some direct and spillover effects of the city-updating
policy in different aspects, including urbanization, foreign direct investment (FDI), local
government revenue, and total factor productivity (TFP).
Our empirical results present that the city-upgrading policy increased Chongqing’s
GDP approximately by 40% on average in the following four years after 1996, relative
to what would have been in the absence of implementation of the upgrading policy. We
demonstrate that following Chongqing’s upgraded to the municipality, GDP increased
markedly in Chongqing relative to a comparable synthetic control region. In addition,
we find the positive spillover effects of the establishing municipality on the economic
growth of surrounding cities. Further evidence shows the direct and spillover effects of
establishing the municipality on its neighboring cities in different aspects, such as FDI,
urbanization, fiscal revenues of local governments, and productivity.
Literature. This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, our
paper adds to the vast body of work on the political institutions and the administrative
hierarchies.1 In the specific context of China, the local government has a significant
influence on the regional economy (Li and Zhou, 2005). Therefore, if the administrative
hierarchy of the region to which the local government belongs is upgraded, it may significantly impact local economic development. Chen et al. (2017) find that political favoritism
helps cities with higher administrative levels grow faster in China’s political hierarchy
by paying a lower capital price. Tang and Hewings (2017) think that cities with a higher
1 Political

institutions play an essential role in regional development and urbanization (Henderson and
Becker, 2000). Some previous empirical studies have examined the importance of the political institutions
in determining regional development, economic stability, and urbanization concentration (Davis and
Henderson, 2003; De Haan, 2007; Henderson and Wang, 2007; Jong-A-Pin, 2009; Desmet and Henderson,
2015).
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hierarchy level have more access to economic resources and administrative power. The
centralized “cities” replacing prefectures could increase industrial productivity (Bo, 2020).
However, Fan et al. (2012) find that an upgrading-county to create cities fails to benefit
the county’s economic performance. This paper reveals how another essential dimension
of political institutions, namely, the centralization of local government power by upgrading the city’s administrative hierarchy, affects regional development, urbanization, and
industrialization.
Second, this paper also contributes to the literature on inter-city spillovers. Existing
studies have investigated the regional spillovers of different potential mechanisms.2 However, to our best knowledge, few studies examined the spillover effect of the policy related
to change of the administrative hierarchies.3 Although several policies have been designed
to promote industrialization and urbanization in China, a large fraction of cities are undersized and under-urbanized (Au and Henderson, 2006). Therefore, this paper investigates
whether the city-upgrading policy designed a prefectural city to a “larger” municipality
has spillover effects on the surrounding cities and how aspects of these spillover effects
are manifested.
Finally, this paper is the first application of SCM to assess the impact of an administrative hierarchy upgrading policy on economic development in a developing country.4
We further adopt the spatial panel model used to investigate the spillover effects of the
city-upgrading policy because the purpose of establishing a municipality is not only to
2 The

spillover effects on regional economic development are caused by different factors, including foreign
direct investment (FDI), environmental pollution, market potential, infrastructure, and human capital
(Delgado and Álvarez, 2007; Chun-Chien and Chih-Hai, 2008; Motohashi and Yuan, 2010; Bai et al., 2012;
Huang et al., 2017).
3 Gong et al. (2019) probably is the closest study to explore the spillover effect of the administrative
hierarchy policy, which find that the larger city has a significantly positive effect on the wage levels of cities
and positively influences the surroundings.
4 SCM has been used to evaluate the effect of reforms and specific policies, such as California’s tobacco
control program (Abadie et al., 2010), EU cohesion policy (Barone et al., 2016), German reunification (Abadie
et al., 2015a), spillovers from universities (Liu, 2015), Economic liberalization (Billmeier and Nannicini,
2013), the Tourism Development Policy (Castillo et al., 2017), and energy policy (Ando, 2015).
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promote the city’s economic development but also to have a wider impact on the surrounding areas. Besides, we investigate the effects of the municipality on both the local TFP
at the city level and the TFP of firms. We incorporate a standard production function
approach with an administrative governance structure using firm-level data to estimate
city-level productivity and its spillover effect.5 Iyoha (2021) points out the importance of
firm-to-firm productivity spillover effect on aggregate productivity. Different from her
work, this paper examines the spatial spillover effect of firms between cities. We find that
cities near municipalities have around 2 to 6 percent higher TFP growth.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2.2 introduces China’s
administrative structure and the stylized facts on municipalities. In section 2.3, we mainly
apply synthetic control methods to estimate the impacts of the city-upgrading policy and
the spillover effects of the municipality on the economic growth of surrounding cities.
section 2.4 discusses the direct and spillover effects of establishing the municipality in
different aspects. Section 2.5 concludes.

2.2

Institutional Background

China’s Administrative Structure. China still remains a unitary political system after
1978, although the current governance structure bears prominent features of decentralization. The decentralization of decision-making in China is hierarchical and uneven.
Subnational governments in China are organized in a four-level hierarchy and own their
specific administrative hierarchies, unlike the administrative system in the US and Europe
(Tang and Hewings, 2017). Each level of government is obliged to report to the higher
level (Shen et al., 2012). Therefore, the distribution of all administrative powers matches
the hierarchical system (Zhang and Wu, 2006). Such the vertical administrative system
5 This

semi-parametric proxy variable/control function approaches first introduced by Olley and Pakes
(1992) and refined in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), Wooldridge (2009) and Ackerberg et al. (2015).
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determines the extent of economic and administrative power for subnational governments
at different levels (Chen, 1991). The four administrative levels in subnational jurisdictions
are shown as follow:
• Provincial administrative unit: is the highest level of local government and includes
provinces, autonomous regions (zizhiqu), direct-administered municipalities (zhixiashi), and special administrative regions (SAR). At the end of 2019, China had 23
Provinces, 5 Autonomous Regions, 4 Municipalities, and 2 SARs.
• Prefectural administrative unit: is the administrative subdivision of the provincial
division and includes prefecture-level cities, prefectures, autonomous prefectures,
and leagues. At the end of 2019, there were 293 prefecture-level cities and 40 other
prefectural administrative regions.
• County administrative unit: includes counties (xian) and county-level cities (xianjishi),
autonomous counties (zizhixian) and city districts (shixiaqu). At the end of 2019,
there were 2,846 county-level administrative regions, particularly including 387
county-level cities.
• Township administrative unit: is the most basic administrative unit in China and includes towns and villages.
Figure 2.1 shows that there are 684 designated cities at different levels in China
in 2018, including 293 prefecture-level cities, 387 county-level cities, and four directadministered municipalities.6 The prefecture-level cities are the second level of the
administrative structure in China. The direct-administered municipalities are the highest
level of classification for cities and have the same rank as provinces. The administrative
6 If not specified, a city denotes the prefectural-level city, and a municipality or a direct-administered
municipality denotes a city under the direct administration of central government in this paper.
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Figure 2.1: Structure of Chinese Government (End of 2018)

Source: China Statistical Yearbook in 2019

hierarchy of a city represents the power of local government and corresponding policymaking power (Li et al., 2015). By place in the hierarchy, cities have different formal
degrees of autonomy, different fiscal responsibilities, and resources, so a city at a higher
level of the hierarchy can have more access to the economic resources and administrative
power (Chen et al., 2017). The Municipalities have the same administrative and economic
powers as provinces and are higher than those of other cities so that they have priority
in the allocation of resources. As the administration and development of prefecture-
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level cities and directly-administered municipalities play an essential role in China’s
political and economic process, how governance responsibilities and powers are divided
and matched is critical to affecting regional economic development. This paper would
mainly focus on upgrading a low-level prefectural city to a high-level municipality and
whether the policy of changing the administrative hierarchy can promote local economic
development.
The City-Upgrading Policy for Chongqing. The Chinese central government designed a
series of relevant policies to promote regional development and urbanization, such as the
1983 reform to create prefectural cities and the city-county mergers policy. As shown in
fig:city number, The number of prefectural cities dramatically increases relative to the total
number of regions at the prefectural level.7 However, establishing a direct-administered
municipality is very prudent for the central government because the chosen municipality
should significantly impact local economic development and play an essential role in
driving the surrounding areas’ economic growth. The bars in fig:city number show the
number of municipalities in some selected years. After the founding of the People’s
Republic of China in 1949, the first batch of municipalities established were 12 cities.
There were some frequent changes in the number of municipalities between 1950 and
1953. In June 1954, 11 of 14 municipalities were reduced to sub-provincial cities. Only
Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin remained municipalities until Chongqing was upgraded to
a municipality in 1997.8
The three municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin are all in the developed
eastern regions (See donorcity), so there was an urgent need for a western inland city
upgraded in order to develop western inland areas. After a series of studies and discussions,
7 The

regions at the prefectural level refer to prefecture-level administrative units between the provincial
and county level, including prefectural cities, autonomous prefectures, autonomous regions, and leagues.
8 Although Tianjin was also temporarily reverted to sub-provincial city status between 1958-1967, there
were still three municipalities after 1967.
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Figure 2.2: Number of prefectures and municipalities since 1949

Notes: This figure displays the numbers of all prefectural-level regions, the prefectural level cities,
and the municipalities in China over the years.
Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs of China

which focused on selecting the city and how to use the city as an anchor to link the
eastern region with western China, Chongqing was eventually designated as the fourth
municipality on 18 June 1997. Before this, Chongqing was a sub-provincial city within
Sichuan province in southwest China. As the only upgraded prefectural city after the
Chinese economic reform in 1978, Chongqing was expected to be an economic center
serving the needs of southwest China and an engine driving the growth of China’s vast
western region (Han and Wang, 2001).
Stylized Facts on Municipalities. The Municipalities have the same administrative and
economic powers as provinces and are higher than those of other cities to prioritize
resource allocation. By place in the hierarchy, cities have different formal degrees of
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autonomy, different fiscal responsibilities, and resources, so a city at a higher level of
the hierarchy can have more access to the economic resources and administrative power
(Chen et al., 2017). Under the tax-sharing system in China, local governments have to
rely more on how the central government allocates fiscal resources by favoring politically
important provinces over provinces with greater needs but of less political importance. As
a result, the system could create inequitable distributions of public resources by favoring
politically important jurisdictions over jurisdictions with greater needs but of less political
importance (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003). Figure 2.3 shows that the proportion
of central government transfer payments obtained by any of four municipalities is much
higher than the average of the transfers obtained by the 162 prefectural cities.
Figure 2.3: The proportions of Transfer Payments in Four municipalities and Prefectural
Cities on average
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Transfer payments to finance more investment in health, education, and infrastructure
could improve economic growth potential (Jiang et al., 2012). In addition, the fiscal
incentive effect on local economic growth brought by transfers can direct local governments’ acts by encouraging them to improve the administrative performance (Li and Du,
2021). Therefore, the transfer payments of the central government has a very significant
impact on the regional economic development in China. Figure 2.4 shows that the transfer
payments per capita is positively associated with TFP at the city level. In addition, the
transfer payments per capita could have a positively spillover effect on the TFP at the city
level.
Figure 2.4: City-Level TFP v.s. Transfer Payments Per Capita

Figure 2.5 displays that the neighboring transfer payments per capita of the city could
be positively related to the TFP of the city. One possible explanation for the better
economic performance of municipalities is due to the favoritism of the central government
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so that municipalities can receive more transfers than prefectural cities. In addition, the
municipalities probably could have positive spillover effects on the economic development
of surrounding cities.
Figure 2.5: City-Level TFP v.s. Spatial Lag Transfer Payments Per Capita

2.3

The Effect of City-Upgrading Policy

Preliminary results To initially study the difference in economic performance between
municipalities and prefectural cities, we use the specification of the regression that includes
a dummy variable for municipalities as follows:
Yit = β0 + β1 Municipalityit + Xit′ φ + δi + µt + ϵit

(2.1)
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where Yit is the outcome variable in a city i and year t, including the logarithm of GDP
and GDP growth rate. Municipalityit is a dummy variable indicating that the city i is a
municipality in year t. Municipalityit takes the value of one if a city i is a municipality
in year t and otherwise for all prefectural cities.9 Xit denotes control variables at the city
level, including the investment rate, the value-added of the secondary industry ratio to
GDP, government size, openness degree, the logarithm of population, and the logarithm
of land area.
Table 2.1: Baseline model: Economic growth and development
∆ln(GDPt )
Municipality
Controls
City fixed effect
Year fixed effect
N
R-squared

ln(GDPt )

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.1133***
(0.0095)

0.1299***
(0.0168)

0.1323***
(0.0402)

0.0513**
(0.0235)

NO
YES
YES
8,339
0.8806

YES
YES
YES
8,319
0.8840

NO
YES
YES
8,363
0.6953

YES
YES
YES
8,342
0.8127

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. In addition, ∆ln(GDPt )
and ln(GDPt ) represent growth rate of GDP and the logarithm of GDP, respectively. Columns (1)
and (3) start the estimation by controlling for city fixed effects and year fixed effects. Columns
(2) and (4) add the investment rate, the share of secondary industry, government size, openness,
the logarithm of population, and the logarithm of land area as control variables at the city level.
Standard errors are clustered at the prefectural city level for all regressions in parentheses.
Levels of significance: ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.

Table 2.1 presents the results of our specification (1) (see equation 2.1), alternatively
using the GDP growth rate and the GDP as the dependent variables. Each column
represents the estimate from separate regression and only reports the coefficient of the
municipality.
9 Our sample spans the period 1986-2017 and approximately covers 270 cities. Beijing, Shanghai,
and Tianjin were already directly-administered municipalities before 1986, so the Municipalityit dummy
variable takes one for these three cities. Chongqing is the only city upgraded from a prefectural city to a
directly-administered municipality in 1997 during our sample period.
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We start the estimation by controlling for city-specific fixed effects and year-specific
fixed effects in column (1), where the logarithm of GDP is the dependent variable. It
turns out that the hierarchy of the city is positively associated with the GDP growth rate.
Column (2) takes a further step to add the investment rate, the share of secondary industry,
government size, openness, the logarithm of population, and the logarithm of land area as
control variables at the city level. The coefficient of Municipality is persistently positive
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Quantitatively, column (2) indicates that
the GDP growth rate of municipalities is 11.33% higher than that of prefectural cities.10
We also use the logarithm of GDP used as the dependent variable in columns (3) and (4).
The estimated coefficient of Municipality in column (4) is 0.0513. This indicates that the
GDP of municipalities is 5.13 log points higher than that of prefectural cities.
Synthetic control method One of the advantages of the synthetic control method is that
it offers a suitable approach when a small number of treated and control units. In this
paper, Chongqing is the only city upgraded from a prefectural city to a municipality
during the sample period, so the synthetic control method is more perfectly fitted for such
comparative case studies than the difference in differences (DiD).
Our empirical model closely follows the synthetic control method presented in Abadie
et al. (2010). Let Yit be the outcome variable that would be observed for city i at time
t conditional on the city-upgrading policy event. The treated city (i = 0) is Chongqing,
and we have that i ∈ {1, . . . , N } for the cities in the donor pool that similar in the outcome
variable, i.e., GDP. The sample period began in 1986, and treatment occurs in 1996 in
Chongqing. Hence, time is indexed as t = {1, . . . , T0 , . . . , T0 + 5}, where T0 represents the
number of pre-treatment periods, and T0 + 1 is the year of treatment for city i = 0. We
confine our analysis to the four years after the city-upgrading policy. We assess the effect
10 Chongqing

is the only prefectural city upgraded to a municipality during the sample period.
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of the city-upgrading policy on Chongqing GDP as it is the main purpose of upgrading
the city from the prefectural-level city to the direct-administered municipality.11
We use annual city-level panel data for the period 1986-2000. The city-upgrading
policy for Chongqing was implemented in 1997. Our sample period ends in 2000 because
China’s central government implemented several reforms after 2000, probably influencing
plausible predictions. As mentioned before that the synthetic Chongqing is constructed
as a weighted average of potential control cities in the donor pool. It is necessary to
carefully construct a donor pool to satisfy some identifying assumptions of the synthetic
control estimator. The control group is meant to reproduce the counterfactual of how
the city’s economic performance would have evolved had it not been upgraded to the
direct-administered municipality. To that end, the control group should consist of cities
that do not have the city-upgrading policy or any city that has been upgraded before the
sample period. In other words, cities exposed to treatment should not be included in the
donor pool. We use these criteria to select the cities to be included in the donor pool. Our
donor pool includes a sample of 36 prefectural cities listed in Table 2.2.
We provide definitions of all variables used in the analysis along with the data sources
in Appendix 2.6.1. The outcome variable, Yit is the GDP in city i at time t. For the preintervention characteristics in X1 and X0 , we adopt a standard set of economic development
predictors: investment rate, government debt, FDI ratio, sales ratio, the share of secondary
industry to GDP, and population density. We also experimented with a wide set of
additional predictors, but their inclusion did not change our results significantly.
Using the techniques described in Appendix 2.6.2, we construct a synthetic Chongqing
that weights are chosen so that the resulting synthetic Chongqing best reproduces the
values of the predictors of GDP in the period before the implementation of upgrading
city for Chongqing. Table 2.2 shows the weights of each city in the synthetic version
11 More

details of the Synthetic Control Method are shown in Appendix 2.6.2.
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Table 2.2: Synthetic weights for Chongqing
City

Weight

Anshan
Baoding
Benxi
Changchun
Changsha
Chengdu
Dongying
Foshan
Fushun
Guangzhou
Hangzhou
Harbin
Hebi
Hefei
Hegang
Hohhot
Jinan

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.105
0
0
0
0
0.003
0
0

City
Lanzhou
Liaoyuan
Nanchang
Nanjing
Nanning
Shenyang
Shijiazhuang
Taiyuan
Urumchi
Weihai
Wuhan
Wuxi
Xi’an
Xiamen
Xining
Yangquan
Zhengzhou

Weight
0
0
0
0
0
0.867
0
0
0
0.025
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Notes: The weight is the city weight assigned by the synthetic control method.

of Chongqing. The synthetic Chongqing is a weighted average of Shenyang, Weihai,
Guangzhou, and Hegang, with weights decreasing in this order. Weights of all other cities
are zero in the donor pool.
Table 2.3: GDP predictor means before Chongqing upgrading

Investment rate
Government debt
FDI
Sales share
Industry share
Population density

Chongqing

Synthetic Chongqing

Prefectural City Sample

19.6603
-2.3888
6.5860
48.386
49.6613
582.8

20.2673
-4.5235
4.4617
47.5895
53.6117
600.0412

18.8560
-2.5400
6.9485
43.6052
58.6627
699.2646

Notes: All the variables are averaged for the 1986–95 period. The last column reports a populationweighted average for the 36 prefectural cities in the donor pool.

Table 2.3 compares the pre-upgrading characteristics of Chongqing to those of the syn-
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thetic control Chongqing and those of a population-weighted average of the 36 donor cities.
The results shown in Table 2.3 indicate that the synthetic Chongqing provides a much
better comparison for Chongqing than the weighted average of other cities in the donor
pool. The synthetic Chongqing is very similar to the actual charismatics of Chongqing,
including investment rate, government debt, FDI ratio, sales share, the value-added of
secondary industry ratio to GDP, and population density before 1997. Compared to the
weighted average of the donor cities, the synthetic Chongqing also matches Chongqing
much closer to population density because Chongqing has a larger land area than most
cities in China. This variable cannot be perfectly fitted using a combination of the donor
cities.12
Figure 2.6: Trends in GDP: Chongqing versus Synthetic Chongqing

Figure 2.6 displays the GDP trajectory of Chongqing and its synthetic counterpart for
12 There

are cities with similar or larger land areas to Chongqing, but other variables are very different, or
relevant data are missing, so we finally choose these 36 cities in our donor pool.
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the 1986-2000 period. The synthetic Chongqing almost reproduces GDP for Chongqing
during the pre-upgrading period. This close fit that we obtained in Table 2.3 for GDP
predictors demonstrates a combination of 36 cities that reproduces Chongqing’s economic
attributes before 1997. Our estimate of the impact on GDP in Chongqing is the difference
between GDP in Chongqing and its synthetic version after 1996.
Figure 2.7: GDP between Chongqing and Synthetic Chongqing

The discrepancy between the two lines suggests a sizeable positive effect of cityupgrading policy on Chongqing GDP. We can observe that the effect of the city-upgrading
policy immediately stimulates Chongqing’s GDP right after 1996. Figure 2.7 presents the
estimates of the policy’s scaled impacts, that is, the gap in GDP between Chongqing and
its synthetic version. The four-year average effect relative to GDP in 1996 is around 40%.
The largest effect came from the first year after implementing the city-upgrading policy
and then gradually declined.
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Figure 2.8: GDP gaps in Chongqing and placebo gaps in all 36 control cities

To assess the credibility of our estimates, we conduct a series of placebo studies by
iteratively applying the synthetic control method used to estimate the effect of the cityupgrading policy for Chongqing to every other city in the donor pool. We implement the
upgrading policy to one of 36 cities. In other words, we proceed as if one of the cities in
the donor pool would have been upgraded to a municipality in 1997 instead of Chongqing.
Figure 2.8 displays the results for the placebo test and reproduces Figure 2.7 (solid and
black lines with dots) while also shows the gap associated with each of the 36 runs of the
test (gray lines), which represents the gaps in GDP between each city and its synthetic
version. A narrow (wide) gap of the preintervention period is a signal of an accurate (poor)
synthetic control. A narrow (wide) gap of the postintervention period is a signal of a small
(large) treatment effect. This distribution of gaps provides the sampling variation that
determines whether our results are driven by chance. If there are many placebos with large
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post-treatment gaps, our result is likely driven by chance only. Only Chongqing’s GDP
had a significant jump in 1997, and there is no variation throughout the preintervention
period except there is a slight change in 1995. As the figure makes apparent, we confirm
that the city-upgrading policy significantly impacts the city’s GDP level.
Figure 2.9 reports the ratios between the post-1996 RMSPE and the pre-1996 RMSPE for
Chongqing and all the cities in the donor pool. The RMSPE measures the magnitude of the
gap in the outcome variable of interest between each city and its synthetic counterpart. For
each city, we divide the post-upgrading RMSPE by its pre-upgrading RMSPE.13 Chongqing
stands out as the city with the highest RMSPE ratio. The postintervention gap is around 58
times larger than the preintervention gap. Compared to the second large gap, Chongqing’s
postintervention gap is more than four times the second large gap (Zhongshan). Our
synthetic control method to access the effect of the city-upgrading policy on Chongqing
confirms that the policy significantly affects the region’s economic performance.
The synthetic Chongqing built from other cities may have been biased because of
spillover effects, so we remove the cities included in Chongqing’s contiguous provinces to
construct a new donor pool. Five provinces are bordering Chongqing, including Sichuan,
Shaanxi, Hubei, Hunan, and Guizhou. However, reducing the number of units in the
synthetic control may impact the extent to which the synthetic control can fit the characteristics of the unit of interest (Abadie et al., 2015a). Panel (a) of p1 shows the GDP paths
for Chongqing and synthetic controls without the cities in the five neighboring provinces.
The synthetic controls in panel (a) produce very similar results to the baseline estimate
in Figure 2.6. Therefore, we can eliminate the presence of spillovers that renders current
methods biased. Recall again that the synthetic Chongqing in Figure 2.6 is a weighted
average of four control countries: Guangzhou, Hegang, Shenyang, and Weihai. These four
13 We

consider cities with pre-1996 GDP values that cannot be approximated with a synthetic control by
taking the ratio between the post-1996 RMSPE and the pre-1996 RMSPE.
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Figure 2.9: Ratio of postintervention RMSPE to preintervention RMSPE: Chongqing and
Control Cities

cities are far away from Chongqing, so there should be no potential spillover effects from
Chongqing.14 In panel (b) of Figure 2.10, we find that relative to the original synthetic
control, the decline in the goodness of fit is moderate for synthetic control with the four
cities before 1997. However, this still displays a wide gap in GDP between Chongqing
and its synthetic version, which provides sufficient evidence for the effectiveness of the
city-upgrading policy for Chongqing.15
14 The

geographic distribution of these four cities is shown in Table 2.12.
Appendix 2.6.1, Figure 2.13 displays a wide gap in GDP between Chongqing and its synthetic version,
using three and two cities as the donor cities in panels (a) and (b), respectively.
15 In
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Figure 2.10: GDP gaps between Chongqing and Sparse Synthetic Controls
(a) Removing four neighboring cities

(b) Number of control cities: 4

Spillover Effect of the Municipality The results in synthetic control method have identified the effects of the city-upgrading policy on economic development. However, the
purposes of establishing a municipality are not only limited to promoting local economic
development but also expect that the municipality could become the economic center of
the surrounding area to drive the surrounding regions’ economic growth. Therefore, we
would investigate the spillover effects of the municipalities on the economic development
and growth of the surrounding cities in this section.
To formally check the direct and spillover effects of the municipalities in different
aspects, we adopt the spatial Durbin model (SDM). In general, SDM includes the spatial
lags of the dependent variable and explanatory variables. This paper mainly considers the
spillover effect of the municipalities, so our specification of the SDM as follows:

Y = λW Y + γMun + δW Mun + Xβ + αιT + ϵ

(2.2)

Y is n × 1 vector of the dependent variable. W y = Σnj=1 wit yit is the spatial lag of the dependent variable accounting for various spatial dependencies with W defined as (n × n) spatial
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weight matrix. λ is the spatial autoregressive parameter.16 Mun is a dummy variable for a
direct-administered municipality. If the city is a direct-administered municipality, Mun
takes the value of one. γ represents the difference in the dependent variable between the
prefecture-level city and municipality. The hypothesis of municipalities with spillover
effects on the surrounding cities in different aspects can be verified when δ is statistically
significant. The sign of δ determines the type of spillover effect of the municipalities.
Table 2.4 presents the direct and spillovers effects of establishing municipalities on
regional economic growth. In panel A, we use k-nearest neighbor weight matrices. In
columns (1) and (2), we use 3-nearest neighbor weight matrices. We start the estimation
by controlling year-specific fixed effects and lagged logarithm of GDP in column (1) of
panel A. It turns out that the direct-administered municipalities have relatively higher
economic growth relative to prefecture-level cities. The estimated coefficient of neighbor
municipality is 0.136 and statistically significant, which implies that the municipalities
have a higher positive spillover effect on their surrounding cities’ economic growth relative
to the prefectural cities. Column (2) takes a step further to add the ratio of investment to
GDP, the share of secondary industry to GDP, the size of the government, openness, the
logarithm of population, and the logarithm of land area. The results are consistent with
column (1). Quantitatively, the coefficient of municipality indicates that the growth rate of
direct-administered municipalities is 6.38 percentage points higher than that of prefectural
cities. The estimated coefficient of neighbor municipality is 0.136 and statistically significant,
implying that cities with municipality neighbors would increase their economic growth
rate by 13.6 percentage points than cities without municipalities nearby. In columns (3)
and (4), we choose 6-nearest cities as neighbors of any city to examine a broader scope of
the municipality’s spillover effects. We expect that the magnitude of the municipality’s
spillover effects is higher using the 6-nearest neighbor weights matrix than using the
16 The

value of λ reflects the degree of the spatial dependence (Gelfand et al., 2010).
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Table 2.4: The direct and spillover effects of municipalities on economic growth
∆ ln GDPt
Panel A. k-Nearest
Neighbor Weights.

3-Nearest Neighbor Weights
(1)
(2)

Municipality

0.0638***
(0.0198)
0.1360***
(0.0307)
-0.0122***
(0.0018)
0.0874***
(0.0167)

0.0719***
(0.0199)
0.1360***
(0.0302)
-0.0290***
(0.0022)
0.0764***
(0.0165)

0.0571***
(0.0199)
0.1768***
(0.0525)
-0.0125***
(0.0018)
0.2445***
(0.0206)

0.0655***
(0.0199)
0.1651***
(0.0518)
-0.0288***
(0.0022)
0.2321***
(0.0204)

NO
5,880

YES
5,880

NO
5,880

YES
5,880

Neighbor municipality
ln GDPt−1
spatial lag λ
Controls
N

6-Nearest Neighbor Weights
(3)
(4)

Panel B. Weights
Based on Distance

Inverse Distance Weights
(5)
(6)

Power Distance Weights (α = 2)
(7)
(8)

Municipality

0.0640***
(0.0197)
0.2001**
(0.0802)
-0.0121***
(0.0018)
0.2944***
(0.0261)

0.0699***
(0.0198)
0.2162***
(0.0792)
-0.0286***
(0.0022)
0.2724***
(0.0260)

0.0670***
(0.0198)
0.21097*
(0.1156)
-0.0122***
(0.0018)
0.3331***
(0.0345)

0.0737***
(0.0199)
0.2089*
(0.1139)
-0.0289***
(0.0022)
0.3074***
(0.0344)

NO
5,880

YES
5,880

NO
5,880

YES
5,880

Neighbor municipality
ln GDPt−1
spatial lag λ
Controls
N

Notes: The dependent variable is the GDP growth rate indicated on the top of the columns in panels
A and B. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (6) start the estimation by controlling for city fixed effects and
year fixed effects and including lagged GDP. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) add additional explanatory
variables, including the ratio of investment to GDP, the share of secondary industry to GDP, the
size of government, openness, the logarithm of population, and the logarithm of land area. In
panel A, K-Nearest neighbors for spatial weights are used to construct the spatial matrix. 3-Nearest
and 6-Nearest neighbor matrices are respectively are used in columns (1)-(2), and (3)-(4). In panel
B, weights based on distance are used to construct the spatial matrix. Inverse distance weights
and power distance weights (power=2) matrices are respectively used in columns (5)-(6), and (7)(8). The coefficients of Municipality represent the gap in GDP growth rate between municipalities
and prefectural cities. The coefficients of Neighbor municipality represent the spillover effects of
neighboring municipalities on economic growth. Spatial lag λ represents the spatial effects of the
economic growth of defined neighbors. Standard errors are clustered at the prefectural city level for
all regressions in parentheses. Levels of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
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3-nearest neighbor weights matrix. As shown in columns (3) and (4), the coefficients of
the neighbor municipality and spatial lag economic growth rate are relatively larger than
these in columns (1) and (2).
Furthermore, we choose different weight matrices based on the centroid distances in
panel B. we use a somewhat more flexible family that incorporates finite bandwidths with
inverse distance functions in columns (5) and (6). Compared to the distance between any
other cities and their corresponding nearest neighbors, the longest distance between a city
and its nearest neighbor in the sample is a bandwidth beyond which there is no direct
spatial influence between cities. If the d denotes the maximum radius of bandwidth, then
the class of inverse distance weights is defined as:


1


 dij
wij = 


 0

, 0 ≤ dij ≤ d
,

(2.3)

dij > d

we can further consider different neighbor numbers and neighbor weights for each city in
columns (5) and (6). We find that the coefficients of the neighbor municipality and spatial
lag economic growth rate are relatively larger than these in panel A. In columns (7) and
(8), there are believed to be diminishing effects, then we use one standard approach is to
assume that weights are a negative power function of the distance of the form and the
power is 2: wij = dij−2 . We note that the magnitudes of the municipality’s spatial effect as
neighbors and regional economic growth are greater than those in previous cases.

2.4

Further Discussion

We have investigated the spillover effect of the municipal city on the economic development
and growth in spillover. This section further discusses the direct and spillover effects
of the direct-administered municipalities in different aspects, including foreign direct
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investment (FDI), urbanization, and local government revenues. Moreover, we also studied
the influences of the city-upgrading policy on total factor productivity and its degree of
dispersion using firm-level data from China’s Annual Industrial Survey.
The Effect on FDI. The different influences arising from China’s administrative hierarchies
are probably more connected to foreign direct investment (FDI). Belkhodja et al. (2017)
indicate that agglomeration economies, market size, and the progress of reforms can
attract foreign investors. The purpose of establishing a direct-administered municipality
is to provide a fertile business environment for companies and collaborate with suppliers,
customers, and research institutions located in the same areas. Besides, Xu and Yeh (2013)
find that FDI tends to favor cities with significant market preferential policies. The local
government of municipality have a relatively higher political status in China and play a
leading role in the development of the economy (Li and Wu, 2017). Therefore, compared to
the prefecture-level cities, the municipalities are directly under the central government’s
administration so that their local governments have more autonomy to adopt some local
policies. Zhang (2011) finds that although local governments at prefectural city level in
China set up many development zones to compete for foreign investment, the investment
always goes a region both with the highest-quality infrastructure in its development zone
and with higher administrative power of its local government.
The corresponding results of the direct and spillover effects of the municipalities on
FDI are shown in FDI1. We start the estimation by controlling for year-specific fixed
effects and city-specific fixed effects in column (1), where the logarithm of FDI is used as
the dependent variable. It turns out that the municipalities can attract more FDI than
prefecture-level cities because the estimated coefficient of municipality dummy variable is
positive and statistically significant. However, the coefficient of neighbor municipality is
positive but only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Column (2) takes a step
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Table 2.5: The direct and spillover effects of Municipalities on FDI
ln FDIt
Municipality
Neighbor municipality
ln FDIt−1
spatial lag λ
Controls
N

FDIt /GDPt
(3)
(4)

(1)

(2)

0.2468***
(0.0908)
0.4168*
(0.2418)
0.8954***
(0.0049)
0.0738***
(0.0080)

0.1801*
(0.0928)
0.3015
(0.2421)
0.8814***
(0.0052)
0.0670***
(0.0081)

0.0099*
(0.0059)
0.0400**
(0.0156)
0.0049***
(0.0003)
0.2705***
(0.0197)

NO
5,880

YES
5,880

NO
5,880

∆ ln FDIt
(5)

(6)

0.0148***
(0.0054)
0.0372***
(0.0142)
0.0068***
(0.0003)
0.2373***
(0.0185)

0.2939***
(0.0913)
0.5805**
(0.2429)
-0.0823***
(0.0043)
-0.0528**
(0.0237)

0.2108**
(0.0933)
0.4162*
(0.2432)
-0.1006***
(0.0049)
-0.0485**
(0.0235)

YES
5,880

NO
5,880

YES
5,880

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. Columns (1), (3), and
(5) start the estimation by controlling for city fixed effects and year fixed effects and including
lagged FDI. Columns (2), (4), and (6) add additional explanatory variables, including the ratio of
investment to GDP, the share of secondary industry to GDP, the size of government, openness,
the logarithm of population, and the logarithm of land area. The 6-Nearest neighbor weights are
used to construct the spatial matrix. The coefficients of Municipality represent the gap in FDI
between municipalities and prefectural cities. The coefficients of Neighbor municipality represent
the spillover effects of neighboring municipalities on FDI. Spatial lag λ represents the spatial effects
of the economic growth of defined neighbors. Standard errors are clustered at the prefectural city
level for all regressions in parentheses. Levels of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.

further to add control variables at the city level. The coefficient of municipality is still
positive and statistically significant. Quantitatively, FDI in municipalities is 19.73% higher
than in prefecture-level cities on average.17 FDI has positive spillover effects between
cities because estimated λ is significantly positive.18 Furthermore, municipalities do not
have a spillover effect on FDI in surrounding cities because the coefficient of neighbor
municipality is not statistically significant. In columns (3) and (4), we alternatively use
the ratio of FDI to GDP as the dependent variable. Column (4) indicates that the ratio of
FDI to GDP in municipalities is 1.48% higher than in prefecture-level cities. Additionally,
the coefficient of neighbor municipality is positive and statistically significant, implying
17 (e0.1801 − 1) ∗ 100% ≈ 19.73%
18 A

number of studies have examined the spillover effects of FDI (Coughlin et al., 1999; Head et al., 1999;
Blonigen et al., 2007; Madariaga and Poncet, 2007).
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that the municipalities have a higher positive spillover effect on the ratio of FDI to GDP of
their surrounding cities relative to the prefectural cities. Quantitatively, The estimated
coefficient of neighbor municipality in column (4) is 0.0372, indicating that the ratio of FDI
to GDP in cities with neighboring municipalities is 3.72 percentage points higher than in
cities without neighboring municipalities. In columns (5) and (6), we use the growth rate
of FDI as the dependent variable, and the results are consistent with previous findings of
the direct and spillover effects of the municipalities on FDI.
The Effect on Urbanization Some urban economists have confirmed the importance of
political institutions in determining urbanization (Henderson and Becker, 2000; Henderson and Wang, 2007; Fan et al., 2012). This section would investigate the importance of
administrative hierarchies in China on the urbanization and urban concentration.
Table 2.6: The direct and spillover effects of Municipalities on urbanization

Municipality
Neighbor municipality
spatial lag λ

Controls
N

Non-agricultural pop/total pop
(1)
(2)

ln(Non-agricultural pop)
(3)
(4)

Average nighttime light
(5)
(6)

0.2874***
(0.0216)
-0.1501***
(0.0565)
0.5554***
(0.0147)

0.4076***
(0.0212)
-0.1816***
(0.0530)
0.4589***
(0.0152)

1.6398***
(0.0794)
0.2210
(0.1983)
0.6414***
(0.0123)

1.1621***
(0.0723)
-0.5910***
(0.1813)
0.4886***
(0.0133)

6.7286***
(0.6508)
11.5930***
(1.7313)
0.6497***
(0.0125)

7.8241***
(0.6383)
8.2545***
(1.6371)
0.5292***
(0.0139)

NO
5,880

YES
5,880

NO
5,880

YES
5,880

NO
5,880

YES
5,880

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. Columns (1), (3), and
(5) start the estimation by controlling for city fixed effects and year fixed effects. Columns (2),
(4), and (6) add additional explanatory variables, including the ratio of investment to GDP,
the share of secondary industry to GDP, the size of government, openness, the logarithm of
population, and the logarithm of land area. The 6-Nearest neighbor weights are used to construct
the spatial matrix. The coefficients of Municipality represent the gap in urbanization level
between municipalities and prefectural cities. The coefficients of Neighbor municipality represent
the spillover effects of neighboring municipalities on the urbanization measured by the nonagricultural population and the average nighttime light. Spatial lag λ represents the spatial
effects of the urbanization of defined neighbors. Standard errors are clustered at the prefectural
city level for all regressions in parentheses. Levels of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.

In general, the degree of urbanization is measured by the ratio of the urban population
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to the total population. Due to limited data, we use the non-agricultural population as the
measure of urbanization in this paper.19 Besides, we also investigate how the municipality
could affect peripheral non-agricultural labor forces. We start estimation by controlling
year-specific fixed effects and city-specific fixed effects in column (1) of urban, where the
non-agricultural population ratio to the total population is the dependent variable. It
shows that the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable municipality is positive and
statistically significant, which is consistent with our expectation that the proportion of
people engaged in agriculture is relatively lower in municipalities. Besides, the estimated
coefficient of Neighbor municipality is statistically negative, indicating that the municipalities have negative spillover effects on the ratio of the non-agricultural population of
surrounding cities. Column (2) adds the logarithm of GDP per capita, the ratio of investment to GDP, the share of secondary industry to GDP, the size of government, openness,
the logarithm of population, and the logarithm of land area at the city level as additional
control variables. The coefficient of the municipality is persistently positive and statistically
significant, and the coefficient of the Neighbor municipality is still negative and statistically
significant at the 1 percent level. Quantitatively, the non-agricultural population ratio is
40.76 percentage points higher in the municipalities than in the prefecture-level cities.
However, the estimated coefficient of Neighbor municipality is -0.1816, which implies that
the ratio of the non-agricultural population in cities with municipality neighbors is 18.16
percentage points lower than in cities without municipalities nearby. In columns (3) and
(4), we alternatively use the logarithm of the non-agricultural population as the dependent
variable. Column (3) indicates that the non-agricultural population in multiplicities is
19 Hukou

is divided into two types in China’s centrally planned economy: agricultural Hukou and nonagricultural hukou. Agricultural hukou refers to residents who rely on their own food production, and
non-agricultural hukou refers to urban residents who rely on the state to distribute rations. The hukou
system was retained until the State Council recently abolished the distinction between agricultural and
non-agricultural hukou and unified registration as resident hukou
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219.66% higher than in prefecture-level cities.20 Besides, the ratio of the non-agricultural
population in cities with municipality neighbors is 44.62% lower than in cities without
municipalities nearby.21
The limitation of the previous measures of urbanization is that the agricultural population only refers to the residents holding agricultural hukou. Still, they probably live in
cities for non-agricultural work.22 This paper employs the novel datasets of nighttime light
and examines whether there is a difference between the urbanization of municipalities and
prefectural cities. These data are collected by satellites under the US Air Force Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program Operational Linescan System (DMSP - OLS).23 Columns
(5) and (6) in urban verify that there is a difference between the urbanization of municipalities and prefectural cities. Besides, we also find that cities around the municipality have
higher nighttime lights than cities without municipalities nearby, so the municipalities
have an obvious “Siphon effect” on the prefectural cities in China.
The Effect on Local Government Revenues The fiscal revenue of local governments
primarily comes from public budgetary revenue and land grant premium (land lease
revenue).24 The sum of public budgetary revenue and land grant premium exceeds 90%
of local government’s total fiscal revenue (Zhao and Zhang, 2020).25 revenue presents that
20 (e1.1621 − 1) ∗ 100% ≈ 219.66%
21 (e−0.5910 − 1) ∗ 100% ≈ −44.62%
22 The

problem of migrant workers is that Chinese farmers go to cities for non-agricultural work. The
residents in urban villages also may work in the non-agricultural sector due to the loss of the original
agricultural land.
23 Each satellite observes every location on the planet every night at some instant between 8:30 and 10:00
p.m. local time (Henderson et al., 2012). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
and National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC) computes average annual light intensity for every location
in the world (Kocornik-Mina et al., 2020). This paper uses city-level nighttime light data in China.
24 Chinese local government revenue comprises three primary sources: public budgetary revenue (tax and
majority fees), government fund revenue, the operating revenue of state-owned capital. In 2011, public
budgetary revenue accounted for 71.14%, government fund revenue accounted for 28.33%, and operating
revenue of state-owned capital accounted for only 0.52%. The land grant premium accounted for more than
70% of government fund revenue.
25 For convenience, the total revenue of local governments is referred to as the sum of public budgetary
revenue and land grant premium in this paper if we do not specifically point out other revenues of local
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the difference in local revenue structure between municipalities and prefecture-level cities.
In panels A, B, and C, the dependent variables are the total revenue, public budgetary
revenue, and land grant premium, respectively, and are shown on top of every three
consecutive columns.
We start the estimation by controlling for year-specific effects and city-specific effects
in column (1) of panel A, where the logarithm of total revenue is used as the dependent
variable.26 It shows that the municipalities have more fiscal revenues than prefectural
cities, which is consistent with our expectation that cities with higher administrative levels
can get more financial autonomy. In column (2), we add the ratio of investment to GDP,
the share of secondary industry to GDP, government size, openness, the logarithm of
population, and the logarithm of land area as additional control variables at the city level.
The coefficient of Municipality is persistently positive and statistically significant at the 1
percent level. Column (3) adds the Neighbor Municipality dummy variable to capture the
spillover effects of municipalities on the total revenues of local governments in surrounding
cities. The coefficient of the dummy variable Neighbor municipality is negative but not
statistically significant, which implies that there is no significant difference in the spillover
effect on the total revenue of neighboring cities between municipalities and prefectural
cities. Column (3) indicates that a semi-elasticity of the total revenue of local governments
concerning whether the city is a municipality is 0.6238, implying that the total revenue
of municipalities approximately is higher than that of prefectural cities by 86.60%.27
In columns (4)-(6), we use the ratio of total revenue to GDP as the dependent variable.
We find that the coefficient of Municipality is not statistically significant. Therefore, the
proportion of total revenue to GDP of municipalities is not significantly different from
that of prefectural cities.
governments.
26 Total fiscal revenue is measured by the sum of public budgetary revenue and land grant premium.
27 (e0.6238 − 1) ∗ 100% ≈ 80.60%
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Table 2.7: The direct and spillover effects on fiscal revenue of local government
Panel A. Total local Revenue
Municipality

ln(Total revenue)
(2)

(1)

2.2972***
(0.1972)

0.5998***
(0.1502)

0.4490***
(0.0206)

0.2828***
(0.0175)

Neighbor municipality
spatial lag λ

Panel B. Budgetary Revenue
Municipality

(7)

1.0262***
(0.1617)

0.3973***
(0.0217)

0.2792***
(0.0178)

Neighbor municipality
spatial lag λ

Panel C. Land Grant Premium
Municipality

Controls
N

0.6238***
(0.1517)
-0.4018
(0.3736)
0.2839***
(0.0176)

0.0344
(0.0291)

-0.0837
(0.0649)

-0.0002
(0.0291)

-0.0092
(0.0290)

1.0878***
(0.1633)
-1.0095**
(0.3993)
0.2806***
(0.0178)

ln(Land grant premium)
(13)
(14)
(15)
1.8957***
(0.2044)

-0.0699
(0.1643)

0.5074***
(0.0194)
NO
3,920

-0.0782
(0.0657)
-0.0884
(0.1629)
-0.0089
(0.0290)

Budgetary Revenue/GDP
(10)
(11)
(12)
0.0753***
(0.0048)

0.0542***
(0.0035)

0.1967***
(0.0254)

0.1948***
(0.0185)

0.0551***
(0.0036)
-0.0134
(0.0085)
0.1949***
(0.0185)

Land grant premium/GDP
(16)
(17)
(18)
-0.0510
(0.0599)

-0.1483**
(0.0647)

0.2934***
(0.0179)

-0.0965
(0.1661)
0.4408
(0.4127)
0.2917***
(0.1780)

-0.0014
(0.0291)

-0.0097
(0.0291)

-0.1435**
(0.0655)
-0.0752
(0.1625)
-0.0095
(0.0291)

YES
3,920

YES
3,920

NO
3,920

YES
3,920

YES
3,920

Neighbor municipality
spatial lag λ

(4)

ln(Budgetary Revenue)
(8)
(9)

2.6897***
(0.2125)

Total revenue/GDP
(5)
(6)

(3)

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. The coefficients of
Municipality represent the gap in different types of local revenues between municipalities
and prefectural cities. We first start estimation for each dependent variable by controlling
for city fixed effects and year fixed effects. Then, we add additional explanatory variables,
including the ratio of investment to GDP, the share of secondary industry to GDP, the
size of government, openness, the logarithm of population, and the logarithm of land
area. Finally, we add the Neighbor municipality that represents the spillover effects of
neighboring municipalities on the different types of fiscal revenues of local governments.
Spatial lag λ represents the spatial effects of the economic growth of defined neighbors.
Standard errors are clustered at the prefectural city level for all regressions in parentheses.
Levels of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.

To investigate whether there are differences in various local fiscal revenues between
municipalities and prefectural cities, we use public budgetary revenue and land grant
premium as the dependent variables in panels B and C. In columns (7)-(9), we examine
the difference in budgetary revenues. The coefficients of Municipality are significantly
positive, implying that the municipalities have higher public budgetary revenues than
prefectural cities. Quantitatively, column (9) indicates that the public budgetary revenue
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of municipalities is 196.77 percentage points higher than that of prefectural cities.28
We also use the ratio of public budgetary revenue to GDP to determine how well local
governments direct their economic resources. There are two possible reasons for the
heterogeneity of budgetary revenue between municipalities and prefectural cities. First,
the more budgetary revenues of municipalities come from the non-tax revenues (majority
administrative fees). Second, the statutory tax rate is fixed because the central government
established a specific tax assignment in 1994. The municipalities have a higher rate of tax
compliance than prefectural cities.
In addition, we further examine the difference in land grant premium between municipalities and prefectural cities. We firstly use the logarithm of land grant premium as the
dependent variable. The results in panel C present no significant difference in land grant
premium between municipalities and prefectural cities. However, we alternatively use the
ratio of land grant premium to GDP as the dependent variable. In column (18), the ratio
of land grant premium to GDP in municipalities is 14.35% less than that of prefectural
cities. Therefore, municipalities rely more on public budgetary revenue, particularly tax
revenue, and less on land grant premium than prefectural cities.
The Effect on TFP. Another important feature of the direct-administered municipality is
that the city-upgrading policy probably increases the productivity of firms. Therefore, we
would investigate that the difference in the productivity of firms between the municipality
and prefectural city. We use firm-level data obtained from China’s Annual Industrial
Survey between 1998 and 2007. Firm productivity or TFP (total factor productivity) are
estimated by control function approach 29 . To capture the key of the identification, we use
the specification as follows:
28 The

public budgetary revenue equals the sum of tax revenue and majority fee. The tax revenue accounts
for more than 70 percent of public budgetary revenue. We cannot distinguish the difference between tax
revenues and non-tax revenues (majority fees) for both municipalities and prefectural cities.
29 See Appendix 2.6.3 for detail estimation

CHAPTER 2. CITY-UPGRADING POLICY: CHONGQING MUNICIPALITY

TFPict = βMunicipalityct + γXict + θi + δt + ϵit

95

(2.4)

where TFPict is the productivity of firm i in city c and year t. Municipalityct is a dummy
variable that equals 1 for the municipality, and 0 otherwise. Xict is a set of time-varying
controls at the firm level, θi is firm fixed effect, and δt is year fixed effect.
TFP1 presents the results of the above specification. Each column represents the
estimate from a separate regression and with only the coefficient of the municipality
dummy and its corresponding standard error reported. We start the estimation by only
controlling for firm-specific fixed effects in column (1) and adding year-specific fixed
effects in column (2). Column (3) takes a step further to add some control variables at
the firm level. In column (4), we add the interaction term of year dummy with four-digit
industry dummies. Column (4) implies that the productivity of firms in municipalities is
1.38 log points higher than that of firms in prefectural cities.
Furthermore, we investigate the effect and spillover effects of the municipality on the
aggregate TFP at the prefectural city level. In general, there are different channels through
that spatial dependence may enter a model. Therefore, Table 2.9 presents our results,
alternatively using the spatial lag model (panel A) and the spatial error model (panel B).
Each column of the table represents the estimate using various spatial weight matrices.
We start the estimation using 3- and 6-Nearest Neighbor Weights in columns (1) and
(2), respectively. To capture the diminishing spatial effects along with distance, we use a
standard approach to assume that weights are a negative power function of the distance
of the form. We respectively use the inverse distance weights matrix and power distance
weights matrix (α = 2) in columns (3) and (4).
As shown in Table 2.9, our results on the difference in the aggregate TFP between the
municipality and prefectural city and the difference in spillover effects are quite robust
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Table 2.8: Municipality and firm’s TFP

Municipality

(1)
0.0133***
(0.0040)

ln(TFP)
(2)
(3)
0.0132*** 0.0135***
(0.0040)
(0.0042)

(4)
0.0138***
(0.0021)

Firm fixed effect
Year fixed effect
Industry-year fixed effect
Controls
N

YES
NO
NO
NO
1,715,132

YES
YES
NO
NO
1,715,132

YES
YES
YES
YES
1,243,212

YES
YES
NO
YES
1,243,254

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. The coefficients
of Municipality represent the productivity gap between firms located in municipalities
and prefectural cities. Column (1) starts the estimation by controlling for firm fixed
effects. Column (2) adopts the estimation by controlling for firm fixed effects and year
fixed effects. Column (3) adds additional explanatory variables, including the ratio of
investment to GDP, the share of secondary industry to GDP, the size of government,
openness, the logarithm of population, and the logarithm of land area. Column (4) adds
(four-digit) industry-by year interactive fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the prefectural city level for all regressions in parentheses. Levels of significance: *10%,
**5%, ***1%.

across these alternative spatial weights matrices. Quantitatively, the coefficient of the
municipality is positive and statistically significant in column (4), indicating that the
municipalities have approximately 0.75 log points higher aggregate productivity than
other prefectural cities. The estimated coefficient is 0.0411, implying that the municipality
could increase more 4.11 log points in the productivity for surrounding cities than the
prefectural cities.
Productivity dispersion within narrowly defined industries signifies that technology
or knowledge is not being diffused across different firms coexisting in the same city. We
explore whether dispersion has any robust relationship to the different administrative
hierarchies of the city. In order to study this, we compute TFP dispersion measured by
the ratio of productivity of each firm and the average TFP of each industry based on each
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Table 2.9: The direct and spillover effects of Municipality on aggregate TFP

Panel A.
Spatial lag model
Municipality
Neighbor municipality
Spatial lag λ
City fixed effect
Year fixed effect
Controls
N

(1)
3-Nearest Neighbor
Weights

ln(TFP)
(2)
(3)
6-Nearest Neighbor Inverse Distance
Weights
Weights

(4)
Power Distance
Weights (α = 2)

0.0069*
(0.0041)
0.0184***
(0.0057)
0.3047***
(0.0195)
YES
YES
YES
2,484

0.0076*
(0.0040)
0.0250***
(0.0071)
0.4019***
(0.0222)
YES
YES
YES
2,484

0.0072*
(0.0040)
0.0411***
(0.0113)
0.4862***
(0.0240)
YES
YES
YES
2,484

0.0075*
(0.004)
0.0327***
(0.0090)
0.4461***
(0.0226)
YES
YES
YES
2,484

0.0104**
(0.0043)
0.0259***
(0.0063)
0.4132***
(0.0211)
YES
YES
YES
2,484

0.0123***
(0.0044)
0.0375***
(0.0078)
0.5479***
(0.0234)
YES
YES
YES
2,484

0.0127***
(0.0043)
0.0580***
(0.0126)
0.6592***
(0.0248)
YES
YES
YES
2,484

0.0131***
(0.0043)
0.0520***
(0.0102)
0.6006***
(0.0234)
YES
YES
YES
2,484

Panel B.
Spatial error model
Municipality
Neighbor municipality
Spatial error ρ
City fixed effect
Year fixed effect
Controls
N

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. We use spatial lag model and
spatial error model in panels A and B, respectively. In columns (1)-(4), the spatial model respectively use
3-nearest neighbor weights matrix, 6-nearest neighbor weights matrix, inverse distance weights matrix,
and power distance weights (α = 2) matrix. The coefficients of Municipality represent the productivity gap
between firms located in municipalities and prefectural cities. The coefficients of Neighbor municipality
represent the spillover effects of neighboring municipalities on economic growth. Standard errors are
clustered at the prefectural city level for all regressions in parentheses. Levels of significance: *10%, **5%,
***1%.

four-digit industrial codes as follows:

Dispersionijt =

TFPijt
TFPit

(2.5)

Table 2.10 presents statistics on dispersion measures in the dataset. The average level
of TFP dispersion is 1.0317 and 1.0191 in the municipality and prefectural city. Therefore,
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firms’ productivity in municipalities and prefectural cities would be higher and lower than
the average productivity of these firms’ industries. There is not much difference in the
25th percentile of TFP dispersion between firms in municipalities and prefectural cities.
However, the 75th percentiles of TFP dispersion are significant differences between them.
The standard deviation of TFP dispersion of firms is larger in municipalities relative to in
prefectural cities. Therefore, more firms with higher TFP relative to the average level of
their industries could locate in the municipality.
Table 2.10: TFP Dispersion Statistics

Municipality
Prefectural City

Mean

25th

Median

75th

Std. Dev.

99%/1%

75%/25%

IQ ratio

1.0317
0.9961

0.9846
0.9808

1.0191
0.9927

1.0755
1.0071

0.0710
0.0456

1.3047
1.2069

1.0924
1.0449

0.0893
0.0444

Notes: This table summarises the statistics on TFP dispersion of firm located in municipalities and prefectural
cities, respectively. Authors’ calculations based on the data from Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms.

To illustrate the difference in the productivity of firms located in the municipality and
prefectural city, TFP dispersion distributions in the municipality and prefectural city are
shown in TFP:f1. We can see that the distribution for the municipalities is more dispersed
than that of prefectural cities. Additionally, the proportions of firms with TFP dispersion
less than one are almost the same in municipalities and prefectural cities. Therefore there
are more firms with higher productivity that locate in municipalities.
As a formal analysis, we propose a method to show how TFP dispersion and TFP are
associated with the cities’ administrative hierarchies. We use a standard regression model
to identify any changes in dispersion related to the municipality:

Dispersionict = β1 Municipalityct + γXict + θi + δt + ϵit

(2.6)

where the dispersionict is the TFP dispersion for firm i, within city c, and in year t. Other
variables and parameters are defined above. The baseline regression results are shown in
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Figure 2.11: TFP dispersion: Municipality vs Prefectural city

Notes: This figure visualizes the distribution of log TFP dispersion for all firms in prefectural cities and
municipalities, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the data from Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms.

columns (1)-(3) of dispersion2.
We start the estimation by controlling for firm-specific effects and year-specific effects
in column (1). Column (2) adds the time-varying control variables at the firm level. In
column (3), we add interaction term of year fixed effects with two-digit industry dummies.
The results from the specification in dispersion show that the TFP dispersion of firms in
municipalities is higher than in prefectural cities. The results indicate that the establishing
municipality can increase the ratio of the firms’ productivity to the average productivity
of their industries. In order to capture the heterogeneous differences for various degrees
of TFP dispersion between firms in the municipality and prefectural city, we add three
different quantile dummies and their interaction terms with the municipality dummy into
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Table 2.11: Municipality and TFP Dispersion

Municipality

(1)
0.0305***
(0.0059)

(2)
0.0401***
(0.0065)

First quantile dummy

TFP Dispersion
(3)
(4)
0.0399*** 0.0243***
(0.0063)
(0.0062)
0.4699***
(0.0058)

Second quantile dummy

(5)
0.0243***
(0.062)

0.4677***
(0.0054)

Third quantile dummy
Municipality ×
Quantile dummy
Firm fixed effect
Year fixed effect
Industry-year fixed effect
Controls
N
R-squared

(6)
0.0243***
(0.0062)

1.2811***
(0.0152)

0.8238***
(0.0121)

0.4536***
(0.0053)
0.5846***
(0.0108)

YES
YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
NO
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES

1,615,183
0.7793

1,149,256
0.7874

1,149,256
0.8003

1,149,256
0.8053

1,149,256
0.8052

1,149,256
0.8047

Notes: The dependent variables are indicated on the top of the columns. Column (1) starts the
estimation by controlling for firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. Column (2) adds additional
explanatory variables at the firm level, including investment rate, firm size, firm age, logarithm
of sales, and the wage. Column (3) adds (two-digit) industry-by year interactive fixed effects. In
columns (4)-(6), we add the quantile dummy and its interaction term with municipality dummy.
Standard errors are clustered at the prefectural city level for all regressions in parentheses. Levels of
significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.

the original specification. The quantile dummy takes the value of 1 for which the TFP
dispersion of firms is larger than some quantile values of TFP dispersion in municipalities
or non-municipalities; otherwise, the dummy takes the value of 0. In columns (4)-(6),
we add the first quantile, the second quantile, and the third quantile dummies and their
interaction terms with the municipality dummy. The estimated coefficients of all quantile
dummies are significantly positive and very similar, which indicates that the variation of
TFP dispersion is not large for firms in prefectural cities. For the firms in municipalities,
the difference in their degrees of TFP dispersion is relatively larger. Comparing the
coefficients of interaction terms of the three quantile dummies with the municipality
dummy, we find a massive variation of TFP dispersion for firms in the municipality.
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Conclusion

In this paper, we investigate upgrading the administrative hierarchies of a city as a policy
tool to promote regional development. Previous studies are still ambiguous regarding
whether the centralization of local government power is better. The establishment of
Chongqing municipality is a good quasi-experiment to identify the causal effect of change
in the administrative hierarchy.
This paper examines the impact of municipalities from different perspectives by using
three various techniques, respectively. First, we adopt the synthetic control method
to investigate the causal effect of the city-upgrading policy in Chongqing. Second, we
use the spatial Durbin model to consider the more spillover effects of municipalities on
surrounding areas than prefectural cities. Finally, we apply the control function approach,
including heterogeneity of administrative hierarchy, to estimate the TFP.
Our findings have important policy implications for regional development, particularly
in developing countries. The paper firstly raised the potential value of higher administrative hierarchies when we design the relevant policies. The primary implication is that it
is possible to adjust the administrative hierarchies of local government in less developed
areas for a better local economic performance. Adopting the SCM approach to Chongqing’s
city-upgrading policy in China, we find an average annual impact of 40 percent since 1997.
Secondly, we explore the spillover effects of the municipalities from different angles. We
find that the municipalities have a positive spillover effect on the economic growth and
FDI of surrounding cities compared to prefectural cities. Besides, municipalities have more
non-agricultural populations, but the non-agricultural population of neighboring cities
would be smaller. The municipality has no spillover effects on the total revenue of surrounding city governments but negatively affects their public budget revenue. Thirdly, the
central government has implemented a series of policies for urbanization since the 1978
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economic reform, but some policies are not very successful. We observe more productive
industrial production at the city level in municipalities through the city-upgrading policy
to designate a higher administrative hierarchy for Chongqing. Additionally, establishing a
municipality could also have a positive spillover effect on the productivity of surrounding
cities.
The city-upgrading policy in Chongqing indeed promotes local economic growth and
has a significant impact on the surrounding cities. Compared with the previous series of
policies, the main reasons behind the policy’s success may be related to the incentives to
local governments and the agglomeration effect due to the higher administrative hierarchy.
It is fair to say that the successful solutions are unlikely to be one-size-fits-all; however, the
implementation of the city-upgrading policy is still more likely to be worthy of reference
and implementation, given the success of the Chongqing municipality.
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Appendix

2.6.1

Tables and Figures
Table 2.12: Variable Definitions

Variable

Definition

ln(GDP)
∆ln(GDP)
Investment rate
Industry share
Government debt

Logarithm of the gross domestic product (GDP)
The gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate
The ratio of gross fixed investment to GDP
The ratio of secondary industry value-added to GDP
The ratio of local government deficit (budgetary expenditure minus
budgetary revenue) to GDP
The ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP
The ratio of amount of sales to GDP
The population divided by total land area
The ratio of the sum of imports and exports to GDP
Dummy for city-upgrading policy. (1 if the policy is implemented in
city; 0 otherwise)
Dummy for direct-administered municipalities. (1 if the city is the
direct-administered municipality; 0 otherwise)

FDI
Sales share
Population density
Openness
Upgrading
Municipality

Source: Author’s calculations using data from various China City Statistical Yearbooks.
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Figure 2.12: Geographical distribution of municipalities and donor pool cities

Notes: This figure visualizes the geographic distribution of Chongqing municipalities, three other
municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin), and the cities in donor pool from donor
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Figure 2.13: GDP gaps between Chongqing and Sparse Synthetic Controls
(a) Number of control cities: 3

(b) Number of control cities: 2

Figure 2.14: Placebo Graph
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Figure 2.15: TFP: Municipality and prefectural city over time

Notes: This figure visualizes the distribution of log TFP between 1999 and 2007 for all firms in municipalities
and prefectural cities, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the data from Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms.
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Figure 2.16: TFP dispersion: Municipality and prefectural city over time

Notes: This figure visualizes the distribution of log TFP dispersion between 1999 and 2007 for all firms in
municipalities and prefectural cities, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the data from Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms.
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Figure 2.17: TFP dispersion: Municipality, Second-tier city and others

Notes: This figure visualizes the distribution of log TFP dispersion for all firms in municipalities, second-tier
cities, and other cities, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the data from Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms.
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Figure 2.18: TFP dispersion: Chongqing, big three, second-tier city and others

Notes: This figure visualizes the distribution of log TFP dispersion for all firms in Chongqing municipality,
three other municipalities, second-tier cities, and other cities, respectively.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the data from Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms.
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Synthetic Control Method

Define Ŷit as the value of the outcome variable in the treated city had the city-upgrading
policy event not occurred, and YitI as the outcome that would be observed in country i at
time t if the city-upgrading policy event has occurred. Ŷit is by definition the counterfactual to YitI and is not observed. We assume no interference between units. No interference
means that the outcomes of the untreated units are not affected by the intervention implemented in the treated unit (Rosenbaum, 2007). we assume that the city has been upgraded
to direct-administered municipality does not affect other cities external position. We also
assume that the potential outcomes are independent of being selected for city-upgrading
policy, conditional on past outcomes and observed covariates. We discuss the strength of
these assumptions in sensitivity analysis.
Define αit = YitI − Ŷit as the effect of the city-upgrading policy event in city i at time t
and Dit as the binary indicator equal to one for the treated city at and after the treatment
date. Then according to the potential outcomes framework, the observed outcome for unit
i at time t can be expressed as Yit = Ŷit + αit Dit . We estimate the series of city-upgrading


policy effects αi,T0+1 , . . . , αiT for t > T0 for the treated city i = 0 vis-à-vis an estimate of Ŷit ,
where αit = YitI − Ŷit = Yit − Ŷit .
Suppose that Ŷit can be estimated using a factor model specified according to the
covariates for GDP from literature and determinants described above. Then, we can write:

Ŷit = δt + θt Zi + λt µi + εit ,

(2.7)

where Zi is a matrix of observed covariates and µi is a vector of unobserved factor loadings.
Let W be an (N × 1) vector of positive weights that sum to one: W = (w1 , . . . , wN ); with
wi ≥ 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , N . Each vector W represents a synthetic control—a weighted combination
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of control group observations that estimate what would have happened in the treated city
had the city-upgrading policy not occurred. Suppose that there exists a set of optimal
∗
weights (w1∗ , . . . , wN
) that estimates the values of the pre-treatment characteristics in the
P
∗
treated city. Abadie et al. (2010) show in their Appendix B that Ŷ0t = N
i=1 wi Yit and that

this condition holds for all periods given that there are sufficiently many pre-treatment
periods. From this result, we can estimate the city-upgrading policy effects using observed
data and the optimal weights
α̂0t = Y0t −

N
X

wi∗ Yit

(2.8)

i=1

for treated country i = 0 and years t ∈ {T0 + 1, . . . , T0 + 5}.
We define the (T0 × 1) vector K = (k1 , . . . , kT0 )′ as a linear combination of pre-treatment
PT 0
ks Yis . Assume that M such linear combinations are defined by
outcomes: ȲiK = s=1
the vectors K1 , . . . , KM . Further, define the (k × 1) vector of pre-treatment characteristics
K

K

as X0 = (Z0′ , Ȳ0 1 , . . . , Ȳ0 M )′ for the city that undertakes the change in city level, where
k = r + M. The k × N matrix X1 contains the same information for the cities that do not
undertake changes in such upgrading policy. The ith column of matrix X1 is given by
K

KM ′
).

(Zi′ , Ȳi 1 , . . . , Ȳi

Finally, the vector W ∗ is chosen to minimize the distance ∥X0 − X1 W ∥

such that the weights are positive and sum to one. The distance is minimized using the
following equation:
p
∥X0 − X1 W ∥V = (X0 − X1 W )′ V (X0 − X1 W ),

(2.9)

where V is a (k × k) symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix. Optimal choice of V
is important for minimizing the mean square prediction error of the synthetic control
estimator.
We use the optimal weights to construct a counterfactual city that gives an estimate of
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the outcome variables had the city-upgrading policy not occurred using data based on the
donor pool cities i ∈ {1, . . . , N }. To assess the sensitivity of the results, we follow Abadie
et al. (2010) and Firpo and Possebom (2018) in the calculation of p-values and Doudchenko
and Imbens (2016) in the calculation of variance to estimate confidence intervals. The
p-value is calculated as:
PN
p=

i=1 I {RMSP Ei

≥ RMSP E0 }

N

,

(2.10)

where I {Q} is the indicator function of event Q and RMSP E represents the ratio of postto pre-root mean squared prediction error. RMSP E is calculated as
q
PT
RMSP Ei =


2
Y
−
Ŷ
it
it / (T − T0 )
t=T0 +1
.
q
2
PT0 
t=1 Yit − Ŷit / (T0 )

(2.11)

Intuitively, this statistic counts the number of countries in the donor pool that have
outcomes that can be better approximated using fellow donor pool countries and that
have a larger post-intervention gap between the counterfactual and the observed series.
This version of the p-value helps describe whether our results could be driven by chance
or truly represent a statistically significant event. The measure of variance uses similar
information:

N X
T
X
2

1
1
d
Var =
Yit − Ŷit .
N T − T0 + 1

(2.12)

i=1 t=T0 +1

Each of these measures are calculated in placebo simulations where each of the countries in
the donor pool assume the role of the treated city, and a counterfactual series is estimated
to match the observed series. In the case of eq:variance, Yit is observed for the donor pool
during the intervention years, so this statistic can be empirically estimated, using the
donor pool only.

CHAPTER 2. CITY-UPGRADING POLICY: CHONGQING MUNICIPALITY

2.6.3

113

Production Function Estimation

Following Olley and Pakes (1992) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), consider an economy
with N firms, indexed by i = 1, ..., N . Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity, Zit .
Each firm i uses Kit units of capital, Lit units of labor,and Mit units of material inputs, to
produce Qit . Given the production function, firm i minimizes the contemporaneous cost
of production in the period t:

Qit = Qit (Zit , Kit , Lit , Mit )

(2.13)

The key assumption is that within each period, material inputs adjust freely, whereas
capital is subject to adjustment costs and other frictions and labor is determined before
material input decision. The Lagrangian objective function associated with the firm’s cost
minimization:
L(Vit , Kit , λit ) = Wit Lit + (rit + δ)Kit + PitM Mit + Fit − λit (Qit (·) − Q)

(2.14)

where Wit is the price of the labor input, rit + δ is the user cost of capital, and PitM is the
price of material inputs. Fit is the fixed cost, Q(·) is the technology specified in equ:C1, Q is
a scalar and λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The estimation procedure is so-called production
function approach. We estimate an approximation of the production function in equ:C1
using a sector-year-specific Cobb-Douglas production function, with labor, capital, and
material as inputs. For a given sector-year st, we consider the production function:
m
l
k
qit = θst
mit + θst
lit + θst
kit + zit + εit

(2.15)

CHAPTER 2. CITY-UPGRADING POLICY: CHONGQING MUNICIPALITY

114

where the lower case letters stand for the log form of the variable represented by the
corresponding capital letter. To control for unobserved productivity shocks, which cause
the simultaneity and selection bias, we follow Olley and Pakes (1992) to use control
function approach.30 The unobserved productivity zit is given by a function of the firm’s
inputs and a control variable, dit , such that zit = hst (dit , kit , lit−1 ). Following Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg et al. (2015), We use material input as static control
variables to proxy for productivity and assume that the demand for material input is
strictly monotone in zit . For control variable, we use 4-digit industry market share and
city-level market share.
The production function estimation relies on a so-called two-stage approach. In the
first stage, the measurement error and unanticipated shocks to output are purged using a
non-parametric projection of output on the inputs and the control variable:

qit = φt (mit , lit , kit , dit ) + εit

(2.16)

k
m
l
where φt = θst
mit + θst
lit + θst
kit + hst (dit , kit , lit−1 ). The productivity process is given with

low of motion, zit = g(zit ) + ξit , follows a first-order Markov process. We use second-degree
polynomial approximation for φt (mit , lit , kit , dit ). Given θst , we can obtain productivity
k
m
l
from φit − θst
mit − θst
lit − θst
kit .

In the second stage, We estimate the production function parameters using GMM
moment conditions of the following form to obtain the industry-year-specific output
elasticity:
m
E(ξit (θst
)mit−1 ) = 0

(2.17)

30 Observed inputs (e.g., labor, capital) may be correlated with unobserved inputs or productivity shocks
(e.g., managerial ability, quality of land, materials, capacity utilization). This correlation introduces simultaneity biases. On the other hand, firms exit from the sample is not exogenous and it is correlated with firm
size. Smaller firms are more likely to exit than larger firms. Endogenous exit introduces selection-biases.
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This approach identifies the output elasticity of material input under the assumption that
the material input will immediately respond to productivity shocks, but capital subject to
adjustment cost. The persistence in productivity assumption allows material inputs to be
serially correlated.
Wooldridge (2009) proposes to address the unidentified problems in the first stage
by replacing the two-step estimation procedure with a generalized method of moments
(GMM) setup. It suggests estimating both the first stage and second stage simultaneously.
The estimation procedure is the following: 1) Estimating two-stage production approach
with Ackerberg et al. (2015) correction to extract initial values for the second step. 2)
Estimating the system GMM as proposed in Wooldridge (2009). 3) Throughout the
estimation process, We impose a constant return to scale for the reason that it gives the
identification of output elasticities using data on sales and expenditure. The Wooldridge
(2009) methodology regains the efficiency and computes the standard error, which is hard
to achieve in the traditional two-stage approach.

Chapter 3
On the Effectiveness of Capital Controls:
A Synthetic Control Method Approach
with Richard J. Nugent III
3.1

Introduction

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2011 revised its policy stance on capital
controls, publishing the “The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows: An
Institutional View,” and recognized that in certain circumstances capital flow management
measures can be useful (Arora et al., 2013). The evidence to date suggests that capital
controls push the maturity composition of capital flows toward the long-term end (Montiel
and Reinhart, 1999), generate monetary independence through interest rate differentials
(Carlson and Hernandez, 2002), reduce the share of bank lending denominated in foreign
currencies (Alfaro et al., 2005), reduce exchange rate pressures to a small extent, but
fail to stem the overall volume of capital flows (Magud et al., 2018). There is a growing
body of related evidence that shows that capital controls are useful for improving growth
116
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resilience and reducing the vulnerability to crises.1 Open economy models rationalize
the empirical evidence, where the role of an optimal capital control is to internalize a
pecuniary externality. A pecuniary externality arises in situations where private agents fail
to internalize their effect on equilibrium prices such as the exchange rate or asset prices,
and in turn these prices affect financial constraints. The use of capital controls has been
shown to limit excessive borrowing therein limiting the fallout to a financial crisis.2
Capital controls are measures that restrict capital mobility between residents and
non-residents, segmenting domestic and international financial markets. Capital controls
typically work by increasing the cost of an international financial transaction, but can also
take place in quantity restrictions or outright bans. Increasing the restrictions on capital
inflows and decreasing the restrictions on capital outflows are measures used to stem
surges in net inflows, large credit growth, and rapid exchange rate appreciation (Forbes
et al., 2015). Similarly, decreasing restrictions on capital inflows and increasing restrictions
on capital outflows are measures used to reverse sudden stops, credit retrenchment, and
significant exchange rate depreciation. Controls on capital inflows are also useful for
improving financial stability by limiting over-borrowing (Benigno et al., 2016), excessive
risk-taking (Bianchi and Mendoza, 2011), and excessive short-term debt (Korinek, 2011).
We study the role of capital controls in the short-run dynamics of countries’ external
position: cross-border lending, private credit, movements in the exchange rate, and
cross-border deposits. Cross-border lending and private credit are measures of financial
stability, while movements in the exchange rate and cross-border deposits are measures of
capital flows management. Higher cross-border lending incurs higher exposure to foreign
exchange risk, and is a recent motive for capital controls (Ostry et al., 2011). Private credit
is tied to the vulnerability of an economy to external shock in the case of overborrowing
1 Qureshi

et al. (2011) ,Gupta et al. (2007), Edwards and Rigobon (2009), and Pyun and An (2016)
and Uribe (2017), Benigno et al. (2013), Bianchi and Mendoza (2011), and Jeanne and
Korinek (2010)
2 Schmitt-Grohé
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(Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Bianchi, 2011). The exchange rate is strongly connected
to the net movements in external capital. In the pecuniary externalities perspective,
capital controls and exchange rate policy can serve as complements, causing investors
to internalize the cost of debt (Bianchi, 2011; Benigno et al., 2016). Finally, cross-border
deposits reflect capital outflows, an explicit motive for capital controls particularly in the
case of capital flight (Baldursson and Portes, 2013).
We look at four capital control measures: removing or imposing controls on capital
inflows and removing or imposing controls on capital outflows. We study the effect that
these measures have on cross-border lending, private credit, movements in the exchange
rate, and cross-border deposits. We identify such measures in Russia, Egypt, Kenya, and
Nigeria according to a set of criteria informed by the synthetic control method. The sample
of countries is based on a new dataset of capital control measures by Fernández et al.
(2015), with de jure information on 100 countries over the years 1995–2015. This set of
statutory measures to our knowledge has not been previously evaluated. The evidence
that we present adds to the understanding on the effectiveness of capital controls. Due to
the extent of the mixed evidence and the difficulties facing the econometric techniques
that have been used to assess the effectiveness of capital controls, many questions remain
unsettled.
We have used three methods to examine four capital control measures. Our main
focus on examining the effectiveness of capital control measurement using synthetic
controls method. We find that synthetic control method is appropriate to evaluate the
efficacy of capital control in specific country without assuming parallel trend assumption
in difference-in-difference, which is more commonly used in this literature. We also
perform the tests that each econometric models require in our four countries case. We
find that our dataset satisfied the assumption required in sythetic control method but
do not satisfied the assumption required in difference-in-difference. One concern relates

CHAPTER 3. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CAPITAL CONTROLS

119

to synthetic controls method in our analysis would be it requires a lot of demands from
the data in terms of finding a good control group but it might suffer less performance
because the restriction of small control group. Therefore, we also used synthetic differencein-difference proposed by Arkhangelsky et al. (2019) to analyze our four country cases.
This method correct the parallel trend bias to access the average treatment effect after
implementation. We find that all three different methods essentially give the same results.
Econometric models face many challenges in assessing the effectiveness of capital
controls, chief among them is the the endogeneity of the decision to implement the
policy. The endogeneous nature of the policy analysis stems from reverse causality. Take
for example the effect that capital controls have on capital inflows. The quantitative
assessment of this outcome is complicated by the fact that policymakers respond to large
capital inflows by imposing capital controls, hence the reverse causality. Well-studied
examples include Chile following large inflows in 1990, Colombia following large inflows
in 1991, and Brazil following large inflows in 2006 (Magud et al., 2018). This classic case
of reverse causality, where an explanatory variable depends on the value of the dependent
variable creates an endogeneity problem for traditional linear regression. Serial correlation
in the residual term prevents lagging the endogeneous explanatory variable from solving
the endogeneity problem.
Using the synthetic control method, we are able to solve the endogeneity problem in
the evaluation of capital controls with respect to the policy objectives in a novel way. The
synthetic control method solves the endogeneity problem by constructing a counterfactual
outcome that represents what a country would have experienced had the capital control
event not occurred.3 For example, to assess the effect that imposing capital controls
in Egypt had on the exchange rate, we construct a counterfactual to Egypt’s exchange
rate that consists of several countries that never change capital controls and that jointly
3 Abadie

and Gardeazabal (2003) ,Abadie et al. (2010), and Abadie et al. (2015b)
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approximate the evolution of Egypt’s exchange rate before the change.
Similar analysis is performed using the difference-in-difference method. Abadie et al.
(2010) motivated the synthetic control approach as providing a better comparison because
a data-driven linear combination of countries serves as a better counterfactual than one
country or a group of countries, all with equal weights. We compare the results of the
evaluation of the capital control events using the synthetic control method with results
obtained using the difference-in-difference method. These two methods are similar in
their estimation strategy but differ in the identification of the control group and their identifying assumptions. The synthetic control method assumes independence of treatment
conditional on past outcomes. Difference-in-difference assumes that treated and control
groups follow parallel trends over time. We show in sensitivity analysis that independence
conditional on past outcomes holds, but parallel trends fails.
The evidence that we find suggests that capital controls are not consistent in reaching
conventional financial stability objectives. For example, following the imposition of
controls in Egypt and Nigeria, lower cross-border lending is expected to both countries.
However, we observe lower cross-border lending to Egypt, but higher cross-border lending
to Nigeria. We find that capital controls are more consistent in reaching conventional
capital flows management objectives. For example, we find lower cross-border deposits
from Egypt after the imposition of controls on outflows, and higher cross-border deposits
from Russia after the removal of the same controls. We compare the results of the synthetic
control models to a set of similar models evaluated using the difference-in-difference
method. We are able to corroborate the significance and magnitude of several outcomes.
Finally, we present two approaches to sensitivity analysis. First, we confirm the credibility of the results in a series of placebo simulations and test the identifying assumptions
of each method. Second, we use a new statistical method proposed by Arkhangelsky et al.
(2019), synthetic difference-in-difference, to correct for parallel trend bias. The synthetic
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control method has only one bias-adjusting term that takes into account the stable difference between the treated and the control units. Using the synthetic difference-in-difference
method, we correct for the parallel trend bias and show that the results still hold.
Literature. The evidence on capital controls’ effectiveness for improving financial stability
remains mixed. The relationship between external capital flows and financial instability in
emerging market economies has been extensively documented (Kose et al., 2009; Reinhart
and Reinhart, 2009; Ocampo and Stiglitz, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). The financial
stability motive is the focus of the influential contributions of Jeanne and Korinek (2010),
Bianchi and Mendoza (2011), and Mendoza (2002). In a related study, Acharya and
Krishnamurthy (2018) argue that foreign reserve management and prudential capital
controls work as complements in addressing financial stability4 . However, Forbes et al.
(2015) find little empirical evidence to suggest that capital controls are useful for financial
stability. While much of literature has focused topics such as overborrowing, pecuniary
externalities5 and the welfare effects of capital controls6 , our research focuses on short-run
dynamics of countries’ external position.
A small number of studies have evaluated capital controls using methods that control
for potential omitted variables and reverse causality. In evaluating the effect of capital
controls on capital flows, many have argued that a statistically significant and negative
coefficient in the presence of reverse causality is a robust result (Ostry et al., 2012; Bruno
et al., 2017; Landi and Schiavone, 2018). However, Magud et al. (2018) and Nugent (2019)
demonstrate that the negative coefficient need not be the case for all countries. In other
words, it is possible that a capital control leads to higher net inflows. Researchers have
relied on a handful of ways to address reverse causality including the propensity score
4 Also

of note: Aizenman et al. (2011) and Jeanne and Sandri (2016)
and Korinek (2010); Korinek (2011); Bianchi and Mendoza (2011); Bianchi (2011); Benigno et al.
(2013); Korinek (2009)
6 Korinek (2009); Jeanne and Korinek (2010); Costinot et al. (2014), and Benigno et al. (2013)
5 Jeanne
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method (Forbes et al., 2015), instrumental variables (Giordani et al., 2017; Kinda, 2012;
Nugent, 2019), and vector autoregression (Gregorio et al., 2000; Edison and Reinhart,
2001). However, these methods are still potentially subject to omitted variables and misspecification bias. To solve these issues, we use a new data-driven method to examine the
effectiveness of capital controls. The synthetic control method allows us to address the
endogeneity of capital controls with respect to the policy objectives in a novel way.
The last group of papers related to our research includes the studies that apply the
synthetic control method. Since Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010)
introduced the synthetic control method, it has become a very important tool for policy
analysis. Athey and Imbens (2017) cite the synthetic control method as “arguably the most
important innovation in the policy evaluation literature in the last 15 years.” Recently,
many researchers have used the synthetic control method to analyze a variety of economic
shocks or to evaluate a change in policy7 . Born et al. (2017) use the synthetic control
method to evaluate the output loss attributable to the Brexit vote. Chamon et al. (2017)
use the same method to analyze the Brazilian sterilized foreign exchange intervention in
the aftermath of the taper tantrum. They find that the Brazilian programs were successful
in reversing the exchange rate appreciation. Jinjarak et al. (2013) use the synthetic control
method in a closely related study to model the Brazilian capital control episodes and find
that the effectiveness of controls on capital inflows or the exchange rate is weak. The
episodes that Jinjarak et al. (2013) address are changes in capital controls on the intensive
margin. We use the same method to analyze the macroeconomic implications of broad
changes in capital controls on the extensive margin. Our results present a more general
evaluation of capital control effectiveness.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the empirical framework
7 Cavallo et al. (2013), Jinjarak et al. (2013), Kleven et al. (2013), Abadie et al. (2015b), Pinotti (2015),
Gobillon and Magnac (2016)
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and some facts about the data. The following section presents a discussion on the results
of the synthetic control method. After results, we present the sensitivity analysis. The
final section concludes.

3.2

Empirical Framework

Data. The sample of countries is based on a new dataset of capital control measures
by Fernández et al. (2015), with de jure information on 100 countries over the years
1995–2015. Table 3.1 contains the summary statistics for the outcome variables and the
pre-intervention characteristics in our sample. A complete list of the countries is available
in the Appendix 3.6.1 Table 3.5. The outcome variables that we study are cross-border
lending, private credit, movements in the exchange rate, and cross-border deposits. Crossborder lending and private credit are objectives of capital controls that are associated with
financial stability, movements in the exchange rate and capital outflows are associated with
traditional measures of capital flows management (Forbes et al., 2015; Ostry et al., 2011;
Korinek, 2011). Cross-border lending consists of international loans which can be defined
by those financial assets created through the lending of funds, excluding marketable
securities. We use cross-border lending as a measure of risk-taking as this lending vehicle
involves borrowing in foreign currencies. Private credit, our measure of borrowing, is
defined as the financial resources made available to the private sector by domestic money
banks. We use the log of the real exchange rate as measured by the exchange rate of
real local currency units per U.S. dollar to assess movements in the exchange rate, where
lower (higher) values of the real exchange rate imply higher appreciation (depreciation).
Finally, we assess capital outflows using cross-border deposits from a particular country
to BIS reporting banks. Cross-border deposits consists of all claims that represent an
indication of deposit, including non-negotiable certificates of deposit. We take the log of
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all aggregate level variables and the exchange rate. The remaining variables are presented
as a percentage of GDP, exports, or trade volume for cross-country comparability. The
summary statistics are provided in Table 3.1 for all continuous variables used in the study
for the full sample. A list of all the variables, their definitions, and their sources is available
in the Appendix 3.6.1 Table 3.6. The ranges (given by the distance between the minimum
and the maximum) in the variables demonstrate significant cross-sectional variation. For
example, private credit ranges from about 1.5% to 300% of GDP; the median is about 43%
of GDP.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Median
Log Cross Border Lending
23.072 23.136
Private Credit
60.289 43.039
Log Real Exchange Rate
2.3971 1.8286
Log Cross Border Deposits
23.305 23.325
Interest Rate
7.8719 5.4871
Bank Return on Equity
12.646 13.227
Log GDP (USD)
25.186 25.224
Inflation
11.472 4.6077
Natural Resources (% of GDP)
6.9786 2.2881
Merchandise Trade (% of GDP) 67.369 56.985
Current Account (% of Exports) .03688 -.04470
Observations
2100

Std Dev
2.5102
49.509
2.4497
2.1932
11.191
17.787
1.8797
126.02
10.390
45.649
2.1065

Min
15.761
1.3854
-1.3093
17.265
-.78375
-234.84
20.881
-26.299
0
12.293
-26.169

Max
29.195
312.12
10.146
29.175
300
126.14
30.529
5399.5
61.957
419.96
49.510

The pre-intervention characteristics that are used to match the outcome variables in
the treated countries with outcomes in potential donors are informed by the empirical
literature on cross-border lending, credit, exchange rates, and capital flows (Bruno and
Shin, 2015; Djankov et al., 2007; Jeanneau and Micu, 2002; Papaioannou, 2009; Kollmann
et al., 2011; Cerutti et al., 2019). The push/pull literature is the primary source for
compiling a country-specific list of the determinants of capital control outcomes (Cerutti
et al., 2019; Koepke, 2019). We use step-wise regression to select which variables to
include in the synthetic control model, and refine the list based on the predictor balance
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between the synthetic and control characteristics. The pre-intervention characteristics
are sourced from World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the International Monetary
Fund’s International Financial Statistics, the Bank for International Settlements, and the
Global Financial Development Database. Additionally, we add to the interest rate series
with data from individual central banks where the original series is missing observations.
It is worth noting that the push/pull literature often points to global factors as the
principal determinants of capital flows and their related financial attributes. However, the
synthetic control method requires country-specific information. Global pre-intervention
characteristics would match perfectly across countries, preventing the synthetic control
algorithm from solving.
Selection of Interventions and Donor Pools. Careful construction of the donor pool is
necessary for satisfying the identifying assumptions of the synthetic control estimator.
Previous studies on the effects of capital controls using the synthetic control method have
commonly included countries as donors despite either pre-existing broad capital control
use or changes in capital controls during the time period of the study8 . The control group
is meant to reproduce the counterfactual of how the country using capital controls would
have evolved had it not implemented capital control policy. To that end, the control group,
at the very least, should consist of countries that do not implement capital control policy,
and at best do not have capital controls implemented over the entire sample period. In
other words, countries exposed to treatment should not be included in the donor pool.
8 In

Jinjarak et al. (2013), Indonesia is included in the donor pool with an optimal weight of .126 in
estimating the effect of taxing stock and bond foreign investment in Brazil at 2% in 2009. However, Indonesia
was also adjusting foreign access to stock and bond investment at the same time (Fernández et al. (2015)).
This includes allowing foreign investors access to the primary market for government bonds through a
primary dealer (International Monetary Fund Monetary and Capital Markets Department (2010)). Previously,
foreign investors could only obtain government bonds on secondary markets (International Monetary Fund
Monetary and Capital Markets Department (2008)). In Shousha and Sundaresan (2015), Uruguay is included
in the donor pool to model multiple outcomes the series of capital controls in Brazil from 2009–2013 and is
consistently assigned a positive weight. However, Uruguay implements a capital control on money market
inflows in 2012.
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Our careful construction of the donor pool is an additional contribution in the study of
capital controls using the synthetic control method.
We use strict criteria to select the countries to be included in each donor pool. The
countries included in each donor pool have been listed in Tables 3.7. We are focused on
all capital controls except those on long-term investments (direct investment and real
estate). For the event that capital controls on inflows (outflows) are released, countries
included in the donor group have capital controls on inflows (outflows) imposed across
nearly all capital asset categories and for transactions initiated both by the resident and
the non-resident. We allow no more than two resident or non-resident transactions to be
free of a capital control in any capital asset category in any given year. For the event that
capital controls on inflows (outflows) are imposed, countries included in the donor group
have no capital controls on inflows (outflows) imposed for the duration of the sample
period, with no more than one capital control imposed on a transaction initiated by either
a resident or non-resident, in any capital control asset category.
Finally, we search for a sample of “treated” countries based on five criteria. First, we
look for cases of controls imposed on capital inflows, imposed on capital outflows, removed
from capital inflows, and removed from capital outflows. Second, we are interested in
broad changes in capital controls that are consistent with significant capital account
liberalization or capital account tightening. Third, we require a “pre-treatment” period
where no changes in the capital controls are made for at least 10 years. Fourth, we require
that no other changes in capital controls occur within three years of the intervention
date. Availability of data and applicable donor countries are important limits on the
potential case studies. We use the Fernández et al. (2015) to identify the patterns in
capital controls among countries across capital asset categories, over time. We perform
background research and refer to the IMF’s 2006, 2008, and 2010 Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions to build on the narrative around the
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capital control events.
We identify controls on capital outflows being removed in Russia in January 2007.
We identify controls on capital outflows being imposed in Egypt in 2008. We identify
controls on capital inflows being removed in Kenya in June 2007 and imposed in Nigeria
in November 2006. There are cases of capital controls that are well-documented and have
been featured in the international economics literature; e.g. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and
Malaysia. Our paper does not include these cases because they do not satisfy the strict
criteria described above.9
Empirical Model. The empirical model closely follows the synthetic control method
presented in Abadie et al. (2010). Yit is the outcome variable that is evaluated for the
treated country i at time t conditional on the capital control event. The treated countries
(i = 0) are Russia, Egypt, Kenya, and Nigeria, and we have that i ∈ {1, . . . , N } for the
countries in the donor pool for each treated country. The time period begins in 1995, and
treatment occurs in 2007 in Russia, 2008 in Egypt, 2007 in Kenya, and 2006 in Nigeria.
Hence, time is indexed as t = {1995, . . . , T0 , . . . , T0 + 4}, where T0 represents the number of
pre-treatment periods, and T0 + 1 is the year of treatment for country i = 0. We confine our
analysis to the three years after the capital control intervention. The outcome variables
are log cross-border lending, private credit, log real exchange rate, and log cross-border
deposits. We assess the affect of imposing or removing capital controls on these outcome
variables.
Define Ŷit as the value of the outcome variable in the treated country had the capital
control event not occurred, and YitI as the outcome that would be observed in country i at
time t if the capital control event has occurred. Ŷit is by definition the counterfactual to
9 For

studies on Brazil, see: Alfaro et al. (2017); Forbes et al. (2016); Jinjarak et al. (2013). For studies on
Chile, see: Forbes (2007); Edwards (2007); Edwards (1999). For studies on Colombia, see: Ariyoshi et al.
(2000); Budnevich and Le Fort (1997). For studies on Malaysia, see: Tamirisa (2004); Edison and Reinhart
(2001). For an extensive review, see Magud et al. (2018).

CHAPTER 3. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CAPITAL CONTROLS

128

YitI and is not observed. We assume no interference between units. No interference means
that the outcomes of the untreated units are not affected by the intervention implemented
in the treated unit (Rosenbaum (2007)). In the case of capital controls, we assume that
countries’ use of capital controls do not affect other countries external position10 . We
also assume that the potential outcomes are independent of being selected for capital
control intervention, conditional on past outcomes and observed covariates. We discuss
the strength of these assumptions in sensitivity analysis.
Define αit = YitI − Ŷit as the effect of the capital control event in country i at time t and
Dit as the binary indicator equal to one for the treated countries at and after the treatment
date. Then according to the potential outcomes framework, the observed outcome for unit
i at time t can be expressed as Yit = Ŷit + αit Dit . We estimate the series of capital control


effects αi,T0+1 , . . . , αiT for t > T0 for the treated country i = 0 vis-à-vis an estimate of Ŷit ,
where αit = YitI − Ŷit = Yit − Ŷit .
Suppose that Ŷit can be estimated using a factor model specified according to the
push/pull literature and determinants described above. Then, we can write:

Ŷit = δt + θt Zi + λt µi + εit ,

(3.1)

where Zi is a matrix of observed covariates and µi is a vector of unobserved factor loadings.
Let W be an (N × 1) vector of positive weights that sum to one: W = (w1 , . . . , wN ); with
wi ≥ 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , N . Each vector W represents a synthetic control—a weighted combination
of control group observations that estimate what would have happened in the treated
country had the capital control intervention not occurred. Suppose that there exists a set of
∗
optimal weights (w1∗ , . . . , wN
) that estimates the values of the pre-treatment characteristics
P
∗
in the treated country. Abadie et al. (2010) show in their Appendix B that Ŷ0t = N
i=1 wi Yit
10 There

exists some evidence of capital flows deflection or multilateral policy influence. The potential
exists among countries of similar risk profiles. (Giordani et al., 2017; Forbes et al., 2016)
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and that this condition holds for all periods given that there are sufficiently many pretreatment periods. From this result, we can estimate the capital control effects using
observed data and the optimal weights

α̂0t = Y0t −

N
X

wi∗ Yit

(3.2)

i=1

for treated country i = 0 and years t ∈ {T0 + 1, . . . , T0 + 4}11 .

3.3

Results

We proceed with the empirical macroeconomic analysis of the imposition or removal of
capital controls on an individual country basis. We evaluate the effect that the capital
control intervention had on cross-border lending, private credit, the exchange rate, and
cross-border deposits. We begin the analysis with the controls on capital outflows: the
removal of controls on capital outflows in Russia in 2007, then the imposition of controls
on capital outflows in Egypt in 2008. This is followed by analysis of the controls on capital
inflows: the imposition controls of capital inflows in Nigeria in 2006, then the removal of
controls on capital inflows in Kenya in 2007. In the end of this section, we organized the
results of our analysis together with the expected outcomes of the capital control measures
to discuss the policy implication.
Controls on Outflows Removed in Russia Effective January 1, 2007, controls on capital
outflows in Russia were removed. Through the end of 2006, residents of Russia were
required to satisfy unremunerated reserve requirements on certain transactions (e.g. less
than 3 years maturity or more than $150,000) using a system of special accounts. The real
GDP growth rate for Russia over the years 1995–2015 is plotted in Figure 3.1 (a). Ahead
11 See

detailed estimation procedure in Appendix 3.6.2
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of the release of the capital controls, the economy advanced at a rapid pace with the real
GDP growth rate increasing through 2007. Russia experienced a sharp recession in 2009
as with much of the global economy. The interest rate was above 50% at the beginning of
the sample period and stabilized near 5% by 2000, as plotted in Figure 3.1 (b). Russia’s
economy has been dependent on commodities, with natural resource rents above 10% of
GDP for nearly the entire sample period. As a result, commodity prices will be a driving
factor for the duration of the test period.
Figure 3.1: Economic Conditions in Russia 1995-2015
(a) Russia Real GDP Growth Rate

(b) Russia Interest Rate
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Cross-border lending grew at a constant rate ahead of the release of the capital controls
in Russia. The synthetic control accurately models cross-border lending to Russia ahead of
the intervention. We plot the two series in Figure 3.2 (a). The gap between the synthetic
control and the observed series following the removal of the capital control illustrates the
effect of the change in policy on cross-border lending. We find that cross-border lending
was 19.38% higher over the three years following the removal of the capital controls
in Russia relative to the counterfactual. The large economic significance indicates that
cross-border lending is highly responsive to capital controls. This result is statistically
significant at the 10% level with a p-value of .08, with the caveat that this is not a
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traditionally generated p-value. The 95% confidence interval gives us further evidence
that cross-border lending to Russia would have been lower had the capital control not
been removed.
Removing controls on outflows incentivizes both higher inflows and higher outflows.
However, we expect that the response would be dominant in outflows given that outflow
transactions are now more lucrative relative to inflow transactions. Taken together, removing controls on outflows implies lower net inflows from which we expect lower private
credit. Private credit in Russia was trending upwards ahead of the removal of the capital
controls. We see in Figure 3.2 (b) that had Russia not released the capital controls, private
credit would have been significantly less. Over the three years following the removal of
the capital controls, private credit in Russia was 6.325 percentage points higher than the
counterfactual. This result is not statistically significant with a p-value of .1667. However,
we do see a statistically significant difference by the third year of intervention, and a close
a predictor balance in Table 3.8.
Figure 3.2: Financial Stability for Russia & the Synthetic Control 1995-2010
(a) Russia Cross-border Lending

(b) Russia Private Credit

0

24

Private Credit (% of GDP)
10
20
30
40
50

Russia Private Credit
Capital Controls on Outflows Removed in 2007

Log Cross-border Lending
24.5
25
25.5
26

Russia Cross-border Lending
Capital Controls on Outflows Removed in 2007

1995

2000

2005

2010

1995

2000

Year
Russian Federation
synthetic Russian Federation
Source: BIS & Authors' Calculations

2005

2010

Year
95% Confidence Interval

Russian Federation
synthetic Russian Federation

95% Confidence Interval

Source: World Bank & Authors' Calculations

The absence of a contraction in credit following the removal of controls on capital
outflows in Russia is an important result that can give policymakers confidence about
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relaxing controls on capital outflows in other countries. This outcome in credit is a clear
result of the outcomes that we observe in cross-border lending and cross-border deposits.
While cross-border lending increases following the removal of the controls, we’ll see that
cross-border deposits did not change much. Hence, there is more credit available to the
private sector.
Following the removal of the controls on capital outflows, there may be a concern
for large capital outflows. Figure 3.3 (a) plots the observed and synthetic cross-border
deposits from Russia. The synthetic control closely tracks cross-border deposits from
Russia. The predictor balance in Table 3.8 confirms the close fit of the synthetic control
to cross-border deposits from Russia.12 Our main takeaway is that this is a very small
change and reflects that Russia did not experience capital flight following the removal of
the controls on capital outflows.
Figure 3.3: Capital Flows Management for Russia & the Synthetic Control 1995-2010
(a) Russia Cross-border Deposits

(b) Russia Real Exchange Rate
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particular model poses a challenge for the analysis when in 2005 the synthetic control deviated
from the observed series, two years before the change in capital control policy. There was a 36% deviation
between cross-border deposits from Russia and the counterfactual each year through 2007. The consistent
nature of the deviation can be observed visually in Figure 3.3 (a) and is observed in the data. Russian
cross-border deposits were 36.28% higher than the counterfactual in 2005, 36.78% higher in 2006, 35.19%
higher in 2007. Because of the singular, consistent nature of this deviation, the subsequent .93% increase
in the distance between cross-border deposits from Russia and the counterfactual over 2007–2009 can be
reasonably attributed to the removal of the capital controls in 2007.
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There may also be a concern for a devaluation in the real exchange rate. As demonstrated in Figure 3.3 (b), the synthetic control does not match the Russian log real exchange
rate well. The wide confidence interval indicates that there is large variation in the donor
pool. While we cannot identify the movements in the exchange rate that result from
removing the capital controls, we can make a qualitative assessment based on the trend
in the log real exchange rate. In Figure 3.3 (b), we see a downward trend representing
appreciation in the real exchange rate. The years following the removal of the capital
controls sustain a relatively level log real exchange rate. This indicates that Russia does
not experience significant real exchange rate depreciation.
Controls on Outflows Imposed and Controls on Inflows Removed in Egypt For much of
the sample period, Egypt experienced a shortage of foreign exchange in the banking system
(Economist Intelligence Unit (2014)). As a means of closing the shortage, Egypt imposed
controls on capital outflows. In 2008, Egypt implemented restrictions on investment in
foreign securities or assets abroad, and these restrictions are applied across multiple asset
categories.13
The real GDP growth rate and interest rate are plotted in Figure 3.4. The interest
rate was steadily decreasing over the first half of the sample period, and trended slightly
upward ahead of the capital control intervention. Additionally, Egypt experienced a
deceleration during the 2008 global financial crisis, but the economy did not experience a
recession. Further, Egyptian manufacturing value-added is second largest on the African
continent, so merchandise trade will be an important characteristic for modeling the
synthetic controls (Signé (2018)).
Over the three years following the change in capital controls in 2008, cross-border
13 On

June 1, 2008, Egypt began also allowing international institutions to issue bonds in their local market
following Law No. 123 of Year 2008, but the issues were subject to the approval of the Capital Market
Authority
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Figure 3.4: Economic Conditions in Egypt 1995-2015
(a) Egypt Real GDP Growth Rate

(b) Egypt Interest Rate
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lending to Egypt decreased by 29.04 %. The predictor balance used to identify the
synthetic control together with the country weights and root mean square predictor error
are presented in Table 3.9. The small distance between the predictors is indicative of
the close fit between cross-border lending to Egypt and the synthetic control observed in
Figure 3.5 (a). While the p-value for this outcome is .2424, the 95% confidence interval
demonstrates a statistically significant difference between the counterfactual and observed
series. We expect lower inflows with the imposition of controls on capital outflows,
consistent with the evidence that we have documented here.
The synthetic control and private credit series are well-balanced until 2007 when
they begin to diverge one year before the intervention (the difference is not statistically
significant). The mixed balance across the predictors in Table ?? is consistent with the
partial fit observed in Figure 3.5 (b). Within the margin of error, we can make a qualitative
observation that had the capital controls not changed in Egypt, private credit would
have been higher. This is consistent with what we would expect from higher net inflows
resulting from the imposition of controls on capital outflows.
In the year of the intervention and the three years following, cross-border deposits
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Figure 3.5: Financial Stability for Egypt & the Synthetic Control 1995-2011
(a) Egypt Cross-border Lending

(b) Egypt Private Credit
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were 30.51% lower than what they would have been had Egypt not changed its capital
controls. We plot cross-border deposits and the synthetic control in Figure 3.6 (a). While
the p-value is .1515, the 95% confidence interval demonstrates a significant difference
between the two series during the intervention years. We expected that the control on
outflows would decrease cross-border deposits by more than loans, and that outcome is
what we observe.
Figure 3.6: Capital Flows Management for Egypt & the Synthetic Control 1995-2011
(a) Egypt Cross-border Deposits

(b) Egypt Real Exchange Rate
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The observed log exchange rate in Egypt and the synthetic control are plotted in
Figure 3.6 (b). The real exchange rate is decreased (appreciated) over the pre-treatment
period. Over the three years following the imposition of the controls on outflows, we find
that the Egyptian currency was worth 8.71% more in real terms than what the currency
would have been worth during this time had Egypt not changed the capital controls. The
95% confidence interval indicates that the synthetic and observed series are significantly
different during the intervention years. Recall that Egypt implemented the capital controls
facing a shortage of foreign exchange which puts downward pressure on the value of the
Egyptian Pound. Imposing controls on outflows, Egypt was able to prevent a modest
amount of currency depreciation.
Controls on Inflows Released in Kenya Kenya began steps towards global integration in
the early 90’s with the removal of foreign exchange and price controls. Over the sample
period, Kenya saw an upward trend in growth rates and a downward trend in the interest
rate, with moderate year-to-year volatility in the growth rate, as shown in Figure 3.7. In
June 2007, the Kenyan Capital Markets Authority fully opened its fixed income securities
and derivatives markets to investors from countries in the Eastern Africa Community14
(Capital Markets Authority (2007)). This is the only change in capital controls we observe
taking place in Kenya between 1995 and 2015.
Cross-border lending to Kenya trended slightly upwards over the pre-treatment period,
as plotted in Figure 3.8 (a). Synthetic cross-border lending for Kenya is an imperfect
fit, and the predictor balance in Table 3.10 is mixed. The lumpy characteristics of the
cross-border lending to Kenya makes for a difficult match, and the variance of the synthetic
series is very large. In practice, we would not expect cross-border lending to Kenya to be
changed as a result of the intervention. The countries in the Eastern Africa Community to
14 The

Eastern Africa Community is currently made up of six Partner States: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda,
South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Kenya initiated the Eastern Africa Community in 2000.
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which Kenya opened its financial account are not BIS reporting countries. Hence, we do
not capture cross-border lending from those countries that have the increased financial
market access.
Figure 3.7: Economic Conditions in Kenya 1995-2015
(a) Kenya Real GDP Growth Rate

(b) Kenya Interest Rate
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Figure 3.8: Financial Stability for Kenya & the Synthetic Control 1995-2010
(a) Kenya Cross-border Lending

(b) Kenya Private Credit
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We show in Figure 3.8 (b) that the synthetic control does not approximate private
credit in Kenya either. As with cross-border lending, this could be due to the relatively
lumpy nature of private credit in Kenya. The predictor balance in Table 3.10 shows mixed

2010
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distances between Kenya and the synthetic control. While private credit grew strongly
after the release of the capital controls, we cannot identify causality without a proper
counterfactual.
Capital outflows as measured by cross-border deposits from Kenya are well-modeled
by the synthetic control. We plot both series in Figure 3.9 (a). Cross-border deposits
were growing at a modest pace for the duration of the pre-treatment period. Following
the removal of the capital controls on inflows in 2008, cross-border deposits from Kenya
continued growing at a modest pace and level off. The counterfactual demonstrates that
had Kenya not relaxed the capital controls, cross-border deposits from Kenya would
have been lower during this period. We find that cross-border deposits from Kenya were
20.57% higher than the counterfactual over the first three years with the capital controls
relaxed. While the p-value for this result is .1667, we see that the two series are statistically
significantly different in later years of intervention. We derive the intuition for this result
by again recalling that today’s inflows are tomorrow’s outflows; should more capital enter
the country with the incentive of lower transaction costs today, more capital exits the
country tomorrow.
Figure 3.9: Capital Flows Management for Kenya & the Synthetic Control 1995-2010
(b) Kenya Real Exchange Rate
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The log exchange rate is not accurately modeled using the synthetic control method
for Kenya. Figure 3.9 (b) plots the exchange rate for Kenya and synthetic Kenya. While
movements in the exchange rate are well-captured early in the pre-treatment period, the
two series diverged in 2006 ahead of the intervention. The inaccurate fit is consistent with
the unbalanced predictors in Table 3.10.
Controls on Inflows Implemented in Nigeria Nigeria has experienced remarkable growth
over the last two decades and is now the third largest manufacturer by value-added on the
African continent (Signé (2018)). Nigeria is a member of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries with large oil reserves, but its growth in manufacturing has overtaken
the importance of oil in the economy. The GDP growth rate over the sample period is
plotted in Figure 3.10 (a). In 1996, Nigerian total natural resources rents were 37.5% of
GDP when the average annual OPEC crude oil price was $20.29 per barrel, and in 2015
total natural resources rents were just 4.7% with the average annual OPEC crude oil price
at $49.49 per barrel. Thus, at the beginning of the sample period, commodity prices were
a driving factor, while merchandise trade was more important towards the end of the
sample period.
Figure 3.10: Economic Conditions in Nigeria 1995-2015
(a) Nigeria Real GDP Growth Rate

(b) Nigeria Interest Rate
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In November 2006, Nigerian authorities enacted Memorandum 21 of the Foreign
Exchange Manual which prohibited foreign nationals from purchasing treasury bills with
a maturity of 1 year or less. However, foreign investors that wished to invest in Nigeria at
that term could invest in money market instruments such as commercial paper, negotiable
certificates of deposit, and bankers’ acceptances. This had the effect of increasing the
short-term interest rate in Nigeria, similar to a conventional capital control. Evidence
of this can be seen in Figure 3.10 (b), where the short-term (deposit) interest rate rose
following the implementation of the capital control. While the short-term interest rate is
was rising, the lending interest rate remained steady, driving the interest rate spread from
7.4% in 2006 down to 3.5% in 2008. What’s more, the monetary policy rate decreased
from 14% in 2006 to 10% in 2008. We argue that the rise in short-term interest rate is the
result of the statutorily restricted demand for Nigerian treasury bills.
Figure 3.11: Financial Stability for Nigeria & the Synthetic Control 1995-2009
(a) Nigeria Cross-border Lending

(b) Nigeria Private Credit
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Capital controls on inflows have a conventional objective of reducing financial vulnerability by limiting the foreign-denominated debt that comes with cross-border lending. We
plot cross-border lending for Nigeria and the counterfactual in Figure 3.11 (a). The close
fit of the pre-treatment outcomes observed in Figure 3.11 (a) is consistent with the small
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root mean squared prediction error (.0807) and relatively balanced predictors given in
Table ??. There is a small statistically insignificant difference between the two series in
2005. In 2006, the year of intervention, cross-border lending to Nigeria were 4.61% higher
than they would have been if Nigeria had not imposed the capital control. The p-value
is .5, but the series are statistically significantly different. The direction of this result is
opposite that which is expected.
Following the imposition of the capital controls in 2006, Nigeria experienced a large
escalation in private credit. We plot private credit as observed in Nigeria as well as the
synthetic control in Figure 3.11 (b). The synthetic control for Nigerian private credit
approximates the observed series well, and this is demonstrated in the relatively balanced
predictors in Table 3.11. The synthetic control model suggests that the increase in private
credit is the result of the short-term investment restrictions. This result is intuitive; should
foreign investors in Nigeria have a short-term preference for Nigerian assets, we can
expect some substitutability for the other credit instruments like money market funds.
Additionally, as banks’ marginal returns were decreasing over this time period (reflected
in the decreasing interest rate spread), it is possible that they lend more to compensate
for the lower margin earned per Nigerian Naira loaned. Over the three years following
the capital control, credit was on average 15.52% higher than the counterfactual. This
result is significant at the 10% level with a p-value of .0526, and the 95% confidence
intervals shows that the two series are statistically significantly different. The finding that
private credit is higher in the face of the capital control is consistent with the theoretical
framework developed in Magud et al. (2018), and the extension in Nugent (2019), where
the response of short-term capital inflows to a capital control tax can be negative or
positive, depending on country characteristics. In the Appendix, we discuss additional
factors that may influence Nigerian financial markets during this time frame and describe
their inconsistency with the credit growth observed here.
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Figure 3.12: Capital Flows Management for Nigeria & the Synthetic Control 1995-2009
(b) Nigeria Real Exchange Rate
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The Nigerian real exchange rate experienced appreciation over the duration of the
sample period, as modeled in Figure 3.12 (b). The synthetic counterfactual is an imperfect
fit, and this is evident in the predictor balance in Table 3.11. Because of this poor fit, we
are unable to identify the effect of the capital control on the real exchange rate. Finally,
cross-border deposits from Nigeria are initially well-matched by the synthetic control.
Unfortunately, the observed series and the synthetic control diverged in 2005, one year
before the intervention year. As a result, we are not able to identify the causal effect of the
capital control.
Discussion We have organized the results of our analysis together with the expected
outcomes of the capital control measures in Table 3.2. The expectation rows indicate
conventional predictions of capital control policy. For example, Russia removed outflow
control, therefore we expect that the capital outflows has stronger reaction than the capital
inflows and the change in policy results in net outflow. Continuing the analysis with
respect to net outflows, we can expect that the private credit would be lower and the
exchange rate would be higher in Russia after removing outflow control. We follow the
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same logic and indicate the expectation in all outcome variable and episodes. Table 3.2
also contains the results across all we obtained from previous synthetic control analysis,
which shown in SC Result. We report the percentage difference between the data and
synthetic counterfactual with plus and minus sign to indicate whether it is higher or lower
compare to the synthetic counterfactual. Notice that in some case, SC results show plus
or minus sign with 0%, we find these results are insignificant but we report the signs for
illustrative purposes.
Table 3.2: Results Summary
Country
Intervention

Russia
Egypt
Remove Impose
Outflow
Controls

Kenya
Nigeria
Remove
Impose
Inflow
Controls

weakly
higher

weakly
lower

strongly
higher

strongly
lower

+19.38%

-29.04%

-0%

+0%

lower

higher

higher

lower

SC Result
Exchange Rate

+6.33%

-13.49%

-0%

+15.52%

Expectation

higher

lower

lower

higher

-0%

-8.71%

-19.9%

-13.36%

Expectation

strongly
higher

strongly
lower

weakly
higher

weakly
lower

SC Result

+0.93%

-30.51%

+20.57%

+35.84%

Cross-border Loans
Expectation
SC Result
Private Credit
Expectation

SC Result
Cross-border Deposits

Notes: All expectation and SC results are comparing the effect of policy intervention to counterfactual scenario

CHAPTER 3. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CAPITAL CONTROLS

144

Our analysis using the synthetic control method lends new evidence that capital
controls not consistent in reaching financial stability objectives. The capital control
interventions led to higher cross-border lending to Russia and lower cross-border lending
to Egypt as expected. However, the interventions led to higher private credit in Russia and
higher cross-border lending and private credit in Nigeria. We expected that the measures
would decrease private credit in Russia as well as cross-border lending and private credit
in Nigeria. Nigeria experienced a distortion in the local market for short-term investment
that incentivized entering the private credit market. If Nigeria imposed controls more
broadly on short-term capital inflows, we conjecture that private credit would not have
increased as dramatically as we observe. In Russia, the evidence points to the removal of
the controls increasing net inflows, while their role in the standard toolkit is to decrease
net inflows. This explains the higher level of borrowing.
We find evidence that the controls are more consistent in reaching capital flows management objectives. In fact, all the synthetic control outcomes show the predicted effects
except for Nigeria. The capital control interventions led to a lower real exchange rate in
Egypt, lower cross-border deposits from Egypt, and higher cross-border deposits from
both Russia and Kenya. These capital control interventions include both price and quantity
restrictions, and changes in controls on capital inflows and capital outflows.
This new evidence sheds light on what effects can be expected of capital controls
and what characteristics are important for effectiveness. The exchange rate and capital
outflows are consistent targets for capital controls. However, capital controls may have
unintended consequences in terms of the level of borrowing and foreign-denominated
debt. We have learned that the medium (price or quantity) appears not to matter, but the
scope of the policy does matter. Note that we have assessed how well a capital control has
performed in reaching its conventional objective. The cost of implementing this kind of
policy is important to consider. The important contributions of Forbes (2007) and Alfaro
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et al. (2017) document the costs of capital controls at the firm level, and find that the
costs are particularly pervasive for the smallest firms. On the other hand, Korinek (2011)
reconciles that the increase in the cost of capital is the capital control doing its job.

3.4

Sensitivity Analysis

Placebo Test In this section, we describe the placebo simulations that we use to assess the
uncertainty in the results following Abadie et al. (2010). We re-estimate each of the models
that we have used to evaluate the impact of the capital control events on the outcome
variables. We obtain the sampling variation required for an assessment of the uncertainty
in the results by implementing the synthetic control method, treating each country in a
donor pool as the intervention country and shifting the intervention country to the donor
pool. We carry out these simulations for the four the outcome variables with each of the
intervention countries and their corresponding donor pools.
Using the placebo simulations, we derive a distribution of ‘gaps’ for cross-border lending, private credit, real exchange rates, and cross-border deposits. The gaps represent the
distance between the synthetic and observed series. A narrow (wide) gap pre-intervention
is a signal of an accurate (poor) synthetic control. A narrow (wide) gap post-intervention is
a signal of a small (large) treatment effect. This distribution of gaps provides the sampling
variation that helps to determine whether our results are driven by chance. If there are
many placebos with large post-treatment gaps, then it is likely that out result is driven by
chance only. If, for example, Nigeria’s post-treatment gap is one of the largest, then we can
rule out the the possibility that the results are driven by chance.
Figures 3.13– 3.16 display the results for the placebo simulations for each of the interventions across all of the outcome variables. The gray lines represent the gap associated
with each of the donor runs of the simulations. The black lines represent the gap estimated
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Figure 3.13: Placebo Simulations for Russia 1995-2010
(a) Russia Cross-border Lending

(b) Russia Cross-border Deposits

(c) Russia Private Credit

(d) Russia Real Exchange Rate

for Russia, Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, respectively. Following Abadie et al. (2010), we
focus on the donors that have a pre-intervention mean squared prediction error no more
than twice that of Russia, Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya. The intention is to focus on donors
with accurate synthetic controls, ignoring gaps that do not contribute information toward
the sampling variation.
Russia removed controls on capital outflows in 2007. As confirmed by the placebo
simulations in Figure 3.13, this had significant effects on cross-border lending and private
credit. Cross-border lending increased by 19.38% over the three years following the
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Figure 3.14: Placebo Simulations for Egypt 1995-2011
(a) Egypt Cross Border Lending

(b) Egypt Cross-border Deposits

(c) Egypt Private Credit

(d) Egypt Real Exchange Rate

removal of the capital controls, and private credit increased by 6.325% in the same time.
Russia’s outcomes lie in the tails of the distributions of the post-intervention placebo gaps
in panel (a) and (b). On the other hand, the gaps for cross-border deposits and the real
exchange rate are large pre-intervention and are in the middle of the post-intervention
placebo gab distribution.
The placebo simulations for Egypt are plotted in Figure 3.14. The case of cross-border
lending to Egypt demonstrates the importance of completing placebo simulations. We
found lower cross-border lending to Egypt immediately following the change in capital
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Figure 3.15: Placebo Simulations for Kenya 1995-2010
(a) Kenya Cross Border Lending

(b) Kenya Cross-border Deposits

(c) Kenya Private Credit

(d) Kenya Real Exchange Rate

controls and a statistically significant difference as given by a 95% confidence interval.
However, the placebo simulations in panel (a) show that the Egypt gap is in the middle of
the placebo distribution. This means that the 29.04% decrease in cross-border lending that
we predict could be due to chance. Cross-border lending to Egypt and the real exchange
rate are also in the middle of the distribution. We find that the gap in private credit lies in
the tail of the placebo distribution but the gap becomes slightly negative before 2008.
In the three years following the removal of controls on capital inflows in Kenya, we
observe a 20.57% increase in cross-border deposits to BIS reporting banks. Figure 3.15
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Figure 3.16: Placebo Simulations for Nigeria 1995-2009
(a) Nigeria Cross Border Lending

(b) Nigeria Cross-border Deposits

(c) Nigeria Private Credit

(d) Nigeria Real Exchange Rate

(b) plots the gaps for cross-border deposits for Kenya and the countries in the donor pool.
We see that Kenya is in the tail of the post-intervention placebo distribution. The other
three outcomes are also plotted in Figure 3.15. We could not make conclusions regarding
these outcomes above and we can see that this is due to large pre-intervention gaps and/or
being in the middle of the post-intervention distribution.
We have plotted the placebo simulations for Nigeria in Figure 3.16. The 15.52%
increase in private credit that we predicted over the three years following the imposition
of controls on capital inflows is clearly in the tail of the distribution of the placebo gabs
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in Figure 3.16 (b). The gap for cross-border lending in the intervention year is in the tail
distribution. The large pre-intervention gap in Figure 3.16 (a) decreases the credibility of
this prediction.
The placebo simulations lend credibility to our analysis using both methods above
by showing that the events that we study lie in the tails of the distributions of outcome
gaps. The placebo simulations rule out the possibility that our results could be driven
entirely by chance. We confirm that removing controls on outflows in Russia had a large,
positive effect on both cross-border lending and private credit. We also confirm that
changing controls in Egypt had a large, negative effect on private credit. This result lends
credibility to both the synthetic control analysis and the difference-in-difference analysis.
We provide additional evidence that removing controls from inflows in Kenya had a large,
positive effect on cross-border deposits. Finally, our placebo simulations demonstrate that
imposing controls on inflows in Nigeria had a large, positive effect on private credit and a
smaller effect on cross-border lending. It is worth mentioning that the results on the real
exchange rate for each intervention could be mixed because we do not consider exchange
rate policy. It is well document that the capital controls and exchange rate policy can serve
as complements (Bianchi, 2011; Benigno et al., 2016).
Difference-in-Difference A natural point of comparison for policy evaluation with the
synthetic control method is difference-in-difference. The estimators with both methods are based on the Rubin (1974) potential outcomes framework where outcomes for
some unit(s) that experience an intervention are compared to units that do not experience the intervention. Many authors have looked at the differential performance of the
two methods.15 Notably, O’Neill et al. (2016) use Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate
difference-in-difference against methods that assume independence conditional on past
15 Arkhangelsky

et al. (2019); Doudchenko and Imbens (2016); Powell (2018); Strezhnev (2017)
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outcomes. The authors find that the alternative methods provide less biased estimates of
the treatment effects when parallel trends assumption is violated.
We will use difference-in-difference to evaluate the use of capital controls. We compare
the results of the difference-in-difference analysis to the synthetic control models above.
Finally, following O’Neill et al. (2016), we test the strength of the alternative identifying
assumptions. We will show that the parallel trends assumption is violated for our environment but that independence conditional on past outcomes holds. The viability of
independence conditional on past outcomes adds to the credibility of the analysis using
the synthetic control models.
A methodical distinction between the two methods is that the synthetic control method
is able to evaluate the effect of a policy for a single treated unit. Conversely, the differencein-difference method is traditionally estimated using panel data with multiple units in both
the treated and the control groups. Our strategy above is framed such that we identify and
evaluate specific statutory measures on a country by country basis. In this section, we reframe the approach by re-coding the intervention dates as the years when a capital control
is currently imposed and pooling intervention countries by inflows (outflows) controls.
This approach enables us to exploit the kind of variation required by the difference-indifference method and is comparable to the analysis in the previous sections. The caveat
of this approach is that there is documented evidence that the effectiveness of capital
controls decreases over time (Eichengreen and Rose, 2014). We do not have information
on when Russia nor Kenya first imposed the capital controls that we study.
The identification of the treatment affect using difference-in-difference is different
from the synthetic control method. Difference-in-difference uses all countries in the donor
pool equally to create a weighted average outcome for an estimate of the counterfactual.
Additionally, the identifying assumption with differences-in-differences is parallel trends.
That is, the potential outcomes for the control group are assumed to be independent from
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being assigned to the capital control intervention, conditional on observed covariates,
year and country fixed effects. We evaluate the strength of this assumption in sensitivity
analysis, and show that is does not hold.
The difference-in-difference estimating equation is expressed in Equation 3.3,

Yit = Xit β + λµi + δt + αDit + ϵit

(3.3)

where Xit is the vector of covariates, µi and δt are the country and year fixed effects, Dit
is a dummy variable equal to one for the intervention countries during the intervention
years, and α is the average treatment effect for the treatment group.
Equation 3.3 will be estimated for countries that use controls on capital outflows
separately from countries that use controls on capital inflows. We use the common
covariates from the previous section except when they are included in the dependent
variable. The outflows intervention countries are Russia (Dt = 1 for t < 2007) and Egypt
(Dt = 1 for t > 2007). We use the donor pool constructed for Egypt as the control group for
countries with controls on capital outflows. This group of countries, listed in Table 3.7,
did not generally use controls on capital outflows for the duration of the sample period
and therefore serves as a good control group. On the other hand, the inflows intervention
countries are Kenya (Dt = 1 for t < 2008) and Nigeria (Dt = 1 for t > 2005). Likewise, we
use the donor pool constructed for Nigeria listed in Table 3.7 as the control groups for
countries with controls on capital inflows.
The difference-in-difference estimates for all four outcomes and both groups of countries are organized in Table 3.3. The second last row of Table 3.3 contains the capital
control inflows effects on the set of outcomes. We find that the use of controls on inflows
increased private credit by 3.67 percentage points, increased (depreciated) the exchange
rate by 19.9 percentage points, and increased cross-border deposits by 18.1 percentage
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points. The effect in the regression on the exchange rate is unique due to the negative sign.
The coefficient on the intervention indicator is similar in magnitude to the previous results
on the exchange rate and is in the expected direction of a control on capital inflows.
Table 3.3: Difference in Differences
Dependent Variable:
Log Exchange Rate
Interest Rate
Bank Return on Equity
Log GDP
Inflation
Natural Resources
Inflows Controls

Inflows Controls
CBL
Credit
RER
-0.388
-19.72*
(0.237)
(9.606)
0.0142**
0.537** -0.000319
(0.00524)
(0.244)
(0.00203)
-0.00503*** -0.193* -0.000147
(0.00136) (0.0981) (0.000632)
1.295***
-0.413***
(0.234)
(0.0452)
-0.00656** -0.232* 0.00215***
(0.00245)
(0.114) (0.000592)
0.0113
0.454*
0.00264
(0.0108)
(0.247)
(0.00224)
-0.118
3.673*
0.199***
(0.402)
(1.873)
(0.0443)

CBD
-0.438**
(0.167)
0.00210
(0.00627)
-0.00362**
(0.00150)
0.652***
(0.148)
-0.00485*
(0.00271)
0.0185
(0.0115)
0.181***
(0.0602)

Outflows Controls
Country Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
Countries
Within R2

Yes
Yes
489
25
0.782

Yes
Yes
479
25
0.287

Yes
Yes
489
25
0.774

Yes
Yes
489
25
0.782

CBL
-0.163
(0.195)
0.00974
(0.00835)
-0.00412***
(0.00135)
1.390***
(0.262)
0.0000910
(0.000484)
-0.00378
(0.0114)

0.0849
(0.622)
Yes
Yes
650
34
0.763

Outflows Controls
Credit
RER
-17.90**
(7.197)
0.169
0.00129
(0.246)
(0.00152)
-0.230**
0.000121
(0.0987) (0.000532)
-0.417***
(0.0541)
-0.0177 0.000185*
(0.0169) (0.000103)
0.231
0.00441
(0.253)
(0.00318)

-22.94***
(4.834)
Yes
Yes
635
34
0.378

0.0119
(0.0187)
Yes
Yes
630
33
0.737

CBD
-0.215
(0.160)
-0.00527
(0.00648)
-0.00394**
(0.00154)
0.511***
(0.127)
0.000523
(0.000316)
0.00634
(0.0120)

-0.590***
(0.172)
Yes
Yes
650
34
0.736

Notes: CBL: Cross-border Loans; RER: Real Exchange Rate; CBD: Cross-border Deposits. Standard
errors in parentheses: *10%, **5%, ***1%.

The final row of Table 3.3 contains the capital control outflows effects on the set of
outcomes. The use of controls on outflows decreased private credit by 22.94 percentage
points and decreased cross-border deposits by 59 percentage points. These effects are
almost twice the treatment effects for Egypt as estimated by the synthetic control method,
however are in the same direction. The results of the difference-in-difference analysis as
they relate to Egypt and Nigeria corroborate the mixed effectiveness for financial stability
objectives and the observation that the scope of the capital control policy matters.
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Identifying Assumptions A key identifying assumption of the synthetic control method
is independence conditional on past outcomes. This means that countries with similar
outcomes in the pre-intervention period are expected to have similar potential interventionfree outcomes in the post-intervention period, conditional on the observed covariates.
The identifying assumption of difference-in-difference is parallel trends. Under this
assumption, a potential outcome is independent of intervention assignment, conditional
on observed covariates and fixed effects.
We follow O’Neill et al. (2016) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) in the assessment of
the strength of these identifying assumptions. To assess the strength of the parallel trends
assumption, we estimate the following modified version of the difference-in-difference
estimand on the pre-intervention observations:

Yit = Xit β + λµi + δt + +φt δt Dit + αDit + ϵit .

(3.4)

O’Neill et al. (2016) show that if the parallel trends assumption holds, the coefficient
φt on the interaction term between the year fixed effects and the intervention indicator
will be zero. After executing the test for every pre-intervention year, should we find that
parallel trends holds pre-intervention, then we have additional confidence that parallel
trends holds post-intervention.
O’Neill et al. (2016) suggest a lagged dependent variable model to test the independence
conditional on past outcomes assumption using the last pre-intervention period:

Yit = Xit β +

TX
0 −1

φj Yij + αDit + ϵit .

(3.5)

j=1

If the independence conditional on past outcomes assumption holds, the coefficient α
on the treated dummy Dit will be zero in the last pre-intervention period. Our method of
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empirically testing the identifying assumption is the same here: should we find evidence
that the assumption holds pre-intervention, then we can safely assume that it continues to
hold post-intervention. If instead we find that the identifying assumption does not hold in
the pre-intervention period, then we have substantive evidence that the assumption does
not hold generally.
Table 3.4: Identifying Assumptions

Outcome
CBL
Credit
RER
CBD
Russia
CBL
DC
EX
CBD
Kenya
CBL
DC
EX
CBD
Nigeria
CBL
DC
EX
CBD

Egypt

Parallel Trends Independence/Past Outcomes
p-value Result p-value
Result
0.0000 Reject
0.107
Fail to Reject
0.0000 Reject
0.059
Reject
0.0000 Reject
0.147
Fail to Reject
0.0000 Reject
0.856
Fail to Reject
0.0000 Reject
0.373
Fail to Reject
0.0144 Reject
0.584
Fail to Reject
0.0000 Reject
0.274
Fail to Reject
0.0000 Reject
0.095
Reject
0.0000 Reject
0.471
Fail to Reject
0.0003 Reject
0.721
Fail to Reject
0.0000 Reject
0.0737 Reject
0.323
Fail to Reject
0.0000 Reject
0.062
Reject
0.0260 Reject
0.824
Fail to Reject
0.0000 Reject
0.824
Fail to Reject
0.0000 Reject
0.824
Fail to Reject

We present the results of these tests in Table 3.4. The first two columns contain the
results of the test of the parallel trends assumption. We report the p-values from an F-test
of the joint significance of the φt coefficients across all years. The null hypothesis that
the φt coefficients in Equation 3.4 are zero is rejected for all outcomes and all countries.
This means that the parallel trends assumption does not hold pre-intervention, so the
assumption does not hold generally.
The second two columns contain the results of the tests on the assumption of independence conditional on past outcomes. The p-values from a t-test of the significance of the α
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coefficient on the intervention dummy in Equation 3.5 in the last pre-intervention period
are reported. In all but three cases, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that this coefficient
is different from zero. In other words, the identifying assumption of the synthetic control
method holds, generally.
Synthetic Difference in Difference Arkhangelsky et al. (2019) introduce the synthetic difference in difference (SDID) method which is one of the same family of quasi-experimental
estimators but it includes both unit-specific weights and time-specific weights. The synthetic control (SC) method can be viewied as a weighted least squares regression estimator
with time fixed effects and unit weights. On the other hand, the difference-in-difference
(DID) approach is a two-way least squares regression estimator with equal time and unit
weights. Consider the simplest case of a balanced panel with N units and T time periods,
where outcomes are denoted by Yit , and exposure to the binary treatment is denoted by
Dit ∈ {0, 1}, where Dit = 0 denotes that no intervention at time t for unit i and Dit = 1
denotes that there is a intervention at time t for unit i. Initially suppose that Dit = 0 except
for (i, t) = (N , T ), so that only unit N is treated, and only in period T . Suppose also that
there are no covariates. The weighted least squares regression estimator ᾱ can be written
as16

j

ᾱ j = YN T − ŶN T (0),

where j = DID, SC, SDID

We have shown that the pre-trend assumption is not held across all our four countries
with four outcome variables. To check whether our results are driven by the trend, we
implement the synthetic difference-in-difference approach in Arkhangelsky et al. (2019)
to assure robustness of our results. Specifically, instead of imposing parallel trend assumption, we assume that there exist unit and time weights such that the averaged treated unit
16 See

Appendix 3.6.3 for detailed explanation
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and the weighted average of the control units satisfy a parallel trends assumption for the
averaged post-treatment period and the weighted average of the pre-treatment periods. In
other words, we impose the assumption that, on average, the trends form pre-treatment
periods to post-treatment period of treated unit and control units are parallel. For clarity,
we use only outcome variables to construct the synthetic counterfactual and the synthetic
difference in difference counterfactual to see whether the results are truly driven by the
trend or treatment effect. The synthetic difference-in-difference results have been plotted
in Figures 3.17–3.20. The solid line represents the average pre- and post-intervention
levels. The dash line indicates the average pre- and post-intervention levels in synthetic
control method. The dot line shows the average pre- and post-intervention levels in
synthetic difference-in-difference approach.
Observe in Figure 3.17 that the synthetic control method overlaps with synthetic difference in difference private credit and real exchange rate. These results demonstrate
that these two outcome variables are not driven by country-specific trends. The average
treatment effect of releasing capital outflow controls on private credit is 7.6% higher
than the counterfactual and on the real exchange rate is 28.57% lower than the counterfactual. In the cross-border lending case, the average treatment effect in the synthetic
control method is 61.85% higher than the counterfactual; however, after balancing out
the average parallel trend, we find that the average treatment effect is 34.46% higher
than the counterfactual. The effect is still significant when we control for the parallel
trend. For cross-border deposits, comparing a 121.36% average treatment effect using
the synthetic control method with a 45.38% average treatment effect using the synthetic
difference-in-difference approach, we still find a significant effect on capital outflow after
releasing outflow control. The results from cross-border lending and deposits, which are
measurements of capital inflows and outflows, shows that, without controlling for average
parallel trend, we would have picked up a country-specific trend effect in our analysis. We
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Figure 3.17: Russia: SDID vs. SCM
(a) Cross-border Lending

(b) Private Credit

(c) Real Exchange Rate

(d) Cross-border Deposit

see these results are promising for external validity, which illustrates generally the effect
of removal of capital outflow controls. The results shown in this section should be viewed
as complement to our main results.
Figure 3.18 shows the comparison between synthetic control and the synthetic difference in difference for the Egypt case. It is clear that the results of cross-border lending
are not driven by the parallel trend and the average treatment effect is 46.34% lower than
synthetic counterfactual. The private credit adjusts around 3% down after controlling the
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Figure 3.18: Egypt: SDID vs. SCM
(a) Cross-border Lending

(b) Private Credit

(c) Real Exchange Rate

(d) Cross-border Deposit

average parallel trend, 30% in synthetic control method and 27% in synthetic difference in
difference approach, the result still remains a significant effect after imposition of capital
outflow control. After adjusting the bias from the trend, the real exchange rate remains
significant. If anything, the effect is even larger with synthetic difference in difference,
9.46% lower, compared with synthetic control, 7.15% lower. In the cross-border deposit
case, there is a small adjustment of approximately 3% for the parallel trend, and the result
remains significant at 50% lower than the counterfactual.

CHAPTER 3. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CAPITAL CONTROLS

160

Figure 3.19: Kenya: SDID vs. SCM
(a) Cross-border Lending

(b) Private Credit

(c) Real Exchange Rate

(d) Cross-border Deposit

Figure 3.19 shows the Kenya case for the four outcome variables. The bias-adjustment
for the average treatment effect is from 35.28% to 19.15% lower in cross-border lending,
from 14.7% to 11.64% lower in private credit, and from 31.48% to 35.3% lower in the real
exchange rate. The average treatment effect for cross-border lending becomes effectively
zero after controlling the parallel trend. We conclude that the effect of removing capital
inflow controls on the real exchange rate is significantly similar to the main results;
however, the effect on cross-border deposit is driven by the parallel trend.
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Figure 3.20: Nigeria: SDID vs. SCM
(a) Cross-border Lending

(b) Private Credit

(c) Real Exchange Rate

(d) Cross-border Deposit

The more interesting case in Nigeria is shown in Figure 3.20. We cannot identify the
effect of imposing capital inflow controls on cross-border lending in Section IV before.
However, after adjusting bias, the average treatment effect in cross-border lending is
24.56% higher than the counterfactual Nigerian cross border lending series which would
be observed had the capital inflow controls not been imposed. We fail to identify the effect
on private credit and real exchange rate in this case, the parallel trend reverses the sign
of effect after we adjust the bias. We are not surprised by the results since the synthetic
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counterfactuals are imperfect fits in both cases. However, we correctly identify the sign
and magnitude of the average treatment effect on cross-border deposits is 47.7% higher
than the synthetic counterfactual.
Our implementation of the Arkhangelsky et al. (2019) synthetic difference-in-difference
method, using a two-way weighted least squares regression estimator with time and unit
weights, confirmed our main results successfully. After we adjust the parallel trend bias,
our main results still strongly hold across all countries and all outcome variables. To our
best knowledge, our research is the first paper using the synthetic difference in difference
approach to analyze macroeconomic variables.

3.5

Conclusion

The effectiveness of capital controls is a subject where many questions remain. We add new
evidence on the effectiveness of capital controls with respect to commonly cited financial
stability and capital flows management measures. The evidence that we describe here is
important for two reasons. First, we study specific statutory measures in Russia, Egypt,
Kenya, and Nigeria which have not been previously evaluated. Second, we model the
effects of these measures using the synthetic control method, solving the endogeneity
problem between the decision to make these statutory measures and the outcome variables
of interest.
The new evidence suggests that capital controls are not consistent in reaching conventional financial stability objectives. The removal of controls on capital outflows in Russia
led to higher cross-border lending and the imposition of the same controls in Egypt as
predicted. The outflows measures in Russia and Egypt led to the changes in cross-border
lending that we would expect. However, the outflows measures in Russia did not decrease
private credit, nor did the inflows measures in Nigeria. This result can be understood
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within the framework of Magud et al. (2018), where we see that the response to a capital
control does not need to be negative. These responses may also be understood through the
scope at which the controls were imposed. In Nigeria, a very narrow control on short-term
capital inflows was imposed. We find evidence that suggests that this led to substitution
among short-term instruments, increasing the supply of credit to the domestic market.
Our takeaway from this is that scope matters.
The evidence also shows that capital controls are consistent in reaching capital flows
management objectives. The removal of controls from capital outflows in Russia and from
capital inflows in Kenya led to higher cross-border deposits to BIS reporting banks. The
imposition of outflows controls in Egypt led to lower cross-border deposits and a lower
real exchange rate. This is new evidence that a control on capital outflows can limit the
level of outflows and is able to stem upward exchange rate pressure.
The principle caveat with this research is that we have evaluated the effects of these
capital controls on financial stability and capital flows management during relatively
normal times. None of these countries faced the kind of financial crisis discussed in the
literature as an important motive for capital controls. If these economies did face such a
crisis, we would not be able to model their outcomes using the synthetic control method
because the country in crisis would be very different from the donor pool countries and
we could not estimate a credible synthetic control.
Future research would make an important contribution to the literature by modeling
the statutory measures studied here using a small open economy. Researchers might
simulate the effectiveness of the capital controls in the face of capital surges or capital
flight. Other future research may consider the increased cost of capital for firms that
results from the use of capital controls. How does this trade-off with the increased output
that results from better economic resilience? Additional evidence on the effects of capital
controls at the firm level would both help the policymakers to make informed decisions.
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Appendix
Tables
Table 3.5: Country List

Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Canada
Chile
China

Czech Rep.
Denmark
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Hong Kong
Hungary

Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Korea, Rep.
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Rep.
Latvia
Lebanon
Malaysia
Malta
Mauritius
Mexico

New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russia
Saudi Arabia

Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
U.A.E.
U.K.
U.S.A.
Uruguay
Uzbekistan

Private Credit

Natural Resource Rents

Merchandise Trade

Interest Rate

Inflation

Exchange Rate
Gross Domestic Product

Domestic Saving

Current Account Exports

Cross Border Positions

Bank Return on Equity

Variable Name
Total Commercial banks’ after-tax net income to yearly averaged equity. Source: World Bank’s Global
Financial Development Database.
Loans are defined as those financial assets created through the lending of funds that are not represented
by negotiable securities. Thus, loans include interbank borrowings and loans and inter-office balances.
Data also comprise foreign trade-related credits that are included by almost all reporting countries,
with the country of residence of the drawee of the trade bill generally being the guiding principle for
the geographical allocation of the claims arising from suppliers’ credit. Credits and international loans
received and granted and deposits received and made on a trust basis are also included. Sale and repurchase
transactions (repos) involving the sale of assets (e.g., securities and gold) with a commitment to repurchase
the same or similar assets, financial leases, promissory notes, nonnegotiable debt securities, endorsement
liabilities arising from bills rediscounted abroad and subordinated loans (including subordinated nonnegotiable debt securities) are also reported in this category. Source: Bank for International Settlements.
Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the
rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties,
license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business,
personal, and government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment income
(formerly called factor services) and transfer payments. Data are in constant local currency. Source: World
Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less final consumption expenditure (total consumption).
Source: World Bank and OECD National Accounts.
US dollar exchange rates. End of period Source: Bank for International Settlements.
GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions
for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in
constant local currency. Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data
files.
Growth rate of Consumer price index reflects changes in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring
a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at yearly. Source: Bank for International
Settlements.
Deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or savings deposits.
The terms and conditions attached to these rates differ by country, however, limiting their comparability.
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and Central Bank.
A share of GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by the value of GDP, all in current
U.S. dollars. Source: World Trade Organization.
Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral
rents, and forest rents. Source: Estimates based on sources and methods described in Jarvis et al. (2011).
The financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of GDP. Domestic
money banks comprise commercial banks and other financial institutions that accept transferable deposits,
such as demand deposits. Source: World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database.

Definition and Source

Table 3.6: Variable Definitions and Sources
CHAPTER 3. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CAPITAL CONTROLS
165

CHAPTER 3. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CAPITAL CONTROLS

166

Table 3.7: Donor Pool

Angola
Bangladesh
Burkina Faso
China
Colombia
Czech Republic

Austria
Guatemala
Morocco
Spain
Costa Rica
Kuwait
Panama
Zambia

Angola
India
Sri Lanka
Venezuela
Yemen

Australia
Belgium
Brunei
Canada
Hungary

India
Italy
Jamaica
Kazakhstan
Malaysia
Mauritius

Russia
Mexico
Moldova
Morocco
Norway
Pakistan
Philippines

Poland
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo

Tunisia
Uzbekistan
Vietnam

Egypt
Germany
Lebanon
Portugal
Belgium
Mauritius
Qatar
Brunei Darussalam
Ireland
Romania
Bulgaria
Israel
Netherlands
Canada
Italy
New Zealand
Sweden
Japan
Nicaragua
Togo
Denmark
Norway
Uganda
France
Latvia
United Kingdom United States
Uruguay
Yemen

Cóte d’Ivoire
Philippines
Uzbekistan
Colombia

Kenya
Norway
Ukraine
China
Morocco

El Salvador
France
Georgia
Germany
Latvia

Nigeria
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
United States

Tunisia
Bangladesh
Mauritius
Thailand

Argentina
Italy
Tanzania
Vietnam

Netherlands
Norway
Panama
Uganda

Uruguay
Yemen
Zambia
Denmark
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Table 3.8: Russia
Cross Border Lending
Treated Control
Log Exchange Rate
2.950
2.316
Bank Return on Equity
16.23
8.220
Predictor Balance
Natural Resource Rents
14.93
4.135
Log Gross Domestic Product 26.72
27.34
China
.679
Italy
.112
Kazakhstan
.117
Country Weights
Thailand
.093

Treatment Effect
RMSPE
p-value

19.38%
.0398
.08

Foreign Exchange Rate
Treated
Bank Return on Equity
16.23
Natural Resources Rents
14.93
Merchandise Trade
48.88
Predictor Balance
Interest Rate
12.29
Log Gross Domestic Product 26.72

Country Weights

Treatment Effect
RMSPE
p-value

Angola
Burkina Faso
Malaysia
South Africa
-14.22%
.1301
.6190

Control
17.59
21.27
104.04
18.661
23.91

.347
.224
.313
.116

Private Credit
Treated Control
Merchandise Trade
48.88
81.22
Log Exchange Rate
2.950
3.552
Interest Rate
12.29
14.20
Natural Resource Rents
14.93
4.952
Burkina Faso
.204
Kazakhstan
.171
Mauritius
.011
Moldova
.587
Morocco
.001
Norway
.02
Thailand
.006
6.325%
.6592
.1667
Cross Border Lending
Treated Control
Log Exchange Rate
2.950
1.659
Bank Return on Equity
16.23
12.88
Merchandise Trade
48.88
49.19
Interest Rate
12.29
4.730
Log Gross Domestic Product 26.72
26.36
Natural Resources Rents
14.93
6.825
Italy
.188
Kazakhstan
.021
Norway
.791
.93%
.1990
.6000
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Table 3.9: Egypt
Cross Border Lending
Treated Control
Log Exchange Rate
1.466
1.646
Interest Rate
8.541
9.128
Bank Return on Equity
13.95
11.33
Predictor Balance
Log Gross Domestic Product 25.19
24.82
Inflation
6.361
6.320
Natural Resource Rents
8.187
6.184
Brunei Darussalam
.041
Ireland
.210
Israel
.479
Country Weights
Latvia
.046
Uruguay
.062
Yemen
.163
Treatment Effect
-29.04%
RMSPE
.0658
p-value
.2424
Foreign Exchange Rate
Treated
Private Credit by Banks
49.51
Bank Return on Assets
11.12
Inflation
6.162
Predictor Balance
Interest Rate
8.084
Log Gross Domestic Product 25.28

Panama
Uruguay

.392
.607

Country Weights

Treatment Effect
RMSPE
p-value

Control
55.69
3.69
5.161
13.14
23.53

-8.71%
.0609
.7188

Private Credit
Treated
Bank Return on Equity
11.12
Log Exchange Rate
1.575
Interest Rate
8.084
Inflation
6.162

Brunei Darussalam
Germany
Norway
Uruguay
Yemen

Control
10.52
2.585
8.068
6.668

.127
.328
.075
.016
.454

-13.49%
1.110
.1613
Cross Border Lending
Treated Control
Log Exchange Rate
1.466
2.608
Merchandise Trade
27.55
75.06
Private Credit from Banks
46.44
66.46
Log Gross Domestic Product 25.19
25.40
Interest Rate
8.541
3.641
Natural Resources Rents
8.187
4.859
Inflation
6.361
4.859
Belgium
.244
Brunei Darussalam
.065
Japan
.228
Morocco
.248
Qatar
.077
Togo
.137
-30.51%
.0548
.1515
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Table 3.10: Kenya
Cross Border Lending
Treated Control
Log Exchange Rate
4.232
5.408
Current Account Exports
-.2789
-.0622
Predictor Balance
Domestic Saving
8.928
17.85
Interest Rate
9.025
11.08
Log Gross Domestic Product 23.37
24.18
Bangladesh
.248
Colombia
.197
Ghana
.468
Country Weights
Tanzania
.166
Thailand
.095
Yemen
.295
Treatment Effect
-29.04%
RMSPE
.0658
p-value
.2424
Foreign Exchange Rate
Treated
Bank Return on Equity
18.17
Domestic Saving
8.928
Interest Rate
9.025
Predictor Balance
Merchandise Trade
40.94
Log Gross Domestic Product 23.42

Country Weights

Treatment Effect
RMSPE
p-value

Angola
Italy
Philippines
Ukraine
Yemen

Control
16.59
22.19
20.74
80.69
23.88

.294
.044
.141
.165
.357
19.90%
.0391
.25

Private Credit
Treated Control
Domestic Saving
8.928
20.29
Bank Return on Equity
18.17
12.19
Interest Rate
9.025
11.46
Log Exchange Rate
4.258
4.141
Inflation
10.44
8.698
China
.091
Italy
.022
Morocco
.064
Philippines
.119
Tunisia
.046
Yemen
.658
-13.49%
1.110
.1613
Cross Border Lending
Treated Control
Bank Return on Equity
18.17
12.32
Inflation
10.44
9.446
Log Exchange Rate
4.232
2.143
Domestic Saving
8.928
19.79
Interest Rate
9.025
8.867
Log Gross Domestic Product 23.38
23.87
Angola
.002
Italy
.02
Tanzania
.072
Tunisia
.537
Yemen
.309
20.57%
.0471
.1667
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Table 3.11: Nigeria
Cross Border Lending
Treated Control
Merchandise Trade
60.51
87.17
Bank Return on Equity
17.51
10.05
Predictor Balance
Log Exchange Rate
4.661
1.659
Interest Rate
12.52
14.99
Log Gross Domestic Product 24.65
23.91
Belgium
.279
Hungary
.144
Country Weights
Zambia
.502
Yemen
.075
Treatment Effect
4.610%
RMSPE
.0997
p-value
.5000

Private Credit
Treated Control
Inflation
17.84
9.528
Log Gross Domestic Product 24.82
23.166
Log Exchange Rate
4.754
4.6682
Interest Rate
13.55
13.36
Natural Resource Rents
28.96
29.08
Panama
.083
Uruguay
.022
Yemen
.895

Foreign Exchange Rate
Treated Control
Bank Return on Assets
17.15
25.88
Merchandise Trade
60.51
62.58
Private Credit by Banks
12.08
10.06
Predictor Balance
Interest Rate
12.52
12.89
Log Gross Domestic Product 24.65
23.24
Inflation
15.29
9.348
Hungary
.200
Uganda
.277
Yemen
.523
Country Weights

Cross Border Lending
Treated
Log Exchange Rate
4.661
Merchandise Trade
60.51
Inflation
15.29
Interest Rate
12.52
Log Gross Domestic Product 24.65

Treatment Effect
RMSPE
p-value

-13.36%
.0771
.5833

15.52%
.8561
.0526

Australia
Latvia
Norway
Panama
Zambia
Yemen

Control
1.419
49.58
8.591
10.55
24.14

.152
.082
.233
.171
.235
.128
35.84%
.0807
.2083
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Estimation

The capital control outcomes are observed for up to 21 periods—from 1995 to 2015—in
both the country undertaking the change in capital controls (Y0t ) and in the countries
where no change in capital controls is taking place (Yit , i = 1, . . . , N ). We define the (T0 × 1)
PT0
vector K = (k1 , . . . , kT0 )′ as a linear combination of pre-treatment outcomes: ȲiK = s=1
ks Yis .
Assume that M such linear combinations are defined by the vectors K1 , . . . , KM . Further,
K

K

define the (k × 1) vector of pre-treatment characteristics as X0 = (Z0′ , Ȳ0 1 , . . . , Ȳ0 M )′ for
the country that undertakes the change in capital controls, where k = r + M. The k × N
matrix X1 contains the same information for the countries that do not undertake changes
K

KM ′
).

in capital controls. The ith column of matrix X1 is given by (Zi′ , Ȳi 1 , . . . , Ȳi

Finally,

the vector W ∗ is chosen to minimize the distance ∥X0 − X1 W ∥ such that the weights are
positive and sum to one. The distance is minimized using Equation
p
∥X0 − X1 W ∥V = (X0 − X1 W )′ V (X0 − X1 W ),

(3.6)

where V is a (k × k) symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix. Optimal choice of V
is important for minimizing the mean square prediction error of the synthetic control
estimator. We use the Synth package available for Stata to choose V such that the mean
square prediction error is minimized.
We use the optimal weights to construct a counterfactual country that gives an estimate
of the outcome variables had the capital control intervention not occurred using data
based on the donor pool countries i ∈ {1, . . . , N }. To assess the sensitivity of the results, we
follow Firpo and Possebom (2018) and Abadie et al. (2010) in the calculation of p-values
and Doudchenko and Imbens (2016) in the calculation of variance to estimate confidence
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intervals. The p-value is calculated as:
PN
p=

i=1 I {RMSP Ei

≥ RMSP E0 }

N

,

(3.7)

where I {Q} is the indicator function of event Q and RMSP E represents the ratio of postto pre-root mean squared prediction error. RMSP E is calculated as
q
PT
RMSP Ei =


2
Yit − Ŷit / (T − T0 )
.
q
2
PT0 
t=1 Yit − Ŷit / (T0 )
t=T0 +1

(3.8)

This version of the p-value helps describe whether our results could be driven by chance
or truly represent a statistically significant event.

3.6.3

Synthetic Difference-in-Difference

We can see the difference-in-difference estimator Equation 3.9 as doubly bias-adjusting
the simple average Ȳ c, pre with the first adjustment, Ȳ t,pre − Ȳ c,pre , taking into account
the stable difference between the treated unit and the control units with the second bias
adjustment, Ȳ c,post − Ȳ c,pre , taking into account stable differences over time for the control
group.

ŶNDID
T (0) = Y

c,pre

 t,pre
c,pre   c,post
c,pre 
+ Y
−Y
+ Y
−Y

(3.9)

The main weakness of this basic difference-in-difference estimator is that this estimator
is only valid under a well-specified two-way fixed effects model. The advantage of the
synthetic control approach is the re-weighting of the control rows i = 1, ..., N − 1 of the
matrix Y with weights ω̂iSC so as to make the time trends among the weighted controls
and the treated unit track each other. The second term in the right-hand side of Equation
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3.10 shows that the bias adjustment uses a weighted average of the post-treatment control
outcomes with weights ω̂iSC minus a doubly-weighted average of the pre-treatment control
outcomes.


T −1
N
−1
N
−1 X
T −1
X
X
X


1
1

ω̂isc YiT −
ω̂isc Yit +
ŶNscT (0) =
Yit 
T −1
T −1
i=1 t=1

(3.10)

t=1

i=1

If the weights ω̂iSC were to balance the pre-treatment periods perfectly, we do not
need to adjust it by the second term in the difference-in-difference approach, which is the
pretrend assumption. However, the lack of this second bias-correction term may affect
the properties of the synthetic control estimator when the weights ω̂iSC fail to balance
the pre-treatment periods perfectly. Therefore, Arkhangelsky et al. (2019) propose the
synthetic difference-in-difference estimator as an alternative method that addresses this
issue. The synthetic difference-in-difference estimator can be thought of as adding an
additional bias-adjusting term into the synthetic control estimator based on the pretreatment discrepancies. The second bias-adjusting term is the second term. The synthetic
difference-in-difference approach can be seen as adding unit and time weights to the
difference-in-difference approach or adding time weights and unit fixed effects to the
synthetic control approach.

ŶNsdid
T (0) =

N
−1 X
T −1
X
i=1 t=1

ω̂isc λ̂sc
t Yit +

T −1
X
t=1


 N −1


T −1
N
−1
X
X



 X
Y −

λ̂sc
ω̂isc Yit  +
ω̂isc YiT −
λ̂sc

 N t
t Yit 
t 
i=1

i=1

t=1

Bibliography
Abadie, A. (2019). Using synthetic controls: Feasibility, data requirements, and methodological aspects. Journal of Economic Literature.
Abadie, A., Diamond, A., and Hainmueller, J. (2010). Synthetic Control Methods for
Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control
Program. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 105(490):493–505.
Abadie, A., Diamond, A., and Hainmueller, J. (2015a). Comparative politics and the
synthetic control method. American Journal of Political Science, 59(2):495–510.
Abadie, A., Diamond, A., and Hainmueller, J. (2015b). Comparative politics and the
synthetic control method. American Journal of Political Science, 59:495–510.
Abadie, A. and Gardeazabal, J. (2003). The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of
the Basque Country. American Economic Review, 93(1):113–132.
Acharya, V. V. and Krishnamurthy, A. (2018). Capital Flow Management with Multiple
Instruments. NBER Working Paper Series, (24443).
Ackerberg, D. A., Caves, K., and Frazer, G. (2015). Identification properties of recent
production function estimators. Econometrica, 83(6):2411–2451.
Aghion, P., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., Howitt, P., and Prantl, S. (2009). The effects of entry
on incumbent innovation and productivity. The Review of Economics and Statistics,
91(1):20–32.
Aizenman, J., Chinn, M. D., and Ito, H. (2011). Surfing the Waves of Globalization: Asia
and Financial Globalization in the Context of the Trilemma. Journal of the Japanese
and International Economies, 25(3):290–320.
Akcigit, U. and Ates, S. T. (2019). Ten facts on declining business dynamism and lessons
from endogenous growth theory. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Alan, M. (2011). Imperfect competition in the labor market. In Handbook of labor economics,
volume 4, pages 973–1041. Elsevier.
174

BIBLIOGRAPHY

175

Alfaro, L., Chari, A., and Kanczuk, F. (2017). The Real Effects of Capital Controls:
Firm-level Evidence from a Policy Experiment. Journal of International Economics,
108(C):191–210.
Alfaro, L., Kalemli-Ozcan, S., and Volosovych, V. (2005). Capital Flows in a Globalized
World: The Role of Policies and Institutions. NBER Working Paper Series, (11696).
Ando, M. (2015). Dreams of urbanization: Quantitative case studies on the local impacts
of nuclear power facilities using the synthetic control method. Journal of Urban
Economics, 85:68–85.
Ariyoshi, A., Habermeier, K., Laurens, B., Otker-Robe, I., Canales-Kriljenko, J. I., , and
Kirilenko, A. (2000). Capital Controls: Country Experiences with Their Use and
Liberalization. IMF Occasional Paper, (190).
Arkhangelsky, D., Athey, S., Hirshberg, D. A., Imbens, G. W., and Wager, S. (2019).
Synthetic Difference In Differences. Working Paper 25532, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Arkolakis, C., Costinot, A., Donaldson, D., and Rodrı́guez-Clare, A. (2019). The elusive
pro-competitive effects of trade. The Review of Economic Studies, 86(1):46–80.
Arora, V., Habermeier, K., Ostry, J., and Weeks-Brown, R. (2013). The Liberalization
and Management of Capital Flows: An Institutional View. Revista de economia
institucional, 15(28):205–256.
Athey, S. and Imbens, G. W. (2017). The State of Applied Econometrics: Causality and
Policy Evaluation. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(2):3–32.
Au, C.-C. and Henderson, J. V. (2006). Are Chinese cities too small? The Review of Economic
Studies, 73(3):549–576.
Autor, D., Dorn, D., Katz, L., Patterson, C., and Van Reenen, J. (2017a). Dp11810 concentrating on the fall of the labor share.
Autor, D., Dorn, D., Katz, L. F., Patterson, C., Van Reenen, J., et al. (2017b). The fall of the
labor share and the rise of superstar firms. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Axtell, R. L. (2001). Zipf distribution of us firm sizes. science, 293(5536):1818–1820.
Bai, C.-E., Ma, H., and Pan, W. (2012). Spatial spillover and regional economic growth in
China. China Economic Review, 23(4):982–990.
Baldursson, F. M. and Portes, R. (2013). Capital Controls and the Resolution of Failed
Cross-border Banks: The Case of Iceland. CEPR Discussion Papers, (9706).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

176

Baqaee, D. R. and Farhi, E. (2017). Productivity and misallocation in general equilibrium.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Barone, G., David, F., and De Blasio, G. (2016). Boulevard of broken dreams. the end of
EU funding (1997: Abruzzi, italy). Regional Science and Urban Economics, 60:31–38.
Barth, E., Bryson, A., Davis, J. C., and Freeman, R. (2016). It’s where you work: Increases
in the dispersion of earnings across establishments and individuals in the united
states. Journal of Labor Economics, 34(S2):S67–S97.
Belkhodja, O., Mohiuddin, M., and Karuranga, E. (2017). The determinants of FDI location
choice in China: A discrete-choice analysis. Applied Economics, 49(13):1241–1254.
Benigno, G., Chen, H., Otrok, C., Rebucci, A., and Young, E. R. (2013). Financial Crises
and Macro-prudential Policies. Journal of International Economics, 89:453–470.
Benigno, G., Chen, H., Otrok, C., Rebucci, A., and Young, E. R. (2016). Optimal Capital
Controls and Real Exchange Rate Policies: A Pecuniary Externality Perspective.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 84:147–165.
Berger, D. W., Herkenhoff, K. F., and Mongey, S. (2019). Labor market power. Working
Paper 25719, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bianchi, J. (2011). Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle.
American Economic Review, 101(7):3400–3426.
Bianchi, J. and Mendoza, E. G. (2011). Overborrowing, Financial Crises and ’Macroprudential’ Policy. 2011 Meeting Papers, (175).
Billmeier, A. and Nannicini, T. (2013). Assessing economic liberalization episodes: A
synthetic control approach. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(3):983–1001.
Blonigen, B. A., Davies, R. B., Waddell, G. R., and Naughton, H. T. (2007). FDI in space:
Spatial autoregressive relationships in foreign direct investment. European Economic
Review, 51(5):1303–1325.
Bo, S. (2020). Centralization and regional development: Evidence from a political hierarchy
reform to create cities in China. Journal of Urban Economics, 115:103182.
Bo, S., Wu, Y., and Zhong, L. (2020). Flattening of government hierarchies and misuse of
public funds: Evidence from audit programs in China. Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, 179:141–151.
Bond, S., Hashemi, A., Kaplan, G., and Zoch, P. (2020). Some unpleasant markup arithmetic: Production function elasticities and their estimation from production data.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

177

Born, B., Müller, G. J., Schularick, M., and Sedlacek, P. (2017). The Costs of Economic
Nationalism: Evidence from the Brexit Experiment.
Bornstein, G. et al. (2018). Entry and profits in an aging economy: The role of consumer
inertia. Technical report, mimeo.
Brown, C. and Medoff, J. (1989). The employer size-wage effect. Journal of political Economy,
97(5):1027–1059.
Bruno, V., Shim, I., and Shin, H. S. (2017). Comparative assessment of macroprudential
policies. Journal of Financial Stability, 28(C):183–202.
Bruno, V. and Shin, H. S. (2015). Cross-border banking and global liquidity. The Review of
Economic Studies, 82:535–564.
Budnevich, C. and Le Fort, G. (1997). Capital Account Regulations and Macroeconomic
Policy: Two Latin American Experiences. Working Papers Central Bank of Chile, (06).
Burdett, K. and Mortensen, D. T. (1998). Wage differentials, employer size, and unemployment. International Economic Review, pages 257–273.
Capital Markets Authority (2007). The Capital Markets Act (Cap. 485A). Kenya Subsidiary
Legislation. Legal Notice No. 98.
Carlson, M. and Hernandez, L. (2002). Determinants and Repercussions of the Composition of Capital Inflows. International Finance Discussion Papers, (717).
Castillo, V., Garone, L. F., Maffioli, A., and Salazar, L. (2017). The causal effects of regional
industrial policies on employment: A synthetic control approach. Regional Science
and Urban Economics, 67:25–41.
Cavallo, E., Galiani, S., Noy, I., and Pantano, J. (2013). Catastrophic Natural Disasters and
Economic Growth. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(5):1549–1561.
Cerutti, E., Claessens, S., and Puy, D. (2019). Push factors and capital flows to emerging
markets: why knowing your lender matters more than fundamentals. Journal of
International Economics, 119:133–149.
Chamon, M., Garcia, M., and Souza, L. (2017). FX Interventions in Brazil: A Synthetic
Control Approach. Journal of International Economics, 108:157–168.
Chen, X. (1991). China’s city hierarchy, urban policy and spatial development in the 1980s.
Urban Studies, 28(3):341–367.
Chen, Y., Henderson, J. V., and Cai, W. (2017). Political favoritism in China’s capital
markets and its effect on city sizes. Journal of Urban Economics, 98:69–87.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

178

Chun-Chien, K. and Chih-Hai, Y. (2008). Knowledge capital and spillover on regional
economic growth: Evidence from China. China Economic Review, 19(4):594–604.
Coles, M. G. and Mortensen, D. T. (2016). Equilibrium labor turnover, firm growth, and
unemployment. Econometrica, 84(1):347–363.
Coşar, A. K., Guner, N., and Tybout, J. (2016). Firm dynamics, job turnover, and wage
distributions in an open economy. American Economic Review, 106(3):625–63.
Costinot, A., Lorenzoni, G., and Werning, I. (2014). A Theory of Capital Controls as
Dynamic Terms-of-Trade Manipulation. Journal of Political Economy, 122(1):77–128.
Coughlin, C. C., Segev, E., et al. (1999). Foreign direct investment in China: a spatial
econometric study. Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Davis, J. C. and Henderson, J. V. (2003). Evidence on the political economy of the urbanization process. Journal of Urban Economics, 53(1):98–125.
Davis, S. J., Haltiwanger, J., Jarmin, R., Miranda, J., Foote, C., and Nagypal, E. (2006).
Volatility and dispersion in business growth rates: Publicly traded versus privately
held firms [with comments and discussion]. NBER macroeconomics annual, 21:107–
179.
De Haan, J. (2007). Political institutions and economic growth reconsidered. Public Choice,
131(3-4):281–292.
De Loecker, J. and Eeckhout, J. (2018). Global market power. Technical report, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
De Loecker, J., Eeckhout, J., and Unger, G. (2020). The rise of market power and the
macroeconomic implications. The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
De Loecker, J. and Warzynski, F. (2012). Markups and firm-level export status. American
economic review, 102(6):2437–71.
Decker, R. A., Haltiwanger, J., Jarmin, R. S., and Miranda, J. (2016). Where has all the
skewness gone? the decline in high-growth (young) firms in the us. European
Economic Review, 86:4–23.
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